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Abstract 
  
 Adaptive control processes underlie our ability to flexibly guide behavior in 
pursuit of our current goals. An important aspect of adaptive control is monitoring for 
signs of poor performance (e.g., interference or errors) which may indicate that increased 
control is needed. Current models of control posit that when poor performance is 
detected, control mechanisms enhance the representation of the current task in working 
memory. While these control mechanisms are largely understood in terms of their effects 
on task performance, it is unclear how they influence task selection in multitasking 
environments. Detecting poor performance in the current task may provide an important 
signal that more resources should be dedicated to the task at hand, rather than switching 
to a different task.  
 We predicted that 1) resolving interference during task selection would recruit 
control to improve subsequent performance; 2) detecting interference or errors during 
task performance would lead to an enhancement of the current task which would bias 
subsequent task choices; and 3) the amount of resources dedicated to processing a task 
would predict whether participants would repeat or switch tasks on the next trial. 
Findings from Chapters 2 and 3 supported the first prediction: when conflict during task 
selection was successfully resolved, subsequent task performance was improved relative 
to when there was no conflict or when the conflict was not resolved. The findings of 
Chapter 3 also demonstrate that there are robust bottom-up biases on task choice, and that 
overcoming these biases relies on the recruitment of control. The second prediction was 
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supported in Chapter 4, we found that while both response conflict interference and errors 
were associated with a bias to repeat tasks on the next trial, only response conflict 
appeared to be resolved by control. Finally, in Chapter 5, we found that the strength of a 
task’s representation, as measured by the P3 component, predicted whether participants 
would repeat or switch on the next trial. In line with previous studies, repeating tasks 
(versus switching tasks) was associated with a stronger task representation on the 
previous trial. Together, these studies demonstrate the importance of adaptive control in 
mediating task selection.  
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Chapter 1   
General Introduction 
 
In multitasking environments we must rely on cognitive control to stay on the task 
at hand. When information in our environment affords multiple tasks, we must select 
only the information relevant for our current goals, while minimizing interference from 
information that might lead us astray (Kiesel, et al., 2010). The need for control can be 
readily seen in everyday multitasking situations such as driving. Only some traffic lights 
and signs are relevant for our current route, so it is important to have a mechanism for 
selecting the relevant information, while suppressing the influence of irrelevant 
information. Furthermore, we need to balance the task of driving with other, sometimes 
relevant tasks, such as changing the music, looking at the GPS for directions, or talking to 
a passenger. It is important to be able to know when the task of driving requires more or 
less of our attention, and adjust accordingly. 
Cognitive or executive control refers to a set of processes that are thought to guide 
behavior in the pursuit of goals (Miller & Cohen, 2001; Norman & Shallice, 1986). 
Constituent processes include attention, inhibition, memory, and planning/ decision 
making. Cognitive control is thought to bias attention towards task relevant stimuli in the 
environment (Desimone & Duncan, 1995; Egner & Hirsch, 2005), and inhibit processing 
of task irrelevant stimuli and/ or responses (Aron, Robbins, & Poldrack, 2004). Task 
goals and rules are thought to be held in working memory and are updated when the task 
changes, or when behavior no longer meets the current goals (Cohen & Servan-Schreiber, 
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1992). Furthermore, cognitive control is thought to guide the planning of future actions 
(Norman & Shallice, 1986). 
While control is important for focusing on the current task, it is important that 
control be adaptive and flexible. The appropriateness of a given action may change or 
demands for control may fluctuate, so the allocation of control must be adapted  
accordingly. Control processes are resource intensive, drawing from a limited pool of 
shared resources (Kahneman, 1973); furthermore, control processes are not always 
required. The latter is clear in the task of driving; when we are travelling on a route that 
we are very familiar with, the task of driving can be accomplished quite easily, and 
somewhat automatically. However, if we are travelling on an unfamiliar, busy highway, 
we may need all the control that we can muster, and may turn off the radio and not 
converse with our passenger in order to avoid distraction. 
In an attempt to explain how control is adjusted in response to current demands, 
the conflict monitoring model was developed (Botvinick, Braver, Barch, Carter, & 
Cohen, 2001). The conflict monitoring model posits that the current demands for control 
can be represented by the amount of conflict in information processing. When conflict is 
detected, a signal is sent to control processes so that additional resources can be recruited. 
Specifically, Botvinick and colleagues (2001) posited that a region of the brain known as 
the anterior cingulate cortex (ACC) detects the presence of response conflict, and then 
signals control regions of the brain, such as the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC), 
to enhance the representation of the current task in working memory.  
This conflict-driven recruitment of control has been shown to carry-over to the 
next trial, in what is called the conflict adaptation (Mayr, Awh, & Laurey, 2003) or 
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Gratton (Gratton, Coles, & Donchin, 1992) effect. This effect describes a reduction of 
current trial conflict interference (i.e., incongruent RT – congruent RT) following an 
incongruent trial compared to following a congruent trial (Botvinick, et al., 2001). 
Further, the amount of ACC activity on one trial is positively associated with the size of 
the conflict adaption effect and the amount of DLPFC activity on the next trial (Kerns, 
2006; Kerns, et al., 2004). There have been some claims that conflict monitoring does not 
reflect adjustments in control, but rather reflects bottom-up priming (Hommel, Proctor, & 
Vu, 2004; Mayr, et al., 2003). However, in studies that have accounted for priming, top-
down control still—at least partially—explains the conflict adaptation effect (Notebaert 
& Verguts, 2007; Orr, Carp, & Weissman, 2011).  
Thus far, relatively few studies have examined conflict-driven control in 
multitasking. One focus of these studies has been to examine whether conflict leads to 
recruitment of control in a general sense, improving control across all task contexts, or 
only in the same task context in which the conflict occurred. While some studies have 
shown evidence for global recruitments of control following conflict (Cho, Orr, Cohen, & 
Carter, 2009; Kunde & Wühr, 2006), it has been argued that the type of tasks used in 
these studies shared relevant information (Notebaert & Verguts, 2008). When using tasks 
that do not share relevant information, control is only recruited for the task in which the 
conflict occurred (Brown, Reynolds, & Braver, 2007; Cho, et al., 2009; Notebaert & 
Verguts, 2008). Thus, when switching away from the task in which conflict occurred, 
performance is not improved (and may be worsened) on the next trial compared to when 
the task repeats (Brown, et al., 2007; Notebaert & Verguts, 2008). As a matter of fact, 
this outcome is predicted by the conflict monitoring model (Botvinick, et al., 2001); 
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conflict signals that control processes should enhance the representation of the current 
task (Botvinick, Cohen, & Carter, 2004). This suggests that conflict during multitasking 
situations may provide an important signal that one task may require more control 
resources than other tasks.  
Task switching is often used to study how control is involved in quickly shifting 
from one task to another (Monsell, 2003). In typical task switching experiments, the 
participant is either explicitly cued which of several tasks to perform, or the tasks are 
performed in a predictable pattern. The typical finding is that participants take longer to 
switch tasks than to repeat tasks, and this is referred to as the switch cost. The origin of 
these switch costs have been a matter of much debate in the task switching literature, with 
the focus on whether they stem from top-down control processes or bottom-up stimulus 
driven processes. The argument for top-down processes accounting for switch costs 
assumes that the extra time to switch tasks stems from time-consuming processes that 
actively reconfigure cognitive system for the next task (Logan & Gordon, 2001; Meiran, 
1996; Rogers & Monsell, 1995; Rubinstein, Meyer, & Evans, 2001). On a switch trial, 
task goals and rules must be retrieved from long-term memory and brought in to working 
memory (Logan & Gordon, 2001; Rubinstein, et al., 2001). Switch costs are reduced with 
increased time between task cues and target presentation, suggesting that preparing for a 
switch takes time.  
Alternatively, switch costs have been suggested to reflect passive interference 
from recently performed tasks (Allport, Styles, & Hsieh, 1994; Allport & Wylie, 2000), 
as increasing the delay between trials reduces switch costs. This suggests that 
interference from recent tasks decays passively over time. Some accounts have proposed 
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that top-down and bottom-up processes both affect switch costs; Mayr and Keele (2000) 
have suggested that when switching away from a task, active processes inhibit the task’s 
representation. The strength of this inhibition passively fades over time, so that switch 
costs reduce with increasing numbers of trials before a task is returned to. 
In an attempt to more clearly demonstrate a role of top-down control in task 
switching, Arrington and Logan (2004) developed the voluntary task switching paradigm. 
Instead of a cue instructing the task in each trial, participants voluntarily chose which 
task to perform. Participants are instructed to perform the tasks equally often, and in a 
random order. Arrington and Logan argued that “… unlike responding to an externally 
provided cue to switch tasks, which may not involve an act of control, voluntary task 
switching necessarily involves active processing” (Arrington & Logan, 2004, p. 611). 
This paradigm allows researchers to not only examine how control influences reaction 
times, but also how control influences task choices.  
 While participants may voluntarily choose the task in each trial, task choice in 
the voluntary task switching paradigm is thought to depend on a combination of a top-
down representativeness heuristic and a bottom-up availability heuristic (Arrington & 
Logan, 2005). The representativeness heuristic is thought to select tasks by comparing a 
mental record of the recently performed tasks to a representation of a random sequence 
(Arrington & Logan, 2005) or by performing a mental coin-flip in each trial (Mayr & 
Bell, 2006). The availability heuristic selects the task whose representation is the most 
active in working memory. Cognitive control is required to overcome the more automatic 
availability heuristic. The availability heuristic may bias task choice when cognitive 
control resources are not available (Arrington & Logan, 2005; Demanet, Liefooghe, 
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Verbruggen, & Vandierendonck, 2010), or simply because participants may not want to 
exert the effort to choose randomly (Botvinick, 2007; De Jong, 2000). 
The following studies examined the role of control in guiding behavior in 
multitasking situations. The first two studies examined the role of control in resolving 
conflict during task selection. The second two studies examined how the amount of 
control allocated to processing a task in one trial predicted whether participants choose to 
repeat or switch tasks in the next trial. Together these studies provide novel tests of 
existing theories of cognitive control, while also demonstrating several novel findings 
regarding the role of control in multitasking. 
The first study (Chapter 2) used functional MRI (fMRI) to demonstrate that 
different regions of the ACC were responsible for detecting the presence of response 
conflict and for resolving conflict. Participants performed a cross-modal attentional cuing 
paradigm where a cue instructed participants to identify an upcoming auditory or visual 
target. Irrelevant information presented along with the cue signaled participants to either 
the same task (auditory or visual) or the other task. The target was presented concurrently 
with an irrelevant distracter that was associated with same or the opposite response as the 
target. The results showed that a dorsal region of the ACC was involved in resolving 
conflict during task selection, while a more rostral region of the ACC was involved in 
detecting response conflict during the target. Increased activity in the dorsal region was 
associated with better task performance, and activity in this region resembled that in the 
DLPFC. These findings demonstrate that the ACC does not just detect conflict as the 
conflict monitoring model posits (Botvinick, et al., 2001), but is involved more directly in 
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cognitive control (Posner & DiGirolamo, 1998). This study was published by Cerebral 
Cortex in 2009 with Daniel Weissman. 
The second study (Chapter 3) extended the findings of the first study by 
examining whether failing to resolve cue conflict biases task choice. In the first study, 
failing to resolve the cue conflict would possibly have led to errors. However, under 
conditions of voluntary task choice, failing to resolve interference from a distracter 
associated with a given task biased task choice. In this behavioral study, participants 
either voluntarily chose which one of two possible tasks to perform, or they were 
explicitly instructed which task to perform. Irrelevant distracters presented during the cue 
were associated with a particular task. We predicted that on voluntary choice trials, 
participants would be biased to choose the task associated with the distracters. In line 
with suggestions that bottom-up biases on task-choice reflect a reduction of top-down 
control (Arrington & Logan, 2005; Arrington & Yates, 2009; Demanet, et al., 2010; Mayr 
& Bell, 2006), we predicted that succumbing to such biases would be associated with 
poorer performance. The results demonstrated a robust bottom-up bias to choose the task 
associated with the distracters, and succumbing to such biases was associated with 
increased switch costs during subsequent task performance. This study was published by 
Frontiers in Cognition in 2011 with Daniel Weissman. 
The third study (Chapter 4) aimed to provide a novel test of the conflict 
monitoring model (Botvinick, et al., 2001). Evidence that conflict is resolved by 
enhancing the representation of a given task may be explained by enhancements of 
lower-level task settings such as stimulus and response representations (Egner, 2008). If 
participants in voluntary task switching paradigms are biased to choose the task with the 
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strongest representation, then the conflict monitoring model predicts that participants 
should be biased to repeat a task following a high conflict trial than after a low conflict 
trial. To investigate this hypothesis, participants performed a voluntary task switching 
version of a numerical Stroop task. Critically, task choice cues and task targets were 
temporally separated in order to examine the effect of conflict on task choice independent 
of effects of conflict on target stimulus and response representations. In line with our 
predictions, participants chose to repeat tasks more often following trials high versus low 
in conflict. This finding provides novel support for the hypothesis that conflict is resolved 
by enhancing a task’s representation. This study was published by Psychological 
Research in 2011 with Joshua Carp and Daniel Weissman. 
The fourth study (Chapter 5) used Event-Related Potentials (ERPs) to examine if 
task choice could be predicted based on the strength of a task’s representation on the 
previous trial. In the voluntary task switching paradigm, participants are biased to choose 
the task with the strongest representation (Arrington & Logan, 2005; Mayr & Bell, 2006). 
The P3 component has previously been associated with the amount of resources or 
attention allocated to processing task stimuli (Kok, 2001; Polich, 2007), and the strength 
of a task set (Barceló, Muñoz-Céspedes, Pozo, & Rubia, 2000; Kieffaber & Hetrick, 
2005), therefore we used the P3 to track the strength of a task’s representation. In line 
with this prediction, larger P3 amplitudes were associated with repeating on the next trial 
than with switching on the next trial. This study demonstrates that ERPs can used to track 
the efficiency of mental processes that guide behavior. The manuscript for this study is in 
preparation and will soon submitted to a peer-reviewed journal.  
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Chapter 2  
Anterior cingulate cortex makes two contributions to minimizing distraction 
 
 
Abstract 
When we detect conflicting irrelevant stimuli (e.g., nearby conversations), we often 
minimize distraction by increasing attention to relevant stimuli. However, dissociating 
the neural substrates of processes that detect conflict and processes that increase attention 
has proven exceptionally difficult. Using a novel cross-modal attentional cueing task in 
humans, we observed regional specialization for these processes in the cognitive division 
of the anterior cingulate cortex (ACCcd). Activity in a dorsal subregion was associated 
with increasing attention to relevant stimuli, correlated with behavioral measures of 
orienting attention to those stimuli, and resembled activity in dorsolateral prefrontal 
regions that are also thought to bias attention toward relevant stimuli. In contrast, activity 
in a rostral subregion was associated only with detecting response conflict caused by 
irrelevant stimuli. These findings support a two-component model for minimizing 
distraction and speak to a longstanding debate over how the ACCcd contributes to 
cognitive control. 
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Introduction 
Think about the last time you spoke with a friend at a crowded party. 
Occasionally, when you detected the volume of background conversations rising, you 
probably increased attention to your friend’s voice in order to avoid becoming distracted. 
Consistent with this example, minimizing distraction is thought to depend on 
complementary brain systems that first detect the presence of distracting stimuli and then 
quickly increase attention to relevant stimuli (Botvinick, Braver, Barch, Carter, & Cohen, 
2001; Carter, et al., 1998; Kerns, 2006). Identifying these systems has attracted much 
interest recently because heightened levels of distraction are associated with adverse 
outcomes in numerous clinical syndromes, including drug addiction (Goldstein, et al., 
2007), attention deficit and hyperactivity disorder (Dickstein, Bannon, Castellanos, & 
Milham, 2006), and schizophrenia (Kerns, et al., 2005). However, because these systems 
are thought to be active at nearly the same time, dissociating them has proven to be a 
difficult and controversial enterprise.  
At the center of this controversy lies the precise contribution to cognitive control 
that is made by the so-called ‘cognitive division’ of the anterior cingulate cortex (ACCcd; 
the subscript ‘cd’ refers to ‘cognitive division’ and is used throughout the paper to 
distinguish the dorsal and rostral subregions of ACCcd that we investigate from dorsal 
and rostral regions of the ACC as a whole). Some models posit that the ACCcd increases 
attention to task-relevant stimuli (Dreher & Berman, 2002; Michael I. Posner & 
DiGirolamo, 1998; Weissman, Gopalakrishnan, Hazlett, & Woldorff, 2005). Others posit 
that the ACCcd signals the coactivation of competing responses (i.e., response conflict, 
which can be highly distracting) to the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC) which, in 
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turn, resolves conflict by increasing attention to relevant stimuli (Botvinick, et al., 2001; 
Carter, et al., 1998; Kerns, 2006). Still others posit a role for the ACCcd in response 
selection (Roelofs, van Turennout, & Coles, 2006), novelty detection (Matsumoto, 
Matsumoto, & Tanaka, 2007; Ranganath & Rainer, 2003), anticipation (Murtha, 
Chertkow, Beauregard, Dixon, & Evans, 1996), error monitoring (W. J. Gehring & 
Fencsik, 2001; William J. Gehring, Goss, Coles, & Meyer, 1993), reward assessment 
(Bush, et al., 2002), and computing error likelihood (Brown & Braver, 2005). Although 
numerous investigators have sought to determine which model best explains ACCcd 
activity (Banich, et al., 2000; Botvinick, Nystrom, Fissell, Carter, & Cohen, 1999; Kerns, 
et al., 2004; MacDonald, Cohen, Stenger, & Carter, 2000; Weissman, Warner, & 
Woldorff, 2004), the findings have been mixed and relatively little consensus has been 
reached. 
Given the heterogeneity of findings in the literature, some authors have suggested 
the existence of regional specialization in the ACCcd for distinct control processes (Bush, 
et al., 2002; Goldstein, et al., 2007; Milham & Banich, 2005). In line with the regional 
specialization hypothesis, we recently reported evidence implicating a dorsal subregion 
of the ACCcd in increasing attention to relevant stimuli and a rostral subregion in 
detecting response conflict caused by irrelevant stimuli (Weissman, et al., 2004). In our 
prior study, however, demands on processes that increase attention to relevant stimuli 
were confounded with the expected difficulty of the upcoming task, which also 
influences ACCcd activity (Brown & Braver, 2005).  
In the present study we therefore used a novel cross-modal attentional cueing task 
to investigate regional specialization in the ACCcd for processes that increase attention to 
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relevant stimuli and processes that detect response conflict (Figure 2.1). In each trial, 
participants received a visually-presented cue word (‘Look’ or ‘Hear’) that instructed 
them to attend to and identify either the visual letter or the auditory letter of a possibly 
upcoming, audiovisual target-distracter letter pair. The visually-presented cue word was 
accompanied by an irrelevant, binaurally-presented auditory word that was equally likely 
to signal the same task as the visual word (less demanding congruent cues) or a different 
task (more demanding incongruent cues). After a brief interval, an audiovisual target-
distracter letter pair was presented. The distracter letter was equally likely to be mapped 
to the same response as the target letter (less demanding congruent target-distracter pairs) 
or to a different response (more demanding incongruent target-distracter pairs). To isolate 
cue-triggered activity associated with increasing attention to relevant stimuli from target-
triggered activity associated with detecting response conflict, in cue-only trials (33%) the 
cue was not followed by a target-distracter letter pair. 
Our hypothesis predicts that dorsal and rostral subregions of the ACCcd, 
respectively, should be differentially sensitive to processes that increase attention to 
relevant stimuli and processes that detect response conflict. Processes (and brain regions) 
that increase attention to relevant stimuli should be more strongly recruited by 
incongruent than by congruent cue-only trials. Indeed, during the processing of 
incongruent cues, such processes should need to work especially hard to ensure that 
attention is oriented to the cued modality rather than to the irrelevant modality signaled 
by the distracter word. Our hypothesis therefore predicts relatively strong effects of cue 
congruency (i.e., peak activity that is greater for incongruent than for congruent cue-only 
trials) in the dorsal ACCcd. On the other hand, processes (and brain regions) that detect 
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response conflict should be more highly activated by incongruent than by congruent 
target-distracter pairs, since only incongruent target-distracter pairs engender response 
conflict. Thus, our hypothesis predicts relatively strong effects of target congruency (i.e., 
peak activity that is greater for incongruent than for congruent target-distracter pairs) in 
the rostral ACCcd.    
Method 
Participants 
Seventeen healthy participants (7 males and 10 females, age range, 19–36 years) 
took part in the study. All had normal or corrected-to-normal vision and had no history of 
serious neurological trauma or disorders. All except one were right handed. Before the 
magnetic resonance (MR) session, each participant practiced the experimental task. 
Participants were paid $20 per hour for their participation, which lasted approximately 2 
hours. Participants gave informed consent before the experiment in accordance with the 
University of Michigan Behavioral Sciences Institutional Review Board.  
Experimental Task 
An IBM-compatible PC was used to present stimuli and to record the participants’ 
responses. Visual stimuli were projected onto a screen at the back of the bore of the 
magnet that participants viewed through a mirror. Auditory stimuli were voice recordings 
of a female speaker (duration, 350 ms) delivered binaurally through MR-compatible 
headphones. Headphone volume was adjusted for each participant so that the auditory 
stimuli could be heard clearly over the background MR scanner noise. All stimuli were 
presented using Presentation software (Neurobehavioral Systems, Albany, CA). 
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Responses were made using the index and middle fingers of the right hand and recorded 
with an MR-compatible response box. 
In each 3.75-second trial, a visually-presented cue word (‘Look’ or ‘Hear’: 3.12° 
x 0.86°) instructed participants to attend to and identify either the visual letter (‘X,’ 1.10° 
x 1.36°; or ‘O’, 1.18° x 1.38°) or the auditory letter (‘X’ or ‘O’) of a possibly upcoming, 
audiovisual target-distracter letter pair. The visually-presented cue word (duration, 350 
ms) was accompanied by an irrelevant, binaurally-presented auditory word (duration, 350 
ms) that was equally likely to signal the same task as the visual cue (Figure 2.1, top left) 
or a different task (Figure 2.1, top right). After a brief interval (cue-target stimulus onset 
asynchrony, 1875 ms), an audiovisual target-distracter letter pair was presented (duration, 
350 ms). The distracter letter in the uncued modality was equally likely to be mapped to 
the same response as the target letter (Figure 2.1, bottom left) or to a different response 
(Figure 2.1, bottom right). Participants were instructed to press one button if the cued 
target letter was an X and a different button if it was an O, as quickly as possible without 
making mistakes, using the index and middle fingers of their right hand (stimulus-
response mappings were counterbalanced across participants). The next trial began after 
an inter-trial-interval that lasted between 0 and 6.25 seconds.  
We used two main trial types to distinguish brain activity associated with cues 
from activity associated with targets. To isolate activity related to cues, we included ‘cue-
only’ trials in which only the cue was presented (33% of all trials). To isolate activity 
related to targets, we included ‘cue-plus-target’ trials in which a cue was followed by a 
target (66% of all trials). Using a mixture of cue-only and cue-plus-target trials allows 
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one to distinguish neural activity for cues from activity for targets even in rapid event-
related fMRI designs (Corbetta, Kincade, Ollinger, McAvoy, & Shulman, 2000). 
 
Figure 2.1. Experimental task. 
In each trial, a visually-presented cue word (‘Look’ or ‘Hear’) instructed participants to attend to 
and identify either the visual letter (‘X’ or ‘O’) or the auditory letter (‘X’ or ‘O’) of a possibly 
upcoming target-distracter letter pair. To modulate demands on cue-triggered processes that 
increase attention to relevant stimuli, we varied whether an irrelevant auditory word signaled the 
same task as the visual word (‘Congruent Cue’) or a different task (‘Incongruent Cue’). After a 
1.875-second interval, an audiovisual target-distracter letter pair was presented. To modulate 
demands on target-triggered processes that detect response conflict, we varied whether the distracter 
letter was mapped to the same response as the target (‘Congruent Target-Distracter Pair’) or to a 
different response (‘Incongruent Target-Distracter Pair’). In cue-only trials (33%, not shown), the 
cue was not followed by a target-distracter letter pair.  
 
We were also able to identify differences in activity associated with incongruent 
and congruent target-distracter pairs in cue-plus-target trials. Indeed, exactly the same 
cues appeared in (1) cue-plus-target trials containing incongruent target-distracter pairs 
and (2) cue-plus-target trials containing congruent target-distracter pairs. Thus, 
22 
 
contrasting activity for these different trial types allowed us to subtract out the common 
cue activations, thereby isolating differences in activity between incongruent and 
congruent target-distracter pairs.     
In all trials, the fixation dot (0.15° x 0.17°) changed color from white to red 1.875 
sec after cue onset (coincident with target presentation in cue-plus-target trials and to 
signal that no target would occur in cue-only trials). Participants were instructed to cease 
attending if the fixation dot turned red and a target failed to appear (cue-only trials).  
Event-related Design 
In every run, there were 12 event-related trial types (four cue-only and eight cue-
plus-target), each of which was presented eight times in a completely randomized order.  
The four cue-only trial types consisted of the four possible combinations of Cue Type 
(look, hear) and Cue Congruency (congruent, incongruent). The eight cue-plus-target 
trials consisted of the eight possible combinations of Cue Type (look, hear), Cue 
Congruency (congruent, incongruent), and Target Congruency (congruent, incongruent). 
To optimize regression estimates of the BOLD responses produced by each of the 12 trial 
types, the inter-trial interval (ITI) was varied between zero and five TRs (0 and 6.25 
seconds) using a nearly exponential distribution that favored short it is (Miezin, 
Maccotta, Ollinger, Petersen, & Buckner, 2000).  
Data Acquisition 
All MRI images were collected on a 3-T GE Signa whole-body scanner with a 
standard head coil. The blood oxygenation level-dependent (BOLD) signal was measured 
with a reverse spiral imaging sequence (TR, 1250 ms; TE, 30 ms; FOV, 22cm; 27 
contiguous 4.5-mm-thick slices; in-plane resolution, 3.44 x 3.44 mm). Anatomical 
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images were collected in-plane with the functional images using a T1-weighted gradient-
echo (GRE) sequence (TR, 250 ms; TE, 5.4 ms; flip angle, 90°, in-plane resolution 0.86 
X 0.86 mm). Every participant completed five runs, each consisting of 96 trials. During 
each run, 395 brain volumes were collected. The first six functional images of each run 
contained no trials and were discarded. 
Data Analysis 
Using SPM2 (Friston, 1995), the functional images were corrected for 
asynchronous slice acquisition and head movement, normalized to MNI (Montreal 
Neurological Institute) space with dimensions 3.75 mm x 3.75 mm x 4.5 mm, and 
spatially smoothed with a three-dimensional Gaussian filter (8 mm at full-width half-
max). Due to head movements greater than 3 mm, the final run was eliminated from two 
participants’ data, and the final two runs were removed from one participant’s data. Next, 
the time series for each run was analyzed using a version of the general linear model that 
makes no assumptions about the shape of the BOLD response. This model, sometimes 
called the finite impulse response (FIR) model, estimates the average stimulus-locked 
fMRI response for each trial type and has been used successfully in many prior studies 
(Ollinger, Corbetta, & Shulman, 2001; Ollinger, Shulman, & Corbetta, 2001; Shulman, et 
al., 1999). We estimated 14 TRs (17.5 s) of the average BOLD response for each of the 
12 trial types. This resulted in 168 regressors (12 trial types X 14 timepoints) being 
entered into the design matrix. We also included six head movement regressors (i.e., 
SPM2 motion estimates) and two regressors for the linear trend and the y-intercept term. 
Parameter estimates for each run were converted to units of percent change from baseline 
and then averaged across runs for each participant.  
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Voxelwise Analyses 
A voxelwise, repeated-measures analysis of variance (ANOVA) was conducted to 
test for a significant 3-way interaction between Cue Congruency, Target Congruency, 
and Time (0 -17.5 seconds) in prefrontal regions (thresholded at F13, 208  = 2.8, P < 0.001 
and 5 contiguous voxels). This analysis identified a region of the left DLPFC (10 voxels; 
MNI center of mass: x = -44, y = 10, z = 39; BA 9). 
Region of Interest (ROI) Analyses 
Two regions of interest from our prior study of regional specialization in the 
ACCcd (Weissman, et al., 2004) were chosen to test whether there is regional 
specialization in the ACCcd for processes that increase attention to relevant stimuli and 
processes that detect response conflict from irrelevant stimuli: (1) a dorsal subregion of 
the ACCcd that included parts of the caudal ACC and pre-supplementary motor area (20 
voxels; Montreal Neurological Institute (MNI) center of mass: x = -2, y = 6, z = 52; 
Brodmann Area (BA) 32) and (2) a rostral subregion of the ACCcd that included parts of 
the rostral cingulate zone (20 voxels; MNI center of mass: x = 0, y = 25, z = 29; BA 32). 
ROI analyses were also performed for a region of the left DLPFC that was identified in a 
voxelwise analysis of the present data (see Voxelwise Analyses).   
In all ROI analyses, we averaged the responses to particular trial types across all 
voxels within each ROI. Statistical tests were then performed to contrast peak activity for 
the different trial types. In the rostral ACCcd, inspection of the average BOLD responses 
revealed that peak activity in cue-only trials occurred 3.75 seconds after cue onset while 
peak activity in cue-plus-target trials occurred 6.25 seconds after cue onset (Figure 2.2d). 
The delay of peak activity in cue-plus-target trials is consistent with the target being 
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presented about two seconds after the cue. In both the dorsal ACCcd and the left DLPFC 
(Figures 2.2c and 2.3d), inspection of the average BOLD responses revealed that peak 
activity in cue-only trials was distributed across two time points (3.75 and 5 seconds after 
cue onset) as was peak activity in cue-plus-target trials (5 and 6.25 seconds after cue 
onset). Thus, for both cue-only and cue-plus-target trials, peak activity in these regions 
was defined as the average amount of activity across two time points. We made a single 
exception to these definitions of peak activity when contrasting activity for incongruent 
hear cue-only and incongruent look cue-only trials in the dorsal ACCcd. Inspection of the 
average BOLD responses for these trial types revealed substantial inter-participant 
variability in the timing of peak activity. Therefore, for each of these trial types, we 
defined peak activity separately in each participant as the maximum activation at either 
3.75 or 5 seconds after cue onset and performed statistical tests on that single time point. 
Given the small number of ROIs (i.e., 3), we considered p-values less than 0.05 to be 
significant. Moreover, since all of our hypotheses were directional all t-tests were one-
tailed.  
The ROI analyses also involved correlating behavioral and neural (i.e., fMRI) 
measures of attention. Specifically, we correlated the behavioral cue congruency effect 
(i.e., the degree to which responses to targets were faster after incongruent than after 
congruent cues) with the neural cue congruency effect (i.e., the degree to which 
incongruent cue-only trials evoked greater activity than congruent cue-only trials in 
particular ROIs). The purpose of these correlations was to gain greater insight into the 
behavioral significance of the brain activations that we observed. 
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Results 
Behavior 
The behavioral data indicated that our task manipulations were highly effective. 
First, we observed an effect of cue congruency: participants were faster [870 ms versus 
899 ms; F(1, 16) = 14.5, p < 0.005] and marginally more accurate [98% versus 97%; F(1, 
16) = 4.2, p < 0.06] when responding to targets that followed incongruent (compared to 
congruent) cues. Since increasing attention to relevant stimuli facilitates identifying those 
stimuli (Posner, 1980; Stoffer, 1993), this result suggests that, in line with predictions, 
participants recruited processes that increase attention to relevant stimuli more strongly 
when they encountered incongruent cues than when they encountered congruent cues. 
Second, in line with prior work (Weissman, et al., 2004), we observed an effect of target 
congruency: participants were both slower [929 ms versus 840 ms; F(1, 16) = 44.6, p < 
0.001] and less accurate [96% versus 99%; F(1, 16) = 34.2, p < 0.001] when responding 
to incongruent (compared to congruent) target-distracter pairs. Third, the target 
congruency effect was smaller, F(1, 16) = 7.42, p < 0.02, following incongruent cues [69 
ms, t(16) = 4.94, p < 0.001] than following congruent cues [109 ms, t(16) = 6.63, p < 
0.001]. Because increasing attention to relevant stimuli reduces interference from 
irrelevant stimuli (Lavie, 1995; Weissman, et al., 2004), this result provides further 
evidence that participants increased attention to relevant stimuli more strongly when they 
encountered incongruent cues than when they encountered congruent cues. Fourth, the 
target congruency effect was also smaller, F(1, 16) = 4.70, p < 0.05, when the cue in the 
immediately preceding trial was incongruent [79 ms, t(16) = 4.96, p < 0.001] than when it 
was congruent [116 ms, t(16) = 5.59, p < 0.001], indicating that the effect of more 
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strongly increasing attention to relevant stimuli following an incongruent (compared to 
congruent) cue persisted across trials. 
In addition to the main findings above, which were averaged across the visual and 
auditory modalities, we observed two differences between the visual and auditory 
modalities that were not crucial for testing our hypotheses. First, the cue congruency 
effect was larger when participants responded to visual targets [54 ms; t(16) = 5.27, p < 
0.001] compared to auditory targets [2 ms; t(16) = 0.17,  p < 0.44], F(1, 16) = 17.59, p < 
.001. And, second, as in our prior study (Weissman, et al., 2004) participants were both 
slower [915 ms versus 854 ms; F(1, 16) = 20.6,  p < 0.001] and less accurate [97% 
versus 98%; F(1, 16) = 5.5, p < .05] when they responded to auditory targets than when 
they responded to visual targets. No other behavioral effects were significant.    
FMRI 
Our hypothesis predicts that the dorsal ACCcd should be especially sensitive to 
cue congruency while the rostral ACCcd should be especially sensitive to target 
congruency. To test this prediction, we probed activity within two regions of interest 
(ROIs) that were identified in our prior study of regional specialization in the ACCcd 
(Weissman, et al., 2004) (Figure 2.2a): (1) a dorsal subregion of the ACCcd that included 
parts of the caudal ACC and pre-supplementary motor area (20 voxels; Montreal 
Neurological Institute (MNI) center of mass: x = -2, y = 6, z = 52; BA 32) and (2) a 
rostral subregion of the ACCcd that included parts of the rostral cingulate zone (20 
voxels; MNI center of mass: x = 0, y = 25, z = 29; BA 32).  
In line with our hypothesis, ROI analyses on peak activity revealed a significant 
3-way interaction between ACCcd Subregion (rostral, dorsal), Cue Congruency 
28 
 
(congruent, incongruent), and Target Congruency (congruent, incongruent) [F(1, 16) = 
12.62, p < 0.005; see Figure 2.2b]. First, and consistent with a role in increasing attention 
to relevant stimuli, in the dorsal subregion the cue congruency effect was significantly 
larger than the target congruency effect [t(16) = 1.94, p < 0.04; see Figure 2.2b]. 
Additional tests revealed significant effects of both cue congruency [t(16) = 4.34, p < 
0.001], and target congruency [ t(16) = 3.48, p < 0.001; see Figure 2.2c], consistent with 
models in which resolving response conflict involves further increasing attention to 
relevant stimuli (Weissman, et al., 2004). Second, and consistent with a role in detecting 
response conflict, in the rostral subregion the target congruency effect was significantly 
larger than the cue congruency effect [t(16) = 2.12, p < 0.025; see Figure 2.2b]. Further 
tests revealed a significant target congruency effect [t(16) = 2.816, p < 0.0005], in the 
absence of a significant cue congruency effect [t(16) = 0.48, p < 0.49; see Figure 2.2d]. 
These findings support our hypothesis that a dorsal subregion of the ACCcd is especially 
involved in increasing attention to relevant stimuli while a rostral subregion is 
differentially involved in detecting response conflict.  
Three additional predictions stem from our hypothesis that the dorsal subregion of 
the ACCcd increases attention to relevant stimuli. First, as in our prior study (Weissman, 
et al., 2004), the dorsal subregion should show greater activity in hear cue-only trials than 
in look cue-only trials, since only in hear cue-only trials is it necessary to switch attention 
from the visual cue to the auditory modality. Moreover, this effect should be most visible 
in incongruent cue-only trials in which attention to the visual aspect of the cue is 
absolutely necessary to correctly identify the upcoming task. In line with this prediction, 
peak activity in the dorsal subregion was significantly greater for incongruent hear cue- 
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Figure 2.2. Regional specialization for cognitive control in the ACCcd. 
(a) Saggital slice indicating our rostral ACCcd subregion (green) and our dorsal ACCcd subregion 
(red) on the MNI-normalized brain. (b) Activity specific to cue congruency and target congruency in 
the dorsal ACCcd and in the rostral ACCcd. In the dorsal ACCcd, we observed significantly greater 
activity specific to cue congruency than to target congruency, while in the rostral ACCcd we observed 
exactly the opposite effect. (c) The average fMRI signal across time (in units of percent signal change 
from baseline) in the dorsal ACCcd for the various cue and target stimuli. There were significant 
effects of both cue congruency (i.e., greater peak activity for incongruent cues than for congruent 
cues) and target congruency (i.e., greater peak activity for incongruent target-distracter pairs than 
for congruent target-distracter pairs). (d) The average fMRI signal across time for the various cue 
and target stimuli in the rostral ACCcd. There was a significant effect of target congruency, but not of 
cue congruency. Dashed circles in b and c indicate significant differences in peak activity (P < 0.05). 
In d, a single asterisk denotes P < 0.05 while two asterisks denote P < 0.005. Error bars represent 
S.E.M. 
 
only than for incongruent look cue-only trials [t(16) = 2.26, p < 0.02; see Figure 2.3a], 
but did not significantly differ for congruent hear cue-only and congruent look-cue only 
trials [t(16) < 1]. Note that semantic conflict between the relevant visual aspect of the cue 
and the irrelevant auditory aspect was present in both incongruent hear cue-only and 
incongruent look cue-only trials, making it highly unlikely that the difference in activity 
between these trial types indexed processes that monitor for semantic conflict. Also 
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important, a significant difference in peak activity between incongruent and congruent 
cue-only trials was not observed in the rostral subregion [t(16) = 1.33, p > 0.10], 
suggesting that this subregion was not involved in increasing attention to relevant stimuli, 
and leading to a significant interaction between ACCcd Subregion (rostral, dorsal) and 
Incongruent Cue Type (Look, Hear) [F(1, 16) = 5.34, p < 0.04; see Figure 2.3a].  
Second, if the dorsal subregion participates in increasing attention to relevant 
stimuli, then participants who show the largest cue congruency effect in the dorsal 
subregion should exhibit the fastest speedup in response time for targets that follow 
incongruent (compared to congruent) cues. In line with this prediction, an across-
participants correlation indicated that the larger the effect of cue congruency on dorsal 
subregion peak activity in an individual participant, the faster that participant tended to 
respond to targets that followed incongruent (compared to congruent) cues [r(15) = -0.59, 
p < 0.05; see Figure 2.3b]. The correlation remained significant after controlling for 
possible outliers [r(13) = -.52, p < 0.05]. This correlation was not significant in the rostral 
subregion [r(15) = -0.37, p = 0.14], suggesting that this subregion was not involved in 
increasing attention to relevant stimuli. 
Third, if the dorsal subregion helps to increase attention to relevant stimuli, then 
the pattern of activity in this region should mirror that in the left DLPFC, a region that is 
widely posited to focus attention on relevant stimuli (Banich, et al., 2000; MacDonald, et 
al., 2000; Miller and Cohen 2001; Weissman, et al., 2004). Moreover, this effect should 
be most pronounced at the time of peak activation. Consistent with this prediction, a 
voxelwise, repeated-measures analysis of variance (ANOVA) restricted to prefrontal 
regions (thresholded at F(13, 208)  = 2.8, p < 0.001 and 5 contiguous voxels) revealed a  
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Figure 2.3. Effects of cue type, cue congruency, and target congruency in the ACCcd and in the left 
dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC). 
(a) Peak activity was significantly greater for incongruent hear cue-only trials than for incongruent 
look cue-only trials in the dorsal ACCcd, but not in the rostral ACCcd. (b) An across-participants 
correlation showing that participants with larger differences in peak activity between incongruent 
cue-only trials and congruent cue-only trials in the dorsal ACCcd tended to respond more quickly to 
targets following incongruent cues than to targets following congruent cues. (c)  A region of the left 
prefrontal cortex (24 voxels; BAs 6, 8, and 9), centered in the left DLPFC, in which cue congruency 
modulated activity significantly more than target congruency displayed on the MNI-normalized 
brain. (d)  The average fMRI signal across time in the left DLPFC (10 voxels; BA 9) for the various 
cue and target stimuli. Dashed circles represent significant differences in peak activity (P < 0.05). In 
a and b, a single asterisk represents P < 0.05. Error bars represent S.E.M. 
 
significant 3-way interaction between Cue Congruency, Target Congruency, and Time 
(0-17.5 seconds) in the left middle frontal gyrus (24 voxels; MNI center of mass: x = -42, 
y = 10, z = 39; BAs 6, 8, and 9; Figure 2.3c), and part of this region was located within 
the left DLPFC (10 voxels; MNI center of mass: x = -44, y = 10, z = 39; BA 9). 
Subsequent ROI analyses of the simple effects of this interaction focused on peak activity 
in the left DLPFC. These analyses confirmed that, as in the dorsal ACCcd subregion (but 
opposite to the rostral ACCcd subregion), the cue congruency effect was significantly 
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larger than the target congruency effect [t(16) = 1.81, p < 0.05]. Also as in the dorsal 
ACCcd subregion, there were significant effects of both cue congruency [t(16) = 3.16, p < 
0.005], and target congruency [t(16) = 2.22, p < 0.025; see Figure 2.3d]. Further 
underscoring the similar patterns of activity that we observed in the left DLPFC and in 
dorsal subregions of the ACCcd, the three-way interaction between ROI (dorsal ACCcd, 
left DLPFC), Cue Congruency (congruent, incongruent) and Target Congruency 
(congruent, incongruent) was far from achieving significance [F(1, 16) = 1.0, p > 0.33]. 
These findings further implicate the dorsal ACCcd in increasing attention to relevant 
stimuli. 
Discussion 
Minimizing distraction is thought to involve distinct control processes that first 
detect conflict caused by irrelevant stimuli and then quickly resolve such conflict by 
increasing attention to stimuli of interest (Botvinick, et al., 2001; Carter, et al., 1998; 
Kerns, 2006). Consistent with this two-component model, we found that rostral and 
dorsal subregions of the ACCcd, respectively, are differentially involved in implementing 
processes that detect response conflict and processes that increase attention to relevant 
stimuli. This finding sheds new light on the brain mechanisms that minimize distraction 
(Botvinick, et al., 2001; Carter, et al., 1998; Kerns, 2006) and speaks directly to a 
longstanding debate over how the ACCcd contributes to cognitive control. 
Several of our findings provide compelling evidence that a dorsal subregion of the 
ACCcd participates in increasing attention to relevant stimuli. First, activity in the dorsal 
subregion was significantly greater when participants shifted their attention from the 
visual cue to the auditory modality than when they simply maintained attention in the 
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visual modality. This finding strongly implicates this subregion in increasing attention to 
relevant stimuli. Second, the cue congruency effect was significantly larger than the 
target congruency effect not only in the dorsal subregion of the ACCcd, but also in the left 
DLPFC, a region that is widely posited to increase attention to relevant stimuli (Banich, 
et al., 2000; MacDonald, et al., 2000; Miller & Cohen, 2001; Weissman, et al., 2004). 
Moreover, a significant effect of target congruency was also observed in both regions, 
consistent with models in which resolving conflict involves further increasing attention to 
relevant stimuli (Botvinick, et al., 2001; Weissman, et al., 2005; Weissman, et al., 2004). 
Given that our findings implicate both dorsal subregions of the ACCcd and the left 
DLPFC in implementing processes that increase attention to relevant stimuli, future work 
should be aimed at determining whether these regions make identical or distinct 
contributions to such processes.  Third, in line with prior findings that increasing 
attention to relevant stimuli speeds response times to identify those stimuli (M. I. Posner, 
1980; Stoffer, 1993), the more a given participant exhibited greater activity in the dorsal 
subregion for incongruent cue-only than for congruent cue-only trials (i.e., a cue 
congruency effect), the more that participant tended to respond faster to targets that 
followed incongruent cues than to targets that followed congruent cues. Taken in 
isolation, one might interpret this correlation as indicating that greater conflict detection 
by the dorsal subregion leads to greater recruitment of other brain regions (e.g., the 
DLPFC) that resolve conflict during cue processing. However, given that several of our 
other findings implicate the dorsal subregion in implementing attentional processes, the 
most parsimonious interpretation of our findings is that the dorsal subregion of the ACCcd 
implements attentional processes in multiple contexts, consistent with recent claims that 
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the dorsal ACCcd is a critical component of a “core task-set system” (Dosenbach, et al., 
2007; Dosenbach, et al., 2006). 
 Of importance, our findings also weigh against the possibility that the cue 
congruency effect in the dorsal subregion of the ACCcd reflects control processes other 
than those that increase attention to relevant stimuli. First, the cue congruency effect is 
unlikely to index processes that detect pre-response (e.g., semantic) conflict (van Veen & 
Carter, 2005; Weissman, Giesbrecht, Song, Mangun, & Woldorff, 2003). Indeed, even 
when semantic conflict was equated during the processing of incongruent cues, switching 
attention from the visual to the auditory modality was associated with greater activity in 
the dorsal subregion than was maintaining attention in the visual modality. Second, the 
cue congruency effect is unlikely to reflect processes that signal an increased likelihood 
of making an error in an upcoming task (Brown & Braver, 2005) or an increased 
probability of receiving a reduced reward when an error is relatively likely (Hewig, et al., 
2007). Specifically, activity in the dorsal subregion was greater for incongruent than for 
congruent cues despite the fact that behavioral performance was both faster and more 
accurate for targets that followed incongruent cues than for targets that followed 
congruent cues. Third, the cue congruency effect is unlikely to index processes 
underlying response selection (Roelofs, et al., 2006) because no responses were made to 
the cue stimuli. Fourth, the cue congruency effect is unlikely to index the expectation of 
greater response conflict in an upcoming task (Sohn, Albert, Jung, Carter, & Anderson, 
2007) because behavioral measures of response conflict were significantly smaller 
following incongruent cues than following congruent cues. And, fifth, the cue 
congruency effect is unlikely to index processes underlying anticipation (Murtha, et al., 
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1996) or novelty detection (Matsumoto, et al., 2007; Ranganath & Rainer, 2003) because 
we held constant the nature of the task that followed incongruent and congruent cues. For 
all of these reasons, our findings are most compatible with a role for the dorsal subregion 
of the ACCcd in increasing attention to relevant stimuli (Dreher & Berman, 2002; 
Michael I. Posner & DiGirolamo, 1998). 
Although we have argued against an interpretation of the cue congruency effect in 
dorsal subregions of the ACCcd as reflecting processes that monitor for semantic 
conflict, one might wonder whether a visually-presented cue instructing participants to 
shift their attention to the auditory modality is inherently associated with greater semantic 
conflict than a visually-presented cue instructing subjects to maintain their attention in 
the visual modality. Such a view may appear plausible at first, but two pieces of data 
argue against it as an alternative account of our findings. First, we did not observe 
significantly greater activity in the dorsal ACCcd for congruent hear cue-only than for 
congruent look cue-only trials, even though, according to this view, congruent hear cue-
only trials should be associated with greater semantic conflict than congruent look cue-
only trials. Second, in a prior study (Weissman, et al., 2004) we observed significantly 
greater activity for hear cue-only than for look cue-only trials, even though each type of 
cue was presented in the visual modality in half the trials and in the auditory modality in 
the other half, a manipulation that should have equated for these trial types the specific 
form of semantic conflict that is under consideration. For these reasons (and others 
discussed in the preceding paragraph), we would argue that the cue congruency effect 
that we have observed in the dorsal ACCcd is much more consistent with a role for this 
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region in implementing attentional processes than with a role in monitoring for semantic 
conflict. 
We have also argued that the cue congruency effect in dorsal subregions of the 
ACCcd is unlikely to index processes underlying response selection (Roelofs, et al., 
2006) because no responses were made to the cue stimuli. Nonetheless, it is important to 
consider whether our findings might be accounted for by a more broadly-conceived 
response selection model (Milham & Banich, 2005). In this model, dorsal subregions of 
the ACCcd that are activated during cue processing might link information from the 
currently relevant sensory stream to mechanisms that plan future responses. Some 
investigators have argued that support for this type of response selection model comes 
from findings that dorsal ACCcd activity is greater for both congruent and incongruent 
trials than for neutral trials in the classic Stroop task (Milham & Banich, 2005). The 
central claim is that demands on processes that link a relevant channel of information (ink 
color) to response mechanisms are greater when an irrelevant channel of information 
(word identity) contains task-relevant information (a color-related word) than when it 
contains task-irrelevant information (a color-unrelated word). Clearly, this response 
selection model differs from the attention-based model that we favor, which posits that 
dorsal subregions of the ACCcd bias attention at perceptual stages of processing toward 
whichever stream of sensory information is currently relevant.  
We now consider whether the response selection model can provide a better 
account of our findings than the attention-based model. According to the response 
selection model, cue-related activity in dorsal subregions of the ACCcd reflects processes 
that select the channel of information (auditory or visual) upon which a future response 
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will be based. In this view, basing a response on the auditory channel should impose 
similar demands on response selection processes as basing a response on the visual 
channel. In both cases, information from a single sensory modality needs to be linked to 
response mechanisms, and there is no a priori reason to hypothesize that this link should 
be more difficult to make for one sensory modality than for another. For example, the 
number of irrelevant channels that contain task-relevant information during cue 
processing (i.e., one auditory channel) is the same regardless of whether participants are 
cued to direct their attention toward the auditory or toward the visual sensory modality. 
Contrary to the response selection view, however, we observed greater activity in dorsal 
subregions of the ACCcd for hear cue-only than for look cue-only trials. As we discussed 
earlier, this finding is highly consistent with our view that the dorsal ACCcd implements 
attentional processes. Indeed, demands on attentional processes should have been greater 
when participants were cued to shift attention away from the visual modality and toward 
the auditory modality (hear cue-only trials) than when they were cued to maintain 
attention in the visual modality (look cue-only trials). The response selection model is not 
about increasing attention to relevant stimuli at perceptual stages of processing, but rather 
about pre-setting or biasing response-related aspects of selection. Therefore, our finding 
that the dorsal ACCcd is more highly activated for hear cue-only than for look cue-only 
trials appears to be better explained by the attention model than by the response selection 
model. 
Our conclusion that the dorsal subregion of the ACCcd increases attention to 
relevant stimuli raises an important question about how we should interpret previous 
findings implicating these regions in various aspects of performance monitoring, such as 
38 
 
conflict monitoring, error monitoring, and reward assessment (Ridderinkhof, Ullsperger, 
Crone, & Nieuwenhuiss, 2004). In our view, the present data suggest that dorsal ACCcd 
activity attributed to performance monitoring in some prior studies may actually have 
reflected attentional processes. Specifically, as in the present study, dorsal ACCcd activity 
that varied with demands on performance monitoring processes might also have varied 
with demands on cue-triggered attentional processes, even when demands on 
performance monitoring processes were minimal. Such a result would be highly 
consistent with a role for the dorsal ACCcd in implementing attentional processes that are 
recruited not only during cue processing to orient attention, but also during target 
processing to resolve response conflict by further increasing attention to relevant stimuli 
(Weissman, et al., 2004). Unfortunately, only a handful of previous investigators have 
used experimental designs in which attentional and performance monitoring processes 
can be distinguished from one another as in the present study (MacDonald, et al., 2000; 
Weissman, et al., 2005; Weissman, et al., 2004). Thus, additional studies are needed to 
determine whether, and to what degree, dorsal ACCcd activity that is frequently 
associated with various performance monitoring processes (e.g., error monitoring, reward 
assessment, etc.) may actually reflect attentional processes. 
The present findings also weigh against the possibility that the target congruency 
effect in the rostral subregion of the ACCcd reflects control processes other than those 
that detect response conflict. First, if these regions detected pre-response (e.g., semantic) 
conflict (van Veen & Carter, 2005; Weissman, et al., 2003), then we should have 
observed greater activity for incongruent than for congruent cue-only trials. Incongruent 
cue-only trials were high in semantic conflict because the two words (‘Look’ and ‘Hear’) 
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had different meanings, whereas congruent cue-only trials were low in semantic conflict 
because the same word (e.g., ‘Look’) was presented twice. However, we observed no 
such effect. Second, if these regions signaled either when an error was relatively likely in 
an upcoming task (Brown & Braver, 2005) or when an upcoming task was more likely to 
be less rewarding because an error was relatively likely (Hewig, et al., 2007), then we 
should have observed greater activity for congruent than for incongruent cue-only trials. 
Indeed, as we mentioned earlier, behavioral performance was worse for targets that 
followed congruent cues than for targets that followed incongruent cues. However, once 
again we observed no such effect. Thus, our findings are most compatible with a role for 
the rostral subregion of the ACCcd in detecting response conflict. 
More broadly, the present results add to a growing body of work indicating 
regional specialization of function in the ACC (Bush, et al., 2002; Goldstein, et al., 2007; 
Somerville, Heatherton, & Kelley, 2006). A major finding of this work has been that 
relatively dorsal and caudal ACC regions (i.e., the so-called ‘cognitive’ division of the 
ACC) participate in implementing cognitive processes while relatively ventral and rostral 
ACC regions (i.e., the so-called ‘emotional’ division of the ACC) contribute to emotional 
processes. The present findings of regional specialization completely within the cognitive 
division of the ACC indicate regional specialization on a much finer spatial scale than 
have many prior studies, consistent with recent data indicating that rostral and dorsal 
subregions of the ACCcd exhibit different patterns of functional connectivity with other 
brain regions when participants are not actively performing a cognitive task (Margulies, 
et al., 2007). As such, our findings suggest that brain imaging techniques offering 
relatively high degrees of spatial resolution may be useful for mapping the complete 
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spatial topography of cognitive and emotional processes in the ACC. Such techniques 
have already been applied successfully to study regional specialization within the visual 
system. For example, recent findings from ‘high-resolution’ fMRI suggest that regions of 
the visual cortex that are specialized for processing faces can, in fact, be subdivided into 
smaller regions that are specialized for processing different types of objects (Grill-
Spector, Sayres, & Ress, 2006). Future high-resolution studies may therefore be helpful 
for obtaining a more fine-grained characterization of regional specialization in the ACC 
for various cognitive control processes. 
Although the present findings of regional specialization in the ACCcd provide 
novel support for two-component models of minimizing distraction, they also have some 
limitations. Most important, they do not reveal the relative timing with which different 
brain regions become activated during the process of minimizing distraction. For 
instance, brain regions that detect response conflict should become activated before brain 
regions that increase attention to relevant stimuli. Given the sluggishness of the 
hemodynamic signal that is measured with fMRI, brain imaging techniques offering 
higher temporal resolution will likely be necessary to test such important predictions. 
In conclusion, our findings support a two-component model of minimizing 
distraction from irrelevant stimuli (Botvinick, et al., 2001; Carter, et al., 1998; Kerns, 
2006). Moreover, they speak to a longstanding controversy over the role of the ACCcd in 
cognitive control by showing that, rather than performing a single cognitive control 
process as some models posit (Botvinick, et al., 2001; Carter, et al., 1998; Kerns, 2006), 
the ACCcd implements multiple control processes. Future studies characterizing the 
spatial topography and relative timing of control processes in the ACC may enhance our 
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understanding of behavior in neurologically-intact populations and in numerous clinical 
syndromes that are characterized by disruptions of cognitive control, including drug 
addiction (Goldstein, et al., 2007), attention deficit and hyperactivity disorder (Dickstein, 
et al., 2006), and schizophrenia (Kerns, et al., 2005). 
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Chapter 3  
Succumbing to bottom-up biases on task choice predicts increased switch costs in 
the voluntary task switching paradigm 
 
Abstract 
Bottom-up biases are widely thought to influence task choice in the voluntary task 
switching paradigm. Definitive support for this hypothesis is lacking, however, because 
task choice and task performance are usually confounded. We therefore revisited this 
hypothesis using a paradigm in which task choice and task performance are temporally 
separated. As predicted, participants tended to choose the task that was primed by 
bottom-up biases. Moreover, such choices were linked to increased switch costs during 
subsequent task performance. These findings provide compelling evidence that bottom-
up biases influence voluntary task choice. They also suggest that succumbing to such 
biases reflects a reduction of top-down control that persists to influence upcoming task 
performance. 
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Introduction 
Much of human behavior is thought to reflect a mixture of top-down and bottom-
up processes. For example, driving from Brooklyn to Los Angeles involves a 
combination of top-down processes that strategically plan a route and bottom-up 
processes that enable habitual responses to familiar stimuli (e.g., traffic lights) along the 
way. A mixture of such processes is also present in most laboratory tasks of selective 
attention. For instance, performance in the Stroop task is thought to be determined by a 
combination of top-down processes that bias attention toward ink color and bottom-up 
processes that underlie word reading (MacLeod, 1991). Similarly, the locus of spatial 
attention in the Posner cueing paradigm is thought to depend on top-down processes that 
underlie voluntary orienting of attention and bottom-up processes that orient attention to 
salient events (Corbetta, Patel, & Shulman, 2008; Posner, Snyder, & Davidson, 1980). 
Further developing our understanding of how top-down and bottom-up processes 
influence performance has therefore become a mainstay of modern attention research. 
Recently, there has been growing interest in understanding how top-down and 
bottom-up processes influence task choice in the voluntary task switching paradigm. In 
each trial, participants are instructed to randomly choose one of two possible tasks to 
perform on an imperative stimulus (Arrington & Logan, 2004). As instructed, participants 
usually perform each task about half the time. However, they often exhibit a task-
repetition bias, meaning that they switch tasks less than fifty percent of the time. To 
account for this effect, it has been suggested that voluntary task choice is influenced by 
two main processes (Arrington & Logan, 2005; Mayr & Bell, 2006). First, a top-down 
random sequence heuristic is thought to choose a task by (a) comparing the recent history 
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of task choices to a representative random sequence (Arrington & Logan, 2004, 2005) or 
(b) treating each trial as a discrete event in which a task is chosen using, essentially, a 
mental coin flip (Mayr & Bell, 2006). Second, a bottom-up availability heuristic is 
thought to choose the task that is currently most active, or available, in working memory, 
which is typically the task performed in the previous trial (Arrington & Logan, 2005; 
Lien & Ruthruff, 2008; Mayr & Bell, 2006). Thus, the task-repetition bias is thought to 
stem from the availability heuristic. 
More direct evidence to suggest an influence of the availability heuristic on 
voluntary task choice comes from studies of stimulus repetition. The logic is that a 
stimulus-task association is strengthened each time a task is performed on an imperative 
stimulus (Arrington, Weaver, & Pauker, 2010; Demanet, Liefooghe, Verbruggen, & 
Vandierendonck, 2010; Verbruggen & Logan, 2008). Thus, presenting a stimulus that 
appeared in a previous trial should increase the activation of the previous-trial task 
representation in working memory, thereby amplifying the task-repetition bias. Several 
findings are consistent with this view. First, the task-repetition bias is larger when an 
imperative stimulus matches the stimulus from the previous trial than when it does not 
(Mayr & Bell, 2006). Second, the task repetition bias is larger when an irrelevant 
stimulus from the previous trial (e.g., a random shape) is repeated than when it is not, 
suggesting that stimulus-task associations are formed even for irrelevant stimuli 
(Demanet, et al., 2010). Third, participants are biased to perform the same task on a 
repeated imperative stimulus that they initially performed, regardless of whether they 
chose the initial task or the experimenter did (Arrington, et al., 2010; Demanet, et al., 
2010). And fourth, stimulus repetition amplifies the task-repetition bias more when a 
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concurrent working memory load is present than when it is absent (Demanet, et al., 
2010), consistent with prior work indicating that working memory resources are 
important for inhibiting bottom-up biases (Lavie, 2004). These findings fit nicely with the 
view that a bottom-up availability heuristic influences voluntary task choice.  
Additional evidence to suggest that a stimulus can influence voluntary task choice 
in a bottom-up fashion comes from recent findings concerning stimulus availability 
(Arrington, 2008). When two stimuli are presented in rapid succession (e.g., a letter and a 
digit), participants are biased to perform the task associated with the first stimulus (e.g., 
the letter). This finding suggests that the first stimulus activates its task representation in 
working memory before the second stimulus can activate its task representation, thereby 
increasing the chances that the first task will be chosen via the availability heuristic. In 
sum, studies of stimulus availability also suggest that a stimulus can influence voluntary 
task choice in a bottom-up fashion. 
Definitive support for this view is lacking, however, because task choice and task 
performance are usually registered with a single button press to an imperative stimulus. 
Putative bottom-up biases on task choice may therefore reflect bottom-up biases on task 
performance. First, consider the finding that stimulus repetition amplifies the task-
repetition bias (Mayr & Bell, 2006). Although repeating a stimulus may prime the task 
with which it was most recently associated (Arrington, et al., 2010; Demanet, et al., 2010; 
Verbruggen & Logan, 2008), it may also prime the task-relevant response with which it 
was most recently linked (Hommel, 1998). Participants may therefore execute this 
response without actually making a task choice (Arrington, et al., 2010; Demanet, et al., 
2010). Second, consider the finding that stimulus availability biases participants to 
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perform the task associated with the first of two rapidly presented stimuli (Arrington, 
2008). This effect may occur because the first stimulus (e.g., a letter) activates its task 
representation in working memory more quickly than the second stimulus (e.g., a digit) 
(Arrington, 2008). However, the two stimuli are unambiguously mapped not only to 
different tasks, but also to different responses. The first stimulus may therefore also 
prime a task-relevant response more quickly than the second stimulus, and participants 
may simply execute this response without making a task choice. For these reasons, data 
to support the view that a stimulus can influence voluntary task choice in a bottom-up 
fashion are often ambiguous. 
Given this ambiguity, it is also unclear whether any potential influence of the 
availability heuristic on voluntary task choice is related to subsequent task performance. 
If such an influence stems from a reduction of top-down control (Arrington & Yates, 
2009; Demanet, et al., 2010) and if this reduction persists for a few seconds (e.g., due to 
fatigue, diminished motivation, etc.), then subsequent task performance might also 
exhibit signs of reduced control. For instance, switch costs might be higher when 
participants select the task primed by the availability heuristic (congruent task choice 
trials) as compared to the opposite task (incongruent task choice trials). Relatively little 
data speak to this issue, however, because the congruency of a task choice with respect to 
the availability heuristic is usually confounded with repeating versus switching tasks. For 
example, choosing the task that is primed by a stimulus repetition (i.e., a congruent task 
choice) usually involves repeating the task from the previous trial. Conversely, choosing 
the task that is not primed by a stimulus repetition (i.e., an incongruent task choice) 
typically involves switching to a new task. Given these typical confounds, it is unclear 
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whether any potential influence of bottom-up biases on voluntary task choice predicts 
subsequent task performance.  
In sum, ambiguity regarding whether bottom-up biases influence voluntary task 
choice through the availability heuristic has arisen because task choice and task 
performance are usually registered with a single response. We therefore investigated the 
influence of bottom-up biases on voluntary task choice using a paradigm in which 
voluntary task choice and subsequent task performance are registered with different 
responses (Arrington & Logan, 2005, Experiment 6). First, we investigated whether 
bottom-up biases influence voluntary task choice as indexed by a tendency to make 
congruent task choices. Second, we investigated whether congruent voluntary task 
choices reflect a reduction of top-down control that persists to influence subsequent task 
performance. Specifically, we investigated whether switch costs are larger after 
congruent as compared to incongruent voluntary task choices. Our findings supported 
both of these hypotheses. 
Method 
Participants 
Fifty-seven healthy, right-handed participants with no history of neurological 
disorders were recruited from the University of Michigan community in accordance with 
the Institutional Review Board (mean age: 20.2 years, range: 18 – 30 years; 33 females). 
Data from three participants were excluded: two participants who repeated tasks on more 
than 80% of the trials, and one participant whose accuracy during task performance fell 
below 85%. Thus, only the data from the remaining 54 participants (30 females) were 
further analyzed in group analyses.  
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Apparatus and Stimuli 
The stimuli were generated and displayed using Presentation software 
(Neurobehavioral Systems Inc., Albany, CA). Participants viewed the task stimuli on a 
17” CRT monitor at a viewing distance of 60 cm. A chin rest was used for head 
stabilization.  
Participants performed a voluntary task switching version of the numerical Stroop 
task, which involved comparing two digits in terms of their numerical size or in terms of 
their physical size (Henik & Tzelgov, 1982). In each trial, participants voluntarily chose 
to perform one of these tasks (Figure 3.1a) or were explicitly instructed to perform one of 
these tasks (Figure 3.1b). Voluntary and explicit task choice trials were presented in a 
random order throughout the experiment.  
Each trial began with the presentation of a cue at the center of the screen. In 
voluntary task choice trials, the cue was a question mark that prompted participants to 
voluntarily choose a task. In explicit task choice trials, the cue was an ‘N’ or a ‘P’ which, 
respectively, instructed participants to perform either the numerical or the physical size 
comparison task. In each trial, the cue remained on the screen until participants pressed 
the D key (left middle finger) or the F key (left index finger) to indicate which task they 
would perform on the upcoming digit pair. The task-key mapping was counterbalanced 
across participants.  
To manipulate which task was most salient to the availability heuristic, the central 
cue in each trial was flanked by two identical distracter letters: one appeared 1.37° to the 
left of the central cue and the other appeared 1.37° to the right (Figure 3.1). The distracter 
letters were often strongly associated with either the numerical or the physical size 
57 
 
comparison task because they served as explicit cues to perform these tasks in explicit 
task choice trials. Specifically, in equal numbers of trials, the distracter letters were 
associated with the numerical size comparison task (i.e., two ‘Ns’), the physical size 
comparison task (i.e. two ‘Ps’), or with no task (i.e., two ‘Os’). We reasoned that, while 
serving as a distracter letter, an ‘N’ or a ‘P’ would activate (a) a representation of a 
specific task and/or (b) a representation of the response involved in choosing that task. 
Either or both of these representations might then influence voluntary task choice through 
the availability heuristic (Arrington, et al., 2010). 
To determine whether voluntary task choice was influenced by the distracter 
letters, we distinguished among three types of voluntary task choice trials. In congruent 
voluntary task choice trials, participants chose the task signaled by the distracter letters. 
In incongruent voluntary task choice trials, participants chose the task that was not 
signaled by the distracter letters. In neutral voluntary task choice trials, participants chose 
a task in the presence of two distracter letters that were not associated with either of the 
two possible tasks.  
Five hundred milliseconds after participants indicated which task they would 
perform in response to the central cue, two digits appeared (1.7° above and 1.7° below 
fixation). One digit was numerically larger (7, 8, or 9) and the other was numerically 
smaller (1, 2, or 3). Further, one digit was physically larger (0.7° by 1.1°) while the other 
was physically smaller (0.4° by 0.6°). In congruent trials (50%), the numerically larger 
digit was also physically larger. In incongruent trials (50%), the numerically larger digit 
was physically smaller. The digits remained on the screen until the participant indicated 
the spatial position (top or bottom) of the digit that was larger at the relevant dimension 
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(i.e., numerical size or physical size) by pressing the J key (the digit on top; right middle 
finger) or the N key (the digit on the bottom; right index finger) on a computer keyboard.  
 
Figure 3.1. Experimental design. 
Examples of voluntary and explicit task choice trials used in the experiment. Participants performed 
a task switching version of the numerical Stroop task, which involved comparing two digits with 
respect to their numerical size or with respect to their physical size. (A) Each voluntary task choice 
trial began with the presentation of a central question mark (‘?’), which indicated that participants 
should voluntarily choose which task to perform in the current trial. Participants were instructed to 
indicate their task choice by pressing a button with the middle or index finger of their left hand. (B) 
Each explicit task choice trial began with the presentation of a central cue letter, which indicated that 
participants should choose to perform either the numerical or the physical size comparison task. 
Participants were instructed to confirm their task choice by pressing a button with the middle or 
index finger of their left hand. In both voluntary and explicit task choice trials, the central cue was 
flanked by two identical distracter letters that were associated with the numerical size comparison 
task (i.e. two ‘Ns’), the physical size comparison task (i.e. two ‘Ps’), or neither task (i.e. two ‘Os’). 
The cue and flanking distracter letters remained on the screen until participants indicated their task 
choice. Five hundred ms after making a task choice, the imperative task stimuli (i.e., two digits) 
appeared. One was numerically larger (e.g. ‘7’) while the other was numerically smaller (e.g. ‘3’). 
Further, one was presented in a larger font (e.g. ‘3’) while the other was presented in a smaller font 
(e.g. ‘7’). In congruent trials, the numerically larger digit was also physically larger. In incongruent 
trials, the numerically larger digit was physically smaller. Depending on the task, participants 
indicated which of the two digits (top or bottom) was numerically larger or physically larger. They 
were instructed to indicate their decision as quickly and as accurately as possible by making a key 
press with either their right index finger or their right middle finger. The next trial began after a 100 
ms or a 1000 ms response-to-cue interval (RCI), which varied across participants. 
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The next trial was presented after a response-cue interval (RCI) of either 0 ms or 
1000 ms. Switch costs are typically larger after short as compared to long RCIs, 
suggesting a passive dissipation of the task-set from the previous trial (Allport, Styles, & 
Hsieh, 1994; Arrington & Logan, 2005). Recent findings, however, suggest that this 
effect occurs only when the RCI varies from one trial to the next and not when the RCI 
remains constant throughout a block of trials (Horoufchin, Philipp, & Koch, 2010). It has 
therefore been suggested that mechanisms other than a passive decay of the previous 
trial’s task set, such as the temporal distinctiveness of the current task cue, may explain 
the effect of RCI on switch costs (Horoufchin, et al., 2010). Nonetheless, at least one 
prior study has revealed that switch costs are larger after short compared to long RCIs 
when the RCI remains constant throughout a block of trials, but varies across participants 
(Koch, 2001). Although this result appears more consistent with task-set decay than with 
temporal distinctiveness, it has been suggested that it may somehow have resulted from 
the fact that participants switched among three possible tasks, rather than just two 
(Horoufchin, et al., 2010). We therefore investigated whether we could replicate this 
result by varying the RCI across (but not within) participants in our paradigm, which 
involved switching between just two tasks. The RCI lasted 0 ms for 28 participants and 
1000 ms for 26 participants.  
Procedure 
The procedure consisted of four parts. First, participants practiced the numerical 
and physical size comparison tasks separately. Each practice block (one for each task) 
consisted of 20 trials, and the order in which the tasks were practiced was 
counterbalanced across participants. Second, participants practiced voluntarily choosing 
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to perform either the numerical or the physical size comparison task when prompted by a 
question mark. In particular, they performed a single block of 36 voluntary task choice 
trials in the absence of distracter letters. Third, to prepare for the actual experiment, 
participants practiced randomly alternating between voluntary and explicit task choice 
trials. That is, they performed a single block of 32 trials in which voluntary and explicit 
task choice trials appeared in a random order. As in the actual experiment, each cue was 
flanked by two identical distracter letters. At the end of each voluntary task choice and 
mixed voluntary-explicit task choice practice block above, participants were told the 
proportion of trials in which they (a) performed each task and (b) switched tasks. If either 
proportion was less than 40% or greater than 60%, they performed that particular practice 
block again. Each type of practice block (i.e., voluntary and mixed voluntary-explicit) 
was practiced an average of 1.2 times. Fourth, participants’ performance was measured in 
15 blocks of the main experiment, each of which contained 72 trials. The instructions 
stressed that in voluntary task choice trials a task should be chosen randomly. Moreover, 
participants were told that they could take their time choosing which task to perform, but 
that they needed to subsequently perform the task as quickly as possible while remaining 
accurate. 
Data Analysis 
Prior to the main analyses, we discarded (a) outlier trials in which reaction time 
(RT) during task performance was either faster than 200 ms or slower than three standard 
deviations from the participant’s mean RT and (b) trials that were preceded by outlier 
trials. In this manner, 2.9% of trials were discarded. We also discarded trials in which an 
error occurred and trials with a correct response that immediately followed errors. In this 
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manner, 11.5% of trials were discarded. In total, 13.4% of trials were discarded prior to 
the main analyses.  
On the remaining data, omnibus tests were conducted using mixed analysis of 
variance (ANOVA). When necessary, Greenhouse-Geisser corrections for non-sphericity 
were applied to adjust the degrees of freedom. Post-hoc pairwise comparisons were 
performed using the Newman-Keuls test.  
Results 
Task Choice Proportions 
The voluntary task choice data were largely consistent with prior studies of 
voluntary task switching. First, participants performed each task about half the time. The 
mean probabilities for voluntarily choosing (a) the numerical size comparison task 
(49.7%; 95% CI: 48.3% - 50.5%) and (b) the physical size comparison task (50.3%; 95% 
CI: 49.5% - 51.7%) both had 95% confidence intervals that included 50%. Second, 
participants exhibited a task-repetition bias: the mean voluntary switch rate (43.2%) had a 
confidence interval that fell below 50% (95% CI: 39.4% - 47.1%). Thus, we replicated 
two standard effects in the voluntary task switching paradigm.  
Our first main hypothesis was that participants would exhibit a tendency to make 
congruent task choices. To test this hypothesis, we determined how often participants 
Distracter Identity
Numerical Size 
Comparison
Physical Size 
Comparison
N 56% (1%) 44% (1%)
O 49% (0.7%) 51% (0.7%)
P 43% (1%) 57% (1%)
Table 3.1  
Task choice as a function of distracter identity. 
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voluntarily chose each task as a function of the distracter letter pair (two ‘Ns’, two ‘Ps’, 
or two ‘Os’) that appeared in each trial. Next, for each of these three conditions, we 
created a task choice index: the proportion of trials in which participants voluntarily 
chose the numerical size comparison task minus the proportion of trials in which they 
voluntarily chose the physical size comparison task. We reasoned that if participants were 
biased to make congruent task choices, then the task choice index would be positive 
when the distracter letters were ‘Ns’ and negative when the distracter letters were ‘Ps’. 
Further, we predicted that the task choice index would not differ from zero when the 
distracter letters were ‘Os’, which were associated with neither of the two possible tasks.  
We evaluated these predictions by submitting the mean task choice index in 
voluntary task choice trials to a mixed ANOVA with one between-participants factor, 
RCI (0 ms, 1000 ms), and three within-participants factors: previous agency (voluntary, 
explicit), current task transition (repeat, switch), and current distracter identity (‘N’, ‘P’, 
‘O’). Table 3.1 indicates the proportion of trials in which participants chose each task as a 
function of current distracter identity. As predicted, there was a main effect of current 
distracter identity [F(1.4, 75.3) = 45.1, p < 0.001]. The task choice index was positive 
when the distracter letters were ‘Ns’ (14.3%; 95% CI: 9.8% to 18.8%), negative when the 
distracter letters were ‘Ps’ (-16.0%; 95% CI: -11.0% to -20.9%), and did not differ from 
zero when the distracter letters were ‘Os’ (-2.2%; 95% CI: -5.3% to 1.0%). Also as 
expected, post-hoc tests revealed that the task choice index was (a) more positive when 
the distracter letters were ‘Ns’ than when they were ‘Os’ (p < 0.001) and (b) more 
negative when the distracters were ‘Ps’ than when they were ‘Os’ (p < 0.001). These 
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findings support the view that a stimulus can influence voluntary task choice in a bottom-
up fashion through the availability heuristic. 
  There was also an interaction between previous agency and current distracter 
identity [F(1.9, 100.7) = 12.1, p < 0.001;  Figure 3.2]. Post-hoc tests indicated that 
participants were more likely to choose the task associated with the distracter letters 
when the task choice in the previous trial was explicit than when it was voluntary (both p 
< 0.001). A potential explanation addressed below is that the association between a 
distracter letter and a task choice was stronger when that distracter letter had (versus had 
not) appeared as an explicit cue in the preceding trial. No other effects were significant. 
As described above, participants were biased to make congruent task choices in 
voluntary task choice trials. We therefore reasoned that voluntary switch rates should be 
lower when the identity of the current distracter letters matched the previous-trial task 
(thus priming a task repeat) than when it mismatched and signaled the opposite task (thus 
priming a task switch). To test this prediction, we conducted a mixed ANOVA on switch 
rates with one between-participants factor, RCI (0 ms, 1000 ms), and two within-
participants factors: current distracter identity – previous task relationship (match, 
mismatch, neutral) and previous agency (voluntary, explicit). As expected, there was a 
main effect of current distracter identity - previous task relationship [F(1.4, 73.3) = 44.3, 
p < 0.001]. Switch rates were lowest when the current distracter identity matched the 
previous task (36.3%), intermediate when the current distracter identity was neutral 
(44.3%), and highest when the current distracter identity mismatched the previous task 
and therefore signaled the opposite task (49.7%). Post-hoc pairwise comparisons revealed 
that each of these three values differed from the other two (all p’s < 0.01). These findings 
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support previous claims that task availability influences voluntary switch rates (Arrington 
& Logan, 2005; Arrington, et al., 2010; Demanet, et al., 2010; Mayr & Bell, 2006). 
 
Figure 3.2. Task choice index. 
The task choice index (i.e., the proportion of trials in which participants voluntarily chose the 
numerical size comparison task minus the proportion of trials in which they voluntarily chose the 
physical size comparison task) as a function of distracter identity (N, P, or O) and previous agency 
(voluntary, explicit). Positive values indicate a bias to choose the numerical size comparison task 
more often than the physical size comparison task. Negative values indicate the opposite bias. 
Participants tended to choose the task associated with the distracter letters (i.e., a positive task choice 
index for N distracters and a negative task choice index for P distracters) and this bias was stronger 
after explicit than after voluntary task choice trials. Error bars represent 95% confidence intervals.  
 
There was also an interaction between current distracter identity - previous task 
relationship and previous agency [F(1.9, 98.2) = 14.3, p < 0.001; Figure 3.3]. When the 
current distracter identity matched the previous task, switch rates were lower if the 
previous trial contained an explicit cue as compared to a voluntary cue (post-hoc 
comparison: p < 0.001). Conversely, when the current distracter identity mismatched the 
previous task (i.e., signaled the opposite task), switch rates were higher if the previous 
trial contained an explicit cue as compared to a voluntary cue (post-hoc comparison: p < 
0.05). Finally, when the current distracter identity was neutral with respect to the 
previous task (i.e., two ‘Os’), switch rates did not vary with whether the previous trial 
contained an explicit cue as compared to a voluntary cue (post-hoc comparison: p > 
0.09). These findings are consistent with our earlier suggestion that the strength of the 
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association between a distracter letter and a task choice was greater when the distracter 
letter had served as an explicit cue in the previous trial. No other effects were significant. 
 
Figure 3.3. Switch rate. 
Mean switch rate varied with an interaction between current distracter identity - previous task 
relationship and previous agency. When the current distracter identity (e.g., N) matched the previous 
task (e.g., the numerical size comparison task), switch rates were higher if the previous trial involved 
a voluntary task choice as compared to an explicit task choice. In contrast, when the current 
distracter identity (e.g., N) mismatched the previous task (e.g., the physical size comparison task), 
switch rates were higher if the previous trial involved an explicit task choice as compared to a 
voluntary task choice. Error bars represent 95% confidence intervals. 
 
Task Performance – Mean RT 
Our second main hypothesis was that congruent voluntary task choices would be 
followed by larger switch costs during subsequent task performance than either 
incongruent or neutral voluntary task choices. To investigate this hypothesis, we analyzed 
mean RT during task performance using a mixed ANOVA with RCI (0 ms, 1000 ms) as a 
between-participants factor and four within-participants factors: agency (voluntary, 
explicit), cue congruency (congruent, incongruent, neutral), target congruency 
(congruent, incongruent), and task transition (repeat, switch)1 Table 3.2.  provides the 
mean RT for each cell of this ANOVA. Critically, there was an interaction between cue 
                                                 
1 Unlike the task choice data, there were no main effects or interactions involving previous agency in the 
task performance data. Therefore, we did not include previous agency as a factor in the final analyses of 
these data. 
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congruency and task transition [F(1.9, 100.2) = 5.5, p < 0.01]. In line with predictions, 
switch costs in congruent task choice trials (70 ms) were larger than those in both 
incongruent [47 ms; F(1, 52) = 7.9, p < 0.01] and neutral [50 ms; F(1, 52) = 7.6, p < 
0.01] task choice trials.  
Table 3.2  
Mean Reaction Time (ms) in the Main Conditions of the Study. 
Task 
Transition
Congruent 
Target
Incongruent 
Target
Congruent 
Target
Incongruent 
Target
Congruent 
Target
Incongruent 
Target
Repeat 695 (22) 814 (24) 703 (23) 845 (25) 707 (24) 824 (26)
Switch 782 (26) 907 (25) 755 (27) 888 (26) 770 (22) 866 (24)
Repeat 672 (24) 798 (26) 679 (22) 824 (25) 687 (26) 798 (25)
Switch 768 (25) 885 (25) 769 (25) 900 (28) 780 (25) 893 (27)
Repeat 650 (23) 810 (25) 655 (24) 800 (26) 632 (25) 793 (27)
Switch 696 (27) 850 (26) 679 (28) 813 (27) 669 (23) 813 (25)
Repeat 628 (25) 763 (27) 637 (23) 793 (26) 648 (27) 799 (26)
Switch 660 (26) 842 (26) 671 (26) 835 (29) 670 (26) 830 (28)
1000 ms RCI
Voluntary Trials
Explicit Trials
Congruent Task Choice Incongruent Task Choice Neutral Task Choice
0 ms RCI
Voluntary Trials
Explicit Trials
 
We were particularly interested in whether these effects were present in voluntary 
task choice trials. We therefore conducted planned comparisons to determine the effect of 
cue congruency on switch costs separately in voluntary and explicit task choice trials. As 
predicted, switch costs were larger in congruent (67 ms) than in either incongruent [33 
ms; F(1, 52) = 8.0, p < 0.01] or neutral [40 ms; F(1, 52) = 6.4, p = 0.01] voluntary task 
choice trials (see Figure 3.4). In contrast, switch costs in congruent explicit task choice 
trials (74 ms) did not differ from those in either incongruent [61 ms; F(1, 52) = 1.6, n.s.] 
or neutral [60 ms; F(1, 52) = 2.2, n.s.] explicit task choice trials. Nonetheless, in line with 
our second main hypothesis, our findings in voluntary task choice trials suggest that less 
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top-down control was recruited during task performance in congruent as compared to 
either incongruent or neutral task choice trials.  
 
Figure 3.4. Switch costs. 
Switch costs (i.e., incongruent RT – congruent RT) were larger in congruent task choice trials than in 
either incongruent or neutral task choice trials. Error bars represent 95% confidence intervals. 
 
Two effects involving agency were also significant. First, there was an interaction 
between agency and task transition [F(1, 52) = 6.4, p = 0.01]. Replicating prior findings 
(Arrington & Logan, 2005), switch costs were larger in explicit [65 ms; F(1, 52) = 110.1, 
p < 0.001] than in voluntary [47 ms; F(1, 52) = 40.4, p < 0.001] task choice trials.  
Second, there was interaction between agency and cue congruency [F(1, 52) = 6.3, p < 
0.005]. Recent work indicates that presenting an irrelevant task cue during task 
preparation slows responses when it signals a task that should not (versus should) be 
performed in the current trial (Braverman & Meiran, 2010). Thus, we performed planned 
comparisons to determine whether this cue congruency effect was significant in both 
explicit and voluntary task choice trials. The effect was significant in explicit [12 ms; 
F(1, 52) = 5.5, p < 0.05], but not in voluntary [-8 ms; F(1, 52) = 1.3, n.s.] task choice 
trials. Moreover, it was significantly larger in explicit than in voluntary task choice trials 
[F(1, 52) = 5.9, p < 0.05]. These results indicate that agency modulated both switch costs 
and the effect of cue congruency on task performance.    
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Several expected effects that were less important for testing our hypothesis were 
also significant. First, there was a main effect of target congruency [F(1, 52) = 492.3, p < 
0.001]: participants responded more slowly in incongruent (832 ms) than in congruent 
(694 ms) trials. Second, there was a main effect of task transition [F(1, 52) = 93.4, p < 
0.001] because participants responded more slowly in task switch (791 ms) than in task 
repeat (735 ms) trials. Third, and also expected (Arrington & Logan, 2005), there was an 
interaction between task transition and RCI [F(1, 52) = 13.0, p < 0.001]: switch costs 
were greater after the short RCI [77 ms; F(1, 52) = 91.4, p < 0.001] than after the long 
RCI [35 ms; F(1, 52) = 17.7, p < 0.01]. This result appears more consistent with the task-
set decay hypothesis of RCI effects on switch costs (Allport, et al., 1994; Arrington & 
Logan, 2005) than with the temporal distinctiveness hypothesis (Horoufchin, et al., 
2010). Fourth, there was an interaction between target congruency and RCI [F(1, 52) = 
6.2, p < 0.05]: the effect of target congruency was larger after the long RCI [153 ms; F(1, 
52) = 293.4, p < 0.001] than after the short RCI [122 ms; F(1, 52) = 201.6, p < 0.001]. No 
other effects were significant2
Task Performance – Mean Error Rate 
. 
Mean error rates were relatively low (5.1%). As an analysis of error rates was not 
crucial for testing our hypotheses, we simply note two important findings. First, no 
                                                 
2 We performed supplementary analyses of the task performance RT data to investigate whether 
asymmetric switch costs were present in our paradigm, even though the presence or absence of such effects 
was not central to our hypotheses. These analyses involved a mixed ANOVA with four factors: RCI (0 ms, 
1000 ms), agency (voluntary, explicit), task (numerical size comparison, physical size comparison), and 
task transition (repeat, switch). As expected, there was a main effect of task [F(1, 52) = 14.0, p < 0.001] as 
mean RT was faster for the relatively simple physical size comparison task (748 ms) than for the more 
complex numerical size comparison task (772 ms). Moreover, consistent with previous findings (Yeung, 
2010), there was a significant interaction between task and task transition [F(1, 52) = 6.9, p = 0.01] 
indicating the presence of asymmetric switch costs in our paradigm. As expected based on these prior 
findings, switch costs were larger for the easier physical size comparison task (61 ms) than for the harder 
numerical size comparison task (43 ms).  
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speed-accuracy tradeoffs were observed. Second, mean error rates in voluntary task 
choice trials were low (4.5%) and did not differ among congruent (4.6%), incongruent 
(4.7%), and neutral (4.3%) task choice trials [F(2, 104) = 0.05, n.s.]. Indeed, even 
restricting our analyses to voluntary task choice trials in which an incongruent target was 
presented (in these trials, activating the correct task representation was absolutely 
necessary for achieving better than 50% performance) revealed no differences among 
congruent (8.3%), incongruent (8.3%), and neutral (7.9%) task choice trials [F(2, 104) = 
0.05, n.s.]. Our finding that error rates were as low in congruent as in incongruent and 
neutral voluntary task choice trials suggests that the distracter letters in congruent 
voluntary task choice trials primed a decision about which task to perform, regardless of 
whether they also primed the task-selection response associated with choosing that task. 
Task Choice – Mean RT 
Consistent with our second hypothesis, switch costs were larger when participants 
selected the task primed by the availability heuristic (congruent task choice trials) than 
when they did not (i.e., incongruent and neutral task choice trials). This result suggests 
that congruent task choices reflect a reduction of top-down control that can persist to 
adversely influence subsequent task performance. An alternative explanation, however, is 
that congruent task choices were made more quickly than either incongruent or neutral 
task choices, thereby shortening the amount of time between successive trials. Given that 
slowly-dissipating proactive interference from the previous trial contributes to switch 
costs (Allport, et al., 1994), such a difference in timing could also have led to elevated 
switch costs in congruent task choice trials, relative to incongruent and neutral task 
choice trials. 
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To test this alternative account, we analyzed the mean choice RT data from 
voluntary task choice trials using a mixed ANOVA with one between-participants factor, 
RCI (0 ms, 1000 ms), and three within-participants factors: previous agency (voluntary, 
explicit), current task transition (repeat, switch), and cue congruency (congruent, 
incongruent, neutral). As expected (Arrington & Logan, 2005), there was a main effect of 
current task transition [F(1, 52) = 9.2, p < 0.005]: participants were slower when they 
chose to switch tasks (877 ms) than when they chose to repeat tasks (747 ms). 
Participants were also slower to voluntarily choose a task after an explicit (875 ms) as 
compared to a voluntary (712 ms) task choice trial [F(1, 52) = 5.4, p < 0.05]. However, 
no other effects were significant, including all main effects and interactions involving cue 
congruency. Thus, it is unlikely that the elevated switch costs in congruent as compared 
to incongruent and neutral voluntary task choice trials, reflected greater proactive 
interference from the previous trial. 
Discussion 
The present results make two important contributions to the literature on 
voluntary task switching. First, they unambiguously indicate that bottom-up biases 
influence voluntary task choice. Second, they show that succumbing to such biases 
predicts reduced top-down control (i.e., increased switch costs) during task performance. 
We now discuss our findings in relation to the existing literature along with several new 
questions that they raise. 
Our finding that participants were biased to make congruent task choices (i.e., that 
they exhibited a congruent task choice bias) fits nicely with the literature on selective 
attention. Specifically, irrelevant distracters in selective attention tasks (e.g., Stroop, 
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flanker, etc.) often prime the goals and/or responses with which they are associated, 
thereby interfering with task performance (e.g., Kane & Engle, 2003; MacLeod, 1991). 
The congruent task choice bias extends these previous results by showing that irrelevant 
distracters also interfere with voluntary task choice. Future studies might therefore further 
investigate the nature of this interference. For example, motivated by studies in the 
selective attention literature (Dehaene, et al., 1998; Lavie, 2004), such studies could 
investigate whether interference during voluntary task choice (a) requires conscious 
perception of the distracter letters, (b) depends on whether a concurrent working memory 
load is present, or (c) occurs in ecologically valid settings (e.g., deciding whether to 
check e-mail or send a text message). 
Further analyses revealed that the congruent task choice bias was larger after 
explicit than after voluntary task choice trials. Moreover, following explicit task choice 
trials, this bias was greater when the distracter letters in the current trial matched the 
explicit cue in the previous trial than when they mismatched. The latter result suggests 
that the strength of the association between a distracter letter and a task choice was 
strongest (and exerted the largest influence on voluntary task choice) when the distracter 
letter had served as an explicit cue in the previous trial. Thus, by mixing voluntary and 
explicit task choice trials in the same blocks, we were able to obtain additional evidence 
that bottom-up factors influence task choice in the voluntary task switching paradigm. 
The congruent task choice bias raises an interesting question about the locus of 
bottom-up influences on voluntary task choice in our paradigm. Specifically, do the 
distracter letters influence voluntary task choice by activating (a) the decision to perform 
a particular task, (b) the response used to indicate that task choice, or (c) both?  The 
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critical distracter letters in voluntary task choice trials (i.e., ‘N’ and ‘P’) served as task 
cues in explicit task choice trials. Thus, they probably activated the decision to perform a 
specific task, regardless of whether they also activated the response used to indicate that 
choice. Consistent with this view, mean error rates in congruent, incongruent, and neutral 
voluntary task choice trials were uniformly low. Moreover, this was the case even when 
the upcoming imperative stimulus was incongruent, such that better-than-chance 
performance required activating the correct task goal. Thus, it would appear that the 
distracter letters in voluntary task choice trials activated the decision to perform a 
particular task.  
There are two ways in which the critical distracter letters in congruent voluntary 
task choice trials could activate the decision to perform a particular task, and both are 
consistent with a bottom-up influence of the distracters on voluntary task choice. First, 
the distracter letters could directly prime the decision, or goal, to perform a particular 
task. Second, the distracter letters could prime a particular task-selection response which, 
in turn, leads to the decision to perform a particular task (i.e., via response-decision 
priming or because participants strategically activate the appropriate task goal after 
noticing that they make a particular task-selection response). In both of these scenarios, 
the distracter letters influence voluntary task choice in a bottom-up fashion (Arrington, et 
al., 2010). However, these scenarios differ with regard to whether this influence is direct 
or indirect. Future studies might therefore be conducted to distinguish between these 
interesting possibilities. For example, suppose that the distracter letters influence task 
choice only indirectly through response-decision priming. In that case, the congruent task 
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choice bias should vanish when the distracter letters are associated with the decision to 
perform a task, but not with the response used to indicate that decision. 
Given that participants did not always make congruent task choices, one might 
wonder why the congruent task choice bias was present in some trials but not others. An 
intriguing possibility is that top-down control varied over the course of the experiment 
due to such factors as fatigue (De Jong, 2000), diminished motivation (Gray, 2001), or a 
bias to avoid expending cognitive effort (Botvinick, 2007; Kool, McGuire, Rosen, & 
Botvinick, 2010). Such temporary reductions of control may have reduced the efficiency 
of the top-down random task sequence heuristic, thereby allowing the bottom-up 
availability heuristic to more strongly influence task choice (Demanet, et al., 2010). 
Future studies could test this hypothesis by manipulating various factors (e.g., fatigue) 
that are thought to affect the recruitment of top-down control. 
We have argued that the congruent task choice bias reflects a bottom-up influence 
on voluntary task choice. A typical signature of such influences, however, is that they 
dissipate with time. For example, the task-repetition bias is usually weaker when the 
interval between trials is relatively long than when it is relatively short (Arrington & 
Logan, 2004, 2005; Demanet, et al., 2010), likely because top-down processes have more 
time to select a task (and override the availability heuristic) before the next voluntary cue 
appears (Arrington, 2008; Arrington & Logan, 2005). Given such considerations, one 
might have expected weaker task-repetition and congruent task choice biases at the long 
RCI than at the short RCI. However, neither of these biases varied with the duration of 
the RCI. Our claim that the congruent task choice bias reflects a bottom-up influence on 
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voluntary task choice may therefore seem at odds with the rest of the voluntary task 
switching literature.  
However, this discrepancy is likely accounted for by an important difference 
between our paradigm and those typically used in voluntary task switching studies. In our 
paradigm, participants cannot predict whether a voluntary or an explicit task choice cue 
will appear in the next trial. In most other paradigms, however, participants always know 
when a voluntary task choice will be required. Given the uncertainty in our paradigm, 
top-down processes may not be recruited to choose a task during the RCI because such 
recruitment would often constitute a waste of effort. For example, voluntarily choosing to 
perform the numerical size comparison task during the RCI would be a waste of effort if 
an explicit cue to perform the physical size comparison task appeared in the next trial. 
Critically, if top-down processes were not recruited to choose a task during the RCI, then 
the task primed by the distracter letters would influence task choice just as much when 
the RCI was long as when it was short, exactly as we observed. Thus, our finding that the 
congruent task choice bias was not reduced over time likely reflects the inclusion of a 
high percentage of explicit task choice trials in our paradigm, which was necessary to 
associate the distracter letters in voluntary task choice trials with the representations they 
were meant to activate.  
Our second finding was that switch costs in voluntary task choice trials were 
higher after congruent task choices than after incongruent task choices. This result 
suggests that congruent task choices reflected reductions of top-down control that 
persisted to influence subsequent task performance. However, this interpretation raises 
the question of why congruency effects during task performance were not also increased 
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following congruent task choice trials. Numerous findings indicate that top-down control 
is required to limit interference from irrelevant stimuli (Egner & Hirsch, 2005; Gazzaley, 
Cooney, Rissman, & D'Esposito, 2005; Lavie, 2004). Thus, if congruent task choices 
were associated with a reduction of control that led to higher switch costs, then why were 
congruency effects not similarly elevated? 
The answer to this question is far from obvious. However, factors influencing 
switch costs often fail to influence congruency effects. Several studies, for example, have 
reported that reducing the time between an explicit task cue and an imperative stimulus 
increases switch costs, but not congruency effects (Fagot, 1994; Hübner, Kluwe, Luna-
Rodriguez, & Peters, 2004; Monsell, Sumner, & Waters, 2003; Rogers & Monsell, 1995; 
see Kiesel, et al., 2010 for a review). Shortening the duration of the cue-target interval is 
thought to reduce the time allowed by control process to prepare for an upcoming task 
switch (Meiran, 1996). Thus, these prior results also show that a reduction of top-down 
control can lead to increased switch costs in the absence of a change in the size of 
congruency effects. 
One possible account of this dissociation is motivated by models that distinguish 
between two aspects of a task’s representation in working memory: (1) the task-level 
representation and (2) the parameter-level representation (Logan & Gordon, 2001; 
Rubinstein, Meyer, & Evans, 2001). The task-level representation is roughly equal to the 
goal or intention of performing a task. The parameter-level representation specifies the 
relevant stimuli, responses, and rules (e.g., S-R mappings) that underlie task 
performance. In one model (Rubinstein, et al., 2001), the task-level representation is 
activated during cue-triggered task preparation while the parameter-level representation 
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is activated only after the imperative stimulus is presented. Thus, a reduction of top-down 
control during voluntary task choice might delay the formation of a task-level 
representation (i.e., the goal of performing a particular task), thereby biasing participants 
toward a congruent task choice and increased switch costs. However, it might not 
influence the parameter-level representation, which is activated only after an imperative 
stimulus appears. Therefore, congruency effects, which often index the activation of a 
currently-irrelevant S-R mapping (MacLeod, 1991), might be unchanged. Future studies 
will clearly be needed to fully understand the dissociation between switch costs and 
congruency effects that we and others have observed. At present, we simply note that this 
dissociation is consistent with the existing literature. 
Finally, we ruled out an alternative account of our finding that switch costs were 
higher after congruent task choices than after incongruent and neutral task choices. 
Specifically, we ruled out the possibility that the elevated switch costs in congruent task 
choice trials reflected greater proactive interference from the previous trial. Proactive 
interference is more pronounced when the interval between successive imperative stimuli 
is relatively short than when it is relatively long (Allport, et al., 1994). Thus, relatively 
high levels of such interference could have contributed to the relatively high switch costs 
in congruent task choice trials if congruent task choices were made more quickly than 
incongruent task choices (thereby shortening the interval between successive imperative 
stimuli). Weighing against this possibility, mean task choice RT did not differ for 
congruent, incongruent, and neutral task choices. Thus, there is no evidence to suggest 
that heightened proactive interference contributed to the relatively high switch costs in 
congruent task choice trials. 
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In sum, the present results provide critical support for the view that bottom-up 
biases influence task choice in the voluntary task switching paradigm (Demanet, et al., 
2010; Mayr & Bell, 2006). Moreover, they show that succumbing to such biases predicts 
reduced top-down control during subsequent task performance. Given that our paradigm 
provides a relatively unambiguous measure of bottom-up biases on voluntary task choice, 
future studies might use it to more fully characterize (a) which representations contribute 
to such biases and (b) why such biases exert a stronger influence on task choice in some 
trials than in others. 
  
78 
 
Acknowledgements 
The authors thank Sean Masters and Usman Ashraf for their assistance with 
running participants, and Baptiste Liefooghe and Yoav Kessler for their helpful criticisms 
on an earlier version of the manuscript. This research was supported by a Rackham 
Graduate Student Research Grant and a Psychology Dissertation Grant to Joseph M. Orr 
and by startup funds from the University of Michigan to Daniel H. Weissman. This work 
was conducted with Daniel H. Weissman. 
 
  
79 
 
References 
Allport, A., Styles, E. A., & Hsieh, S. (1994). Shifting intentional set: Exploring the 
dynamic control of tasks. In C. Umilta & M. Moscovitch (Eds.), Control of 
Cognitive Processes: Attention and Performance XV (Vol. 15, pp. 421–452). 
Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 
Arrington, C. M. (2008). The effect of stimulus availability on task choice in voluntary 
task switching. Memory & Cognition, 36(5), 991-997. doi: 10.3758/mc.36.5.991 
Arrington, C. M., & Logan, G. D. (2004). The cost of a voluntary task switch. 
Psychological Science, 15(9), 610-615. doi: 10.1111/j.0956-7976.2004.00728.x 
Arrington, C. M., & Logan, G. D. (2005). Voluntary task switching: chasing the elusive 
homunculus. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and 
Cognition, 31(4), 683-702. doi: 10.1037/0278-7393.31.4.683 
Arrington, C. M., Weaver, S. M., & Pauker, R. L. (2010). Stimulus-based priming of task 
choice during voluntary task switching. Journal of Experimental Psychology: 
Learning, Memory, and Cognition, 36(4), 1060-1067. doi: 10.1037/a0019646 
Arrington, C. M., & Yates, M. M. (2009). The role of attentional networks in voluntary 
task switching. Psychonomic Bulletin & Review, 16(4), 660-665. doi: 
10.3758/PBR.16.4.660 
Botvinick, M. M. (2007). Conflict monitoring and decision making: reconciling two 
perspectives on anterior cingulate function. Cognitive, Affective, & Behavioral 
Neuroscience, 7(4), 356. doi: 10.3758/CABN.7.4.356 
80 
 
Corbetta, M., Patel, G., & Shulman, G. L. (2008). The reorienting system of the human 
brain: from environment to theory of mind. Neuron, 58(3), 306. doi: 
10.1016/j.neuron.2008.04.017 
De Jong, R. (2000). An intention-activation account of residual switch costs. In S. 
Monsell & J. Driver (Eds.), Control of Cognitive Processes: Attention and 
Performance XVIII (pp. 357-376). Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 
Dehaene, S., Naccache, L., Le Clec'H, G., Koechlin, E., Mueller, M., Dehaene-Lambertz, 
G., et al. (1998). Imaging unconscious semantic priming. Nature, 395(6702), 597-
600. doi: 10.1038/26967 
Demanet, J., Liefooghe, B., Verbruggen, F., & Vandierendonck, A. (2010). Voluntary 
task switching under load: Contribution of top-down and bottom-up factors in 
goal-directed behavior. Psychonomic Bulletin & Review, 17(3), 387-393. doi: 
10.3758/PBR.17.3.387 
Egner, T., & Hirsch, J. (2005). Cognitive control mechanisms resolve conflict through 
cortical amplification of task-relevant information. Nat Neurosci, 8(12), 1784-
1790. doi: 10.1038/nn1594 
Fagot, C. (1994). Chronometric investigations of task switching. Unpublished Ph.D. 
thesis. University of California, San Diego.  
Gazzaley, A., Cooney, J. W., Rissman, J., & D'Esposito, M. (2005). Top-down 
suppression deficit underlies working memory impairment in normal aging. Nat 
Neurosci, 8(10), 1298-1300. doi: 10.1038/nn1543 
Gray, J. R. (2001). Emotional modulation of cognitive control: Approach-withdrawal 
states double-dissociate spatial from verbal two-back task performance. Journal 
81 
 
of Experimental Psychology: General, 130(3), 436. doi: 10.1037/0096-
3445.130.3.436 
Henik, A., & Tzelgov, J. (1982). Is three greater than five: The relation between physical 
and semantic size in comparison tasks. Memory & Cognition, 10(4), 389-395.  
Hommel, B. (1998). Event files: Evidence for automatic integration of stimulus-response 
episodes. Visual Cognition, 5(1), 183-216. doi: 10.1080/713756773 
Horoufchin, H., Philipp, A. M., & Koch, I. (2010). The dissipating task-repetition benefit 
in cued task switching: Task-set decay or temporal distinctiveness? Journal of 
Experimental Psychology: Human Perception and Performance. doi: 
10.1037/a0020557 
Hübner, M., Kluwe, R. H., Luna-Rodriguez, A., & Peters, A. (2004). Task preparation 
and stimulus-evoked competition. Acta Psychologica, 115(2-3), 211-234. doi: doi: 
DOI: 10.1016/j.actpsy.2003.12.007 
Kane, M. J., & Engle, R. W. (2003). Working-memory capacity and the control of 
attention: The contributions of goal neglect, response competition, and task set to 
Stroop interference. Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, 132(1), 47-70. 
doi: 10.1037/0096-3445.132.1.47 
Kiesel, A., Steinhauser, M., Wendt, M., Falkenstein, M., Jost, K., Philipp, A. M., et al. 
(2010). Control and interference in task switching—A review. Psychological 
Bulletin, 136(5), 849-874. doi: 10.1037/a0019842 
Koch, I. (2001). Automatic and intentional activation of task sets. Journal of 
Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition, 27(6), 1474-1486. 
doi: 10.1037/0278-7393.27.6.1474 
82 
 
Kool, W., McGuire, J. T., Rosen, Z. B., & Botvinick, M. M. (2010). Decision making and 
the avoidance of cognitive demand. Journal of Experimental Psychology: 
General, 139(4), 665-682. doi: 10.1037/a0020198 
Lavie, N. (2004). Load theory of selective attention and cognitive control. Journal of 
Experimental Psychology: General, 133(3), 339. doi: 10.1037/0096-
3445.133.3.339 
Lien, M.-C., & Ruthruff, E. (2008). Inhibition of task set: Converging evidence from task 
choice in the voluntary task-switching paradigm. Psychonomic Bulletin & Review, 
15(6), 1111-1116. doi: 10.3758/pbr.15.6.1111 
Logan, G. D., & Gordon, R. D. (2001). Executive control of visual attention in dual-task 
situations. Psychological Review, 108(2), 393-434. doi: 10.1037/0033-
295x.108.2.393 
MacLeod, C. M. (1991). Half a century of research on the Stroop effect: An integrative 
review. Psychological Bulletin, 109(2), 163-203. doi: 10.1037/0033-
2909.109.2.163 
Mayr, U., & Bell, T. (2006). On How to Be Unpredictable: Evidence From the Voluntary 
Task-Switching Paradigm. Psychological Science, 17(9), 774-780. doi: 
10.1111/j.1467-9280.2006.01781.x 
Meiran, N. (1996). Reconfiguration of processing mode prior to task performance. 
Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition, 22(6), 
1423-1442. doi: 10.1037/0278-7393.22.6.1423 
Monsell, S., Sumner, P., & Waters, H. (2003). Task-set reconfiguration with predictable 
and unpredictable task switches. Memory & Cognition, 31(3), 327-342.  
83 
 
Posner, M. I., Snyder, C. R., & Davidson, B. J. (1980). Attention and the detection of 
signals. Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, 109(2), 160-174. doi: 
10.1037/0096-3445.109.2.160 
Rogers, R. D., & Monsell, S. (1995). Costs of a predictable switch between simple 
cognitive tasks. Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, 124(2), 207-231. 
doi: 10.1037/0096-3445.124.2.207 
Rubinstein, J. S., Meyer, D. E., & Evans, J. E. (2001). Executive control of cognitive 
processes in task switching. Journal of Experimental Psychology-Human 
Perception and Performance, 27(4), 763-797. doi: 10.1037/0096-1523.27.4.763 
Verbruggen, F., & Logan, G. D. (2008). Automatic and controlled response inhibition: 
Associative learning in the go/no-go and stop-signal paradigms. Journal of 
Experimental Psychology: General, 137(4), 649-672. doi: 10.1037/a0013170 
Yeung, N. (2010). Bottom-up influences on voluntary task switching: The elusive 
homunculus escapes. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, 
and Cognition, 36(2), 348. doi: 10.1037/a0017894 
 
84 
 
Chapter 4   
The influence of response conflict on voluntary task switching: 
A novel test of the conflict monitoring model 
 
Abstract 
The conflict monitoring model of cognitive control posits that response conflict triggers a 
top-down enhancement of a task’s representation in working memory. In the present 
study, we conducted a novel test of the conflict monitoring model using a voluntary task 
switching paradigm. We predicted that a task’s representation would be enhanced 
following events associated with high response conflict (i.e., incongruent trials and 
incorrect responses), leading participants to voluntarily choose to repeat that task more 
often after these events than after events associated with low response conflict (i.e., 
congruent trials and correct responses). In two experiments, performance following 
incongruent trials was consistent with the conflict monitoring model. However, 
performance following incorrect trials did not fit with the model’s predictions. These 
findings provide novel support for the conflict monitoring model while revealing new 
effects of incorrect trials that the model cannot explain. 
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Introduction 
How do top-down control processes optimize future performance after a 
distracting stimulus activates a conflicting response?  According to the influential conflict 
monitoring model, they enhance a task’s representation in working memory, which leads 
to an increase of attention toward task-relevant stimuli (Botvinick, Braver, Barch, Carter, 
& Cohen, 2001; Botvinick, Cohen, & Carter, 2004). Consistent with this view, distracter 
interference is lower after high-conflict trials than after low-conflict trials, a phenomenon 
known as conflict adaptation (Gratton, Coles, & Donchin, 1992). 
However, the nature—and even existence—of conflict adaptation remains 
controversial. Indeed, some investigators have claimed that conflict adaptation vanishes 
when bottom-up processes like stimulus and response priming are properly controlled 
(Hommel, Proctor, & Vu, 2004; Mayr, Awh, & Laurey, 2003; but see also Ullsperger, 
Bylsma, & Botvinick, 2005). Efforts to distinguish conflict adaptation from these 
confounds typically involve discarding large numbers of trials (e.g., Kerns, et al., 2004) 
or simultaneously modeling the effects of top-down and bottom-up variables on task 
performance (e.g., Notebaert & Verguts, 2007). However, each of these approaches has 
its limitations: the first requires a relatively large number of trials, and the second 
requires an accurate and complete model of the variables that influence task performance.  
By using the voluntary task switching (VTS) paradigm (Arrington & Logan, 
2004, 2005), the present study avoids these pitfalls and provides a novel test of the 
conflict monitoring model. In each trial of this paradigm, participants are instructed to 
randomly choose one of two possible tasks to perform, after which an imperative 
stimulus is presented (Arrington & Logan, 2005, Experiment 6). Critically, the stimuli 
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and responses associated with task performance are distinct from those associated with 
task choice. Thus, effects of response conflict on subsequent task choice are not 
contaminated by stimulus or response priming. 
Voluntary task choice is thought to reflect a combination of top-down and 
bottom-up processes (Arrington & Logan, 2004; Mayr & Bell, 2006). First, a top-down 
representativeness heuristic is thought to choose a task by comparing the recent trial 
history to a representative random sequence (Arrington & Logan, 2005) or by performing 
a mental coin flip (Mayr & Bell, 2006). Second, a bottom-up availability heuristic is 
thought to choose a task by selecting the task representation that is currently most active 
in working memory (Arrington & Logan, 2005). We reasoned that if response conflict in 
trial n is resolved by increasing the activation of a task’s representation in working 
memory, then bottom-up processes should be more likely to select the same task in trial 
n+1 than to select a different task. The conflict monitoring model therefore predicts that 
participants will repeat their task choices more often after high-conflict than after low-
conflict trials. 
Both correctly performed incongruent trials and errors are associated with high 
amounts of response conflict in the conflict monitoring model (Botvinick, et al., 2001; 
Yeung, Botvinick, & Cohen, 2004). The model also posits that the same mechanism 
detects conflict in these trial types. Thus, each of these trial types should be linked to an 
increase in the activation of the current task’s representation in working memory1
                                                 
1 In the conflict monitoring model (Botvinick, et al., 2001), errors are linked to a shift along the speed-
accuracy tradeoff function that leads participants to respond more slowly and more accurately after making 
an error than after making a correct response. However, there is no reason why such a shift could not co-
occur with an increase in the activation of the current task’s representation in working memory. 
. 
Consistent with this view, incongruent trials and errors activate overlapping regions of 
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the anterior cingulate cortex, which is thought to detect response conflict (Kerns, et al., 
2004; for a review, see Ridderinkhof, Ullsperger, Crone, & Nieuwenhuis, 2004). 
Moreover, interference is reduced not only after incongruent trials (Gratton, et al., 1992), 
but also after errors (Burle, Possamaï, Vidal, Bonnet, & Hasbroucq, 2002; Ridderinkhof, 
2002).  
Given these considerations, we predicted that participants would repeat their task 
choices more often after correctly performed incongruent (versus congruent) trials and 
more often after incorrect (versus correct) responses. Our findings supported the model’s 
claims with regard to incongruent trials, but not with regard to incorrect responses. Thus, 
while providing partial support for the model, our findings also dissociated incongruent 
and incorrect trials in a way that the model did not predict. This result has important 
implications for the conflict monitoring model and, more generally, for our understanding 
of human performance under conditions of distraction. 
Experiment 1 
Method 
Participants 
Thirty-nine participants from the University of Michigan community completed 
Experiment 1. Participants whose mean accuracy fell below 85% (two participants) or 
whose switch rates fell above 90% (four participants) or below 10% (one participant) 
were excluded from analysis. This yielded 32 participants with usable data. These 
participants had an average age of 20.1 years; 10 were male. 
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Apparatus and Stimuli 
Participants performed a VTS version of the number Stroop task (Henik & 
Tzelgov, 1982). In each trial, they were cued by a central question mark to choose 
whether they would compare two upcoming digits in terms of their numerical size or their 
physical size (Figure 4.1). As in Arrington and Logan (2004), participants were instructed 
to choose each task an equal number of times and in a random order across trials. No 
pressure to choose quickly was given in the instructions, and the question mark remained 
on the screen until a choice was made. Task choices were indicated by using the index or 
middle finger of the left hand, respectively, to press the D or F key on a computer 
keyboard (task-key mappings were counterbalanced across participants).  
Each task choice was followed by a 500 ms delay, after which two digits were 
presented. One digit appeared 1.7° of visual angle above fixation while the other 
appeared 1.7° of visual angle below fixation. One of the digits was numerically large (7, 
8, or 9) while the other was numerically small (1, 2, or 3). Moreover, one digit was 
physically large (subtending 1.1° visual angle) while the other physically small 
(subtending 0.6° visual angle). In congruent trials (50%), the numerically large digit was 
also physically large. In incongruent trials (50%), the numerically large digit was 
physically small. The trial sequence was randomized such that exact stimulus repetitions 
were separated by at least three trials (i.e., a digit appearing in trial n could not be 
repeated until trial n+3).  
Participants were instructed to indicate which of the two digits (top or bottom) 
was larger as quickly and as accurately as possible. If they chose to perform the 
numerical comparison task, they indicated which of the two digits was numerically 
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larger. If they chose to perform the physical comparison task, they indicated which of the 
two digits was physically larger. The digits remained on the screen until the participant 
responded, or until 3000 ms elapsed. Responses were made by using the index or middle 
finger of the right hand, respectively, to press the J or K key on a computer keyboard 
(task-key mappings were counterbalanced across participants). The next trial was 
presented after a short (100 ms) or a long (1000 ms) response-cue interval (RCI). 
Participants viewed the stimuli on a 17” CRT monitor at a distance of 60 cm. A 
chin rest was used for head stabilization. Stimuli were generated and displayed using 
Presentation software (Neurobehavioral Systems Inc., Albany, CA).  
 
Figure 4.1. Experimental design. 
A typical trial in Experiment 1. Participants performed a voluntary task switching version of the 
number Stroop task, which involved comparing two digits with respect to their numerical size or 
with respect to their physical size. Each trial began with the presentation of a question mark (?). This 
indicated that participants should choose which task to perform in the current trial by pressing a 
button with the middle or index finger of their left hand. Participants were not pressured to choose 
quickly, and the question mark remained on the screen until a choice was made. After a 500 ms 
delay, the two digits appeared. One was numerically large (e.g., 7) while the other was numerically 
small (e.g., 7). Further, one was presented in a large font (e.g., 3) while the other was presented in a 
small font (e.g., 7). In congruent trials, the numerically large digit was also physically large. In 
incongruent trials, the numerically large digit was physically small.  Depending on the current task, 
participants decided which of the two digits (top or bottom) was numerically or physically larger.  
They were instructed to indicate their decision as quickly and as accurately as possible by pressing a 
button with their right index finger or their right middle finger. The next trial began after a 100 ms 
or 1000 ms response-to-cue interval (RCI). 
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Procedure 
Participants first practiced the number and size comparison tasks separately. Next, 
they practiced one block of the VTS paradigm. If a participant’s task choice proportions 
and switch proportion in this block were not both within 50 ± 10%, then the instructions 
to choose each task equally often and in a random order were repeated and participants 
performed another practice block. This process was repeated until a participant’s task 
choice proportions and switch proportion were both within 50 ± 10% (on average, each 
participant performed one practice block). Finally, participants performed 15 blocks of 
the VTS paradigm, each of which comprised 72 trials.  
Data Analysis  
 Task choice data were analyzed with respect to the proportion of trials in 
which participants switched tasks (i.e., switch rates). Task performance data were 
analyzed in terms of mean reaction time (RT) and accuracy. Accuracy data were arcsine 
transformed prior to analysis in order to yield a more normal distribution (Cohen & 
Cohen, 1983). Omnibus tests were conducted using repeated measures analysis of 
variance (ANOVA); post-hoc pairwise comparisons were conducted using the Newman-
Keuls test. 
Unless otherwise noted, data from error trials and trials immediately following 
error trials were discarded (on average, 12.2% of trials). We also discarded trials in which 
either the current trial RT or the previous trial RT was (1) faster than 200 ms or (2) 
slower than three standard deviations from the participant’s mean RT (on average, 5.7% 
of trials). In total, 16.7% of trials were discarded on average.  
Results 
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Switch Rate Data 
As instructed, participants chose the two tasks equally often [numerical task, 
50.4%; physical task, 49.6%; t(31) = 0.75, n.s.]. Moreover, replicating previous findings 
(e.g., Arrington & Logan, 2004), switch rates fell below 50% [45.1%; 95% CI: 40.2% - 
50.0%], indicating a bias to repeat the previously selected task [t(31) = -2.0, p = 0.05].  
Our first main prediction was that switch rates would be lower after incongruent 
trials than after congruent trials. To test this prediction, the switch rate data were 
submitted to a repeated-measures ANOVA with four factors: previous congruency 
(congruent, incongruent), RCI (short, long), previous task alternation (repeat, switch), 
and previous task (numerical comparison, physical comparison) (see Table 4.1 for the 
mean switch rate in each cell of this design). The main effect of previous congruency did 
not achieve significance. However, we observed a significant interaction between 
previous congruency and RCI [F(1,31) = 5.7, p < 0.05; Figure 4.2a]. Participants repeated 
their previous task choice more often when the previous trial was incongruent than when 
it was congruent at the long RCI [2.4%; F(1,31) = 5.9, p < 0.05], but not at the short RCI 
[0.1%; F(1,31) = 0.03, n.s.]. This result is consistent with prior work indicating that the 
effect of enhancing a task’s representation on subsequent performance can take time to 
develop (Notebaert, Gevers, Verbruggen, & Liefooghe, 2006). Thus, the switch rate data 
supported our first main prediction. 
Three additional expected effects were also significant. First, in line with prior 
results (e.g., Arrington & Logan, 2004), there was a main effect of RCI because switch 
rates were lower at the short RCI (40.7%; 95% CI: 34.8% - 46.6%) than at the long RCI 
(47.0%; 95% CI: 41.2% - 52.7%) [F(1,31) = 29.8, p < 0.001]. Further analyses revealed  
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Table 4.1  
Mean switch rates for Experiment 1 and Experiment 2. 
RCI
Previous 
Task 
Alternation 
Previous 
Congruency
Previous 
Task Experiment 1 Experiment 2
100 ms Repeat Con Numerical 50% 	(3%) 54% (5%)
Physical 51% 	(4%) 54% (5%)
Inc Numerical 51% 	(4%) 54% (4%)
Physical 51% 	(4%) 51% (5%)
Switch Con Numerical 30% 	(4%) 42% (5%)
Physical 32% 	(3%) 42% (5%)
Inc Numerical 30% 	(4%) 41% (5%)
Physical 31% 	(3%) 38% (5%)
1000 ms Repeat Con Numerical 57% 	(3%) 59% (4%)
Physical 58% 	(4%) 56% (5%)
Inc Numerical 56% 	(3%) 56% (4%)
Physical 56% 	(3%) 55% (5%)
Switch Con Numerical 38% 	(3%) 41% (4%)
Physical 40% 	(4%) 39% (5%)
Inc Numerical 35% 	(4%) 40% (5%)
Physical 36% 	(3%) 40% (5%)  
that the bias to choose the previously selected task (as indicated by a switch rate of less 
than 50%) was present at the short RCI [t(31) = -3.2, p < .005]. However, consistent with 
some prior results (Arrington & Logan, 2005, Experiment 6), it was absent at the long 
RCI [t(31) = -0.76, n.s.]. Second, there was a main effect of previous task alternation, 
such that switch rates were lower after switch trials (33.9%) than after repeat trials 
(53.8%) [F(1,31) = 37.1, p < 0.001]. This finding fits with prior data from the VTS 
paradigm indicating that participants often avoid returning to a task from which they 
recently switched away (Lien & Ruthruff, 2008), consistent with claims that switching 
away from a task is accomplished by inhibiting the associated task representation (c.f. 
Mayr & Keele, 2000). Third, there was an interaction between previous congruency and 
previous task alternation [F(1,31) = 4.4, p = 0.05]. Consistent with the view that conflict 
leads to an enhancement of a task’s representation in working memory, the effect of 
previous task alternation on switch rates was larger when the previous trial was 
incongruent [20.7%; F(1,31) = 38.2, p < 0.001] than when it was congruent [19.0%; 
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F(1,31) = 34.9, p < 0.001]. In sum, these additional effects in the switch rate data both 
replicated prior work and further supported our hypothesis.  
 
 
Figure 4.2. Effects of previous congruency and RCI on current trial switch rate. 
A. In Experiment 1, switch rates were lower following incongruent (versus congruent) trials after the 
long response-cue-interval (1000 ms), but not after the short response-cue-interval (100 ms). B. In 
Experiment 2, switch rates were uniformly lower following incongruent (versus congruent) trials. 
Error bars represent one standard error of the mean.   
 
Our second main prediction was that switch rates would be lower after incorrect 
than after correct responses. To test this hypothesis, switch rates were submitted to a 
repeated-measures ANOVA with two factors: previous accuracy (correct, error) and RCI 
(short, long). As hypothesized, there was a main effect of previous accuracy because 
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switch rates were lower after incorrect (25.9%) than after correct (45.1%) responses 
[F(1,31) = 61.9, p < 0.001]. We also observed a significant interaction between previous 
accuracy and RCI [F(1,31) = 6.9, p < 0.001; Figure 4.3a]. Mirroring the interaction 
between previous congruency and RCI described earlier in this section, the effect of 
previous accuracy on switch rates was larger at the long RCI [22.4%; F(1,31) = 71.7, p < 
0.001] than at the short RCI [16.1%; F(1,31) = 33.2, p < 0.001]. This result suggests that 
the effect of previous accuracy on switch rates may be strategic in nature, as it takes time 
to develop (Notebaert, et al., 2006). In sum, the switch rate data supported our second 
main prediction.  
 
Figure 4.3. Effect of previous accuracy and RCI on current trial switch rate. 
A. In Experiment 1, switch rates were lower after incorrect than after correct trials, particularly at 
the long RCI. B. In Experiment 2, switch rates were higher after incorrect trials than after correct 
trials at the short RCI. At the long RCI, however, switch rates did not differ after incorrect and 
correct trials. Error bars represent one standard error of the mean. 
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 Incorrect responses were more frequent in switch than in repeat trials (see 
Accuracy Data below). Therefore, we conducted an additional analysis to determine 
whether the lower switch rates following incorrect responses were simply a byproduct of 
the relatively low switch rates following switch trials that we described earlier in this 
section. To investigate this possibility, switch rates were submitted to a repeated-
measures ANOVA with two factors: previous accuracy (correct, error) and previous task 
alternation (repeat, switch) (data from two participants were not included due to an 
insufficient number of error trials, i.e., less than five errors for any cell of the design). 
Ruling out this possibility, we observed a significant interaction between previous 
accuracy and previous task alternation [F(1,29) = 7.3, p = 0.01], which occurred because 
the effect of previous accuracy on switch rate was actually larger when the previous trial 
was a repeat (23.6%) than when it was a switch (15.5%). Moreover, the effect of previous 
accuracy was significant after both repeat trials [F(1,29) = 55.1, p < 0.001] and switch 
trials [F(1,29) = 34.0, p < 0.001]. Thus, the effect of previous accuracy on switch rate did 
not stem from the fact that incorrect responses occurred more often in switch than in 
repeat trials.  
Reaction Time Data 
The reaction time data were largely as expected, which was revealed by a 
repeated-measures ANOVA with four factors: RCI (short, long), current task alternation 
(repeat, switch), previous congruency (congruent, incongruent), and current congruency 
(congruent, incongruent) (see Table 4.2 for the mean reaction time in each cell of the 
design). For example, participants responded more slowly at the long RCI than at the 
short RCI [694 ms vs. 670 ms; F(1,31) = 26.7, p < 0.001], in switch than in repeat trials 
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[729 ms vs. 635 ms; F(1,31) = 51.6, p = 0.001], and in incongruent than in congruent 
trials [734 ms vs. 631 ms; F(1,31) = 146.4, p < 0.001]. 
Three additional findings further suggested that a task’s representation in working 
memory was enhanced following an incongruent trial. First, there was a three-way 
interaction between current task alternation, previous congruency, and current 
congruency [F(1,31) = 15.9, p < 0.001]: conflict adaptation was greater in repeat trials 
[F(1,31) = 51.0, p < 0.001; Figure 4.4A] than in switch trials [F(1,31) = 7.0, p < 0.05; 
Figure 4.4B]. This result fits with previous reports suggesting that enhancing a task’s 
representation to resolve conflict aids subsequent performance of the same task, but not 
of a different task (Brown, et al., 2007; Egner, 2008; Notebaert & Verguts, 2008). 
Second, there was a four-way interaction among all of the factors [F(1,31) = 4.5, p < 
0.05]. Consistent with previous results (Notebaert, et al., 2006), post-hoc tests revealed 
that conflict adaptation in repeat trials was greater (p < 0.05) at the long RCI (68 ms) than 
at the short RCI (23 ms). In contrast, conflict adaptation in switch trials did not differ (p = 
0.67) after the long (22 ms) versus the short (23 ms) RCI (see Table 4.2). Third, there 
was an interaction between previous congruency and current task alternation [F(1,31) = 
5.2, p < 0.05] indicating that switch costs were higher when the previous trial was 
incongruent [103 ms, F(1,31) = 48.9, p < 0.001] than when it was congruent [86 ms, 
F(1,31) = 47.6, p < 0.001]. Put simply, as in prior studies (Brown, et al., 2007; Goschke, 
2000), it was relatively difficult to switch away from a task following an incongruent 
trial, further suggesting that response conflict is resolved by enhancing a task’s 
representation in working memory. In sum, the RT data were consistent with the conflict 
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monitoring model’s claim that response conflict triggers a top-down enhancement of a 
task’s representation in working memory.   
 
Figure 4.4. Effects of previous congruency and current congruency on response time. 
In both Experiments 1 and 2, the effect of current congruency was reduced when the previous trial 
was incongruent, relative to when it was congruent. Moreover, this effect was larger in repeat trials 
(A, C) than in switch trials (B, D). Error bars represent one standard error of the mean.   
 
Three effects that were less critical for testing our hypotheses were also 
significant. First, RCI interacted with current task alternation [F(1,31) = 7.4, p = .011] 
because switch costs were larger at the short RCI [106 ms, F(1,31) = 59.3, p < 0.001] 
than at the long RCI [83 ms, F(1,31) = 36.2, p < 0.001]. This result fits with previous 
work suggesting that proactive interference from the preceding task set diminishes with 
increasing time between trials (Allport, Styles, & Hsieh, 1994; Meiran, 1996). Second, 
RCI interacted with previous congruency [F(1,31) = 6.5, p < 0.05] because RT was faster 
after incongruent trials (667 ms) than after congruent trials (674 ms) at the short RCI, 
while the opposite pattern was observed at the long RCI (incongruent, 697 ms; congruent, 
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691 ms). However, these simple effects were neither significant (p > 0.10 in both cases) 
nor crucial for testing our hypotheses, so we will not discuss them further. Third, RCI 
interacted with current congruency [F(1,31) = 19.9, p < 0.001] because congruency 
effects were larger at the long RCI [113 ms; F(1,31) = 171.7, p < 0.05] than at the short 
RCI [92 ms; F(1,31) = 106.6, p < 0.05]. This result replicates some previous findings 
(Meiran, 1996; Rogers & Monsell, 1995) but not others (Goschke, 2000).  
Finally, the conflict monitoring model predicts that a task’s representation should 
be enhanced after an incorrect response. Such enhancement is thought to involve raising 
the threshold for selecting a response in the next trial, resulting in slower, more accurate 
performance (Botvinick, et al., 2001; Yeung, et al., 2004). Consistent with prior data 
(Laming, 1968; Rabbitt, 1966), participants responded more slowly after incorrect than 
after correct responses [745 ms vs. 671.6 ms; F(1,31) = 23.5, p < 0.001]. As discussed 
earlier with respect to the RT data, such enhancement is also thought to result in a 
combination of smaller congruency effects and larger switch costs. However, separate 
repeated-measures ANOVAs revealed no effect of previous accuracy (correct, incorrect) 
on congruency effects (F < 1) or switch costs (F < 1) in the current trial. Thus, the RT 
data provided little evidence to suggest that a task’s representation was enhanced 
following an incorrect response (see also Jentzsch & Dudschig, 2009). 
Accuracy Data 
The accuracy data mirrored much of the RT data, as revealed by a repeated-
measures ANOVA with four factors: RCI (short, long), current task alternation (repeat, 
switch), previous congruency (congruent, incongruent), and current congruency 
(congruent, incongruent) (the mean error rate for each cell of this ANOVA is presented in 
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Table 4.3. First, error rates were higher in switch than in repeat trials [7.3% vs. 4.1%; 
F(1,31) = 60.9, p < 0.001]. Second, error rates were higher in current incongruent than in 
current congruent trials [7.3% vs. 4.1%; F(1,31) = 150.7, p < 0.001]. Third, there was an 
interaction between previous congruency and current congruency [F(1,31) = 21.2, p < 
0.001]. Replicating previous findings (Cho, Orr, Cohen, & Carter, 2009), the congruency 
effect in the current trial was smaller when the previous trial was incongruent (5.8%; 
F(1,31) = 83.4, p < 0.001) than when it was congruent (9.1%; F(1,31) = 175.0, p < 
0.001). Moreover, this conflict adaptation effect remained significant even after we 
removed trials in which the response and/or the position of the numerically larger digit 
and/or the position of the physically larger digit was repeated from the previous trial 
[F(1,31) = 22.2, p < 0.001], suggesting that it could not be accounted for by repetition 
priming. Fourth, there was a three-way interaction between current task alternation, 
current congruency, and previous congruency because conflict adaptation was greater in 
repeat trials than in switch trials [F(1,31) = 20.0, p < 0.001; see Table 4.3].    
Two additional effects were also consistent with the RT data and/or previous 
findings. First, as in the RT data, previous congruency interacted with current task 
alternation [F(1,31) = 18.5, p < 0.001]: switch costs were higher when the previous trial 
was incongruent [4.8%; F(1,31) = 62.9, p < 0.001] than when it was congruent [1.7%; 
F(1,31) = 16.3, p < 0.001]. This result further supports the hypothesis that a task’s 
representation is enhanced following an incongruent (versus a congruent) trial. Second, 
current task alternation interacted with current congruency [F(1,31) = 13.9, p < 0.001]: 
the effect of current congruency was larger in switch trials [9.5%; F(1,31) = 130.5, p < 
0.001] than in repeat trials [5.5%; F(1,31) = 90.3, p < 0.001]. This effect may index 
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residual activation of the previous task’s representation in working memory (Goschke, 
2000). 
As discussed above, the conflict monitoring model predicts that a task’s 
representation should be enhanced following an incorrect response. Inconsistent with this 
prediction, however, error rates were higher after incorrect (9.7%) than after correct 
(5.8%) responses [F(1, 30) = 5.2, p < .05]. Moreover, neither switch costs [F(1,30) = 
0.31, n.s.] nor congruency effects [F(1,30) = 0.64, n.s.] in the current trial varied with 
previous-trial accuracy. Thus, similar to the RT data, the accuracy data provided no 
evidence to suggest that a task’s representation in working memory was enhanced 
following an incorrect response.  
Discussion 
Our findings in Experiment 1 provided partial support for the conflict monitoring 
model’s claim that a task’s representation in working memory is enhanced following 
high-conflict trials. Consistent with this view, switch rates were lower after (1) 
incongruent (versus congruent) trials and (2) incorrect (versus correct) trials. 
Furthermore, the performance data revealed that following incongruent (versus 
congruent) trials, congruency effects were relatively small while switch costs were 
relatively large. The performance data following errors, however, were not consistent 
with the conflict monitoring model. First, congruency effects and switch costs in the RT 
data did not vary with previous-trial accuracy. Second, error rates were higher after 
incorrect than after correct trials. In sum, while the switch rate data supported the conflict 
monitoring model for both incongruent and incorrect trials, the performance data 
suggested that a task’s representation was enhanced only after incongruent trials.
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Table 4.2 
Mean Reaction Time (ms) as a Function of RCI, Current Task Transition, Previous Congruency, and Current Congruency in Experiment 1 
and 2. 
M SEM M SEM M SEM M SEM M SEM M SEM M SEM M SEM
Congruent 556 22 587 24 672 30 680 33 581 24 608 28 662 31 698 35
Incongruent 690 28 636 23 777 35 763 32 730 29 690 26 791 34 791 35
Congruent 565 16 589 19 623 24 620 17 592 19 613 22 635 20 641 20
Incongruent 748 23 691 20 776 25 751 26 796 22 759 21 802 26 808 19
Previous 
Incongruent
Previous 
Congruent
Previous 
Incongruent
Experiment 1
Experiment 2
Previous 
CongruentCurrent 
Congruency
Previous 
Congruent
Previous 
Incongruent
Previous 
Congruent
Previous 
Incongruent
Short RCI (100 ms) Long RCI (1000 ms)
Task Repeat Task Switch Task Repeat Task Switch
 
 
 
Table 4.3 
Mean Error Rate as a Function of RCI, Current Task Transition, Previous Congruency, and Current Congruency in Experiment 1 and 2. 
M SEM M SEM M SEM M SEM M SEM M SEM M SEM M SEM
Congruent 1% 0.3% 1% 0.3% 3% 0.6% 3% 0.6% 1% 0.3% 1% 0.4% 3% 0.6% 2% 0.5%
Incongruent 10% 1.0% 3% 0.4% 13% 1.4% 11% 1.4% 11% 1.1% 4% 0.5% 12% 1.3% 13% 1.5%
Congruent 1% 0.3% 2% 0.5% 2% 0.4% 1% 0.4% 1% 0.3% 2% 0.6% 2% 0.5% 1% 0.4%
Incongruent 15% 1.8% 6% 0.8% 17% 1.9% 16% 2.5% 15% 1.6% 7% 1.0% 15% 1.9% 17% 2.0%
Previous 
Incongruent
Previous 
Congruent
Previous 
Incongruent
Experiment 1
Experiment 2
Previous 
CongruentCurrent 
Congruency
Previous 
Congruent
Previous 
Incongruent
Previous 
Congruent
Previous 
Incongruent
Short RCI (100 ms) Long RCI (1000 ms)
Task Repeat Task Switch Task Repeat Task Switch
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Experiment 2 
In Experiment 1, the switch rate data suggested that a task’s representation in 
working memory was enhanced after both incongruent and incorrect trials. However, the 
computer key that was used to choose a given task (e.g., the D key) did not vary across 
trials (even though task-key mappings were counterbalanced across participants). Thus, 
the relatively low switch rates following incongruent and incorrect trials may have 
resulted from a key-repetition bias, rather than a task-repetition bias. For example, the 
central question mark that appeared at the beginning of each trial had been recently 
associated with the previous task choice response. Therefore, its subsequent reappearance 
may have primed participants to repeat that response (Hommel, 1998), and this bias 
might somehow have been greater following incongruent and/or correct trials. The 
existence of such a bias would be consistent with previous findings suggesting an 
influence of stimulus-response priming on voluntary task choice (Arrington, Weaver, & 
Pauker, 2010; Demanet, Liefooghe, Verbruggen, & Vandierendonck, 2010; Mayr & Bell, 
2006).  
We conducted Experiment 2 to dissociate task-repetition and key-repetition 
explanations of the switch rate data. To distinguish between these accounts, we reversed 
the task-key mapping after each trial. For example, if the D key was associated with the 
numerical comparison task in trial n, then it was associated with the physical size task in 
trial n+1. We reasoned that if the switch rate results from Experiment 1 were driven by a 
task-repetition bias, then Experiment 2 should yield identical results: participants should 
repeat tasks more often after incongruent and incorrect trials. On the other hand, if the 
results from Experiment 1 were driven by a key-repetition bias, then Experiment 2 should 
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yield opposite results: participants should repeat tasks less often after incongruent and 
incorrect trials. Finally, if the results from Experiment 1 were due to some combination 
of task- and key-repetition biases, then these biases should tend to cancel each other out 
in Experiment 2. That is, previous congruency and previous accuracy should have smaller 
effects on switch rate than in Experiment 1. 
Method 
Participants 
Twenty-seven participants from the University of Michigan community 
completed Experiment 2. None had participated in Experiment 1. Participants whose 
switch rates fell above 90% (two participants) or below 10% (one participant) were 
excluded from the analysis, yielding 24 participants with usable data. On average, these 
participants were 21.1 years old; 14 were male. 
Apparatus & Stimuli 
Experiment 2 was identical to Experiment 1 with two exceptions. First, the task-
key mapping alternated across consecutive trials. Specifically, if on trial n the numerical 
size task was mapped to the D key and the physical size task was mapped to the F key, 
then on trial n+1 the numerical size task was mapped to the F key and the physical size 
task was mapped to the D key. The D key is to the left of the F key on our computer 
keyboards, and we took advantage of this arrangement to remind participants of the 
correct task-key mapping during the choice phase of each trial. For example, when the 
numerical task was mapped to the D key and the physical task was mapped to the F key, 
the letters N and P, respectively, were displayed 1.7° to the left and 1.7° to the right of 
the central question mark.  
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Second, to encourage participants to choose the two tasks equally often and in 
random order, we provided feedback after each task block. This feedback revealed the 
proportion of trials in which the participant (1) chose to perform each task and (2) 
switched tasks. The rest of the procedure and data analysis were identical to those in 
Experiment 1. 
Results 
Switch Rate Data 
Two basic effects differed somewhat from those in Experiment 1. First, consistent 
with at least one prior finding (Arrington & Logan, 2005), overall switch rates did not 
differ significantly from 50% (mean switch rate: 48.4%; 95% CI: 44.6% - 52.2%)1
                                                 
1 The lack of an overall task-repetition bias is unlikely to have resulted from the end-of-block feedback, 
which indicated the proportion of trials in which a participant had chosen to switch tasks. Indeed, in a 
different study from our laboratory, we observed a task-repetition bias even when such feedback was given 
(Orr, Gehring, & Weissman, 2010). However, the lack of an overall task-repetition bias may have resulted 
from the variable task-key mapping that was employed. 
. 
Second, participants chose to perform the physical comparison task more often that they 
chose to perform the numerical comparison task [51.0% vs. 49.0%; t(23) = 2.5, p < 0.05]. 
Recent data suggest that voluntary task choices favor tasks that require relatively little 
mental effort (Botvinick, 2007; McGuire & Botvinick, 2010). Thus, we investigated 
whether the physical comparison task was easier to perform than the numerical 
comparison task. Consistent with this view, responses in the physical comparison task 
were both faster [666 ms versus 697 ms; t(23) = 4.2, p < 0.001] and more accurate [6.6% 
versus 8.6%; t(23) = 3.7, p < 0.001] than responses in the numerical comparison task, 
replicating prior findings with these tasks (Henik & Tzelgov, 1982), but differing slightly 
from our findings in Experiment 1. Indeed, in Experiment 1, responses in the physical 
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comparison task were faster [700 ms versus 716 ms; t(31) = 2.2, p < 0.05] but not more 
accurate [5.6% versus 5.5%; t(31) = 0.75, n.s.] than responses in the numerical 
comparison task.               
Our first main prediction was that switch rates would be lower after incongruent 
than after congruent trials. To investigate this hypothesis, we submitted switch rates to a 
repeated-measures ANOVA with four factors: previous congruency (congruent, 
incongruent), RCI (short, long), previous task alternation (repeat, switch), and previous 
task (numerical comparison, physical comparison) (the mean switch rate for each cell of 
this design is presented in Table 4.1). As in Experiment 1, participants switched tasks 
more often at the long RCI (48.5%) than at the short RCI (47.0%) [F(1,23) = 4.3, p < 
.05]. Most important, we replicated our finding that switch rates were lower after 
incongruent (47.1%) than after congruent (48.4%) trials [F(1,23) = 6.7, p < .05; Figure 
4.2b]. This finding suggests that the effect of previous congruency on task choice in 
Experiment 1 was driven by a task-repetition bias rather than a key-repetition bias (see 
Between-Experiment Comparisons below for further evidence to support this view).   
Our second main prediction was that switch rates would be lower after incorrect 
than after correct responses. To investigate this prediction, we submitted switch rates to a 
repeated-measures ANOVA with two factors: previous accuracy (correct, error) and RCI 
(short, long); only two factors were included to ensure a sufficient number of errors per 
condition. Unlike Experiment 1, we did not observe a main effect of previous accuracy 
[F(1,23) = 0.65, n.s.]. As in Experiment 1, however, we observed an interaction between 
RCI and previous accuracy [F(1,23) = 6.8, p < .05; Figure 4.3b]. At the short RCI, 
participants switched tasks more often after incorrect than after correct responses (p < 
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.05); at the long RCI, however, no such difference was observed (p = 0.67, n.s.). This 
result replicates our finding in Experiment 1 that the task-repetition bias following errors 
was larger at the long RCI than at the short RCI. However, it also suggests that the effect 
of previous accuracy on switch rates in Experiment 1 was driven by a combination of 
task- and key-repetition biases. 
Reaction Time Data  
 The RT data were largely consistent with those in Experiment 1 as 
revealed by a repeated-measures ANOVA with four factors: RCI (short, long), current 
task alternation (repeat, switch), previous congruency (congruent, incongruent), and 
current congruency (congruent, incongruent) (see Table 4.2 for the mean RT in each cell 
of the design). For example, participants responded more slowly at the long RCI than at 
the short RCI [705 ms vs. 670 ms; F(1,23) = 32.8, p < 0.001], in switch than in repeat 
trials [707 ms vs. 669 ms; F(1,23) = 25.8, p = 0.001], and in current incongruent than in 
current congruent trials [766 ms vs. 610 ms; F(1,23) = 305.1, p < 0.001].  
The conflict monitoring model predicts that a task’s representation should be 
enhanced following incongruent trials, and two findings supported this view. First, and 
consistent with Experiment 1, there was an interaction between current congruency and 
previous congruency [F(1,23) = 25.1, p < 0.001]: congruency effects in the current trial 
were smaller when the previous trial was incongruent (136 ms; F(1,23) = 187.7, p < 
0.001) than when it was congruent (174 ms; F(1,23) = 265.8, p < 0.001). Moreover, this 
conflict adaptation effect remained significant even after removing trials in which the 
response and/or the position of the numerically larger digit and/or the position of the 
physically larger digit was repeated from the previous trial [F(1,23) = 15.0, p < 0.001]. 
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Thus, this effect cannot be explained by repetition priming (Hommel, et al., 2004; Mayr, 
et al., 2003). Second, and also consistent with Experiment 1, there was a three-way 
interaction between task alternation, current congruency, and previous congruency 
[F(1,23) = 8.5, p < 0.005] because conflict adaptation was greater in repeat trials [F(1,23) 
= 23.4, p < 0.001; Figure 4.4c] than in switch trials [F(1,23) = 0.55, n.s.; Figure 4.4d].  
Further replicating our findings in Experiment 1, two additional effects that were 
not crucial for testing our hypotheses were also significant. First, RCI interacted with 
previous congruency [F(1,23) = 4.5, p < 0.05]: RT was faster following incongruent 
(versus congruent) trials at the short RCI [15 ms; F(1,23) = 9.8, p < 0.005], but not at the 
long RCI [1 ms; F(1,23) = 0.05, n.s.]. Second, RCI interacted with current congruency 
[F(1,23) = 10.2, p < 0.005] because congruency effects in the current trial were larger at 
the long RCI [171 ms; F(1,23) = 287.7, p < 0.001] than at the short RCI [142 ms; F(1,23) 
= 199.5, p < 0.001].  
As discussed in Experiment 1, the conflict monitoring model also predicts that a 
task’s representation should be enhanced following an incorrect response, leading to 
slower, more accurate performance in the next trial (Botvinick, et al., 2001; Yeung, et al., 
2004). However, mean RT following incorrect responses did not differ from mean RT 
following correct responses [F(1,23) = 0.63, n.s.]. Enhancing a task’s representation 
following an incorrect response should also lead to a combination of smaller congruency 
effects and larger switch costs in the next trial. However, as in Experiment 1, previous 
accuracy influenced neither congruency effects [F(1,23) = 2.1, n.s.] nor switch costs 
[F(1,23) = 1.1, n.s.] in the current trial. Thus, inconsistent with the conflict monitoring 
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model, the RT data did not provide evidence to suggest that a task’s representation was 
enhanced following an incorrect response.  
Accuracy Data 
The accuracy data replicated much of the RT data above and many of our findings 
in Experiment 1. This was revealed by an ANOVA with four factors: RCI (short, long), 
current task alternation (repeat, switch), previous congruency (congruent, incongruent) 
and current congruency (congruent, incongruent) (mean error rates for each cell of this 
design are presented in Table 4.3. First, as expected, error rates were higher in switch 
than in repeat trials [8.9% vs. 6.3%; F(1,23) = 9.8, p < 0.005] and in current incongruent 
than in current congruent trials [13.5% vs. 1.6%; F(1,23) = 292.8, p < 0.001]. Second, 
there was an interaction between previous congruency and current congruency [F(1,23) = 
26.5, p < 0.001] indicating the presence of conflict adaptation. As predicted, the 
congruency effect in the current trial was smaller when the stimulus in the previous trial 
was incongruent [9.9%; F(1,23) = 184.0, p < 0.001] than when it was congruent [14.0%; 
F(1,23) = 313.5, p < 0.001]. Third, this conflict adaptation effect remained even after 
removing trials on which the response and/or the position of the numerically larger digit 
and/or the position of the physically larger digit was repeated from the previous trial 
[F(1,23) = 15.9, p < 0.001], suggesting it was not due to repetition priming (Hommel, et 
al., 2004; Mayr, et al., 2003). Fourth, there was a three-way interaction between current 
task alternation, current congruency, and previous congruency [F(1,23) = 42.5, p < 
0.001] because the conflict adaptation effect was larger in repeat trials [F(1,23) = 59.6, p 
< 0.001] than in switch trials [F(1,23) = 1.8, n.s.; see Table 4.3].    
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Two additional effects were also consistent with our findings from Experiment 1. 
First, previous congruency interacted with current task alternation [F(1,23) = 15.0, p < 
0.001]: switch costs were higher when the previous trial was incongruent [4.6%; F(1,23) 
= 15.0, p < 0.001] than when it was congruent [0.5%; F(1,23) = 0.72, n.s.]. In line with 
the conflict monitoring model, this finding further suggests that a task’s representation 
was enhanced following incongruent compared to congruent trials (Botvinick, et al., 
2001; Yeung, et al., 2004). Second, we observed an interaction between current task 
alternation and current congruency [F(1,23) = 19.6, p < 0.001]: the effect of current 
congruency was larger in switch trials [14.6%; F(1,23) = 212.0, p < 0.001] than in repeat 
trials [9.4%; F(1,23) = 228.1, p < 0.001]. As mentioned in Experiment 1, this latter effect 
may index residual activation of the previous task’s representation in working memory 
(Goschke, 2000).  
The conflict monitoring model predicts that a task’s representation should be 
enhanced following an incorrect response, leading to slower, more accurate performance. 
However, previous accuracy (correct, incorrect) had no effect on error rates in the current 
trial [F(1,23) = 0.03, n.s.]. Moreover, as in Experiment 1, neither switch costs [F(1,23) = 
0.99, n.s.] nor congruency effects [F(1,23) = 1.4, n.s.] in the current trial varied with 
previous-trial accuracy. Thus, similar to the RT data above and to our findings in 
Experiment 1, the accuracy data provided no evidence to suggest that a task’s 
representation in working memory was enhanced following an incorrect response.  
 Discussion 
 In Experiment 2, we reversed the task-key mapping after each trial to 
determine whether effects of previous congruency and previous accuracy on switch rate 
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in Experiment 1 reflected a task-repetition bias, a key-repetition bias, or both. As in 
Experiment 1, both switch rates and congruency effects were lower after incongruent 
than after congruent trials, suggesting that effects of previous congruency reflected a 
task-repetition bias. Unlike Experiment 1, however, there was no overall effect of 
previous accuracy on switch rates. Indeed, previous accuracy influenced switch rates only 
slightly at the short RCI, and the nature of this effect was to slightly increase (rather than 
to massively decrease) switch rates after an incorrect (versus correct) response. These 
data suggest that the robust effects of previous accuracy in Experiment 1 were driven by 
a combination of task- and key-repetition biases, which tended to cancel each other out in 
Experiment 2. In sum, our findings suggest that effects of previous congruency were 
driven by a task-repetition bias while effects of previous accuracy were driven by a 
combination of task- and key-repetition biases. 
Between-experiment comparisons 
 Our findings thus far suggest two conclusions: (1) previous congruency 
affected switch rates similarly in Experiments 1 and 2 and (2) previous accuracy affected 
switch rates differently in Experiments 1 and 2. However, to firmly establish these 
conclusions, it is necessary to directly contrast the effects of previous congruency and 
previous accuracy in Experiments 1 and 2. To accomplish this objective, we conducted a 
series of between-experiment comparisons using two mixed ANOVAs.  
The first ANOVA assessed the effect of previous congruency on switch rates. It 
included experiment (Experiment 1, Experiment 2) as a between-participants factor and 
four within-participants factors: previous congruency (congruent, incongruent), RCI 
(short, long), previous task alternation (repeat, switch), and previous task (numerical 
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comparison, physical comparison). We observed a significant interaction between RCI 
and experiment [F(1,54) = 11.0, p < 0.005] because the degree to which switch rates were 
higher at the long RCI than at the short RCI was greater in Experiment 1 (6.3%) than in 
Experiment 2 (1.4%). Of greater interest, there was a main effect of previous congruency 
[F(1,54) = 6.5, p = 0.01] indicating lower switch rates after incongruent (45.2%) than 
after congruent (46.4%) trials. Critically, however, there was no interaction between 
experiment and previous congruency, [F(1,54) = 0.034, n.s.]. Thus, the degree to which 
participants switched tasks less often after incongruent than after congruent trials did not 
differ in Experiments 1 and 2. This result suggests that the effect of previous congruency 
is attributable to a task-repetition bias: participants are biased to repeat tasks, not key 
presses, after incongruent trials. 
The second ANOVA assessed the effect of previous accuracy on switch rates. It 
included experiment (Experiment 1, Experiment 2) as a between-participants factor and 
two within-participants factors: previous accuracy (correct, incorrect) and RCI (short, 
long). As expected, the effect of previous accuracy on switch rate varied across 
Experiments 1 and 2 [F(1,54) = 29.3, p < 0.001]. Specifically, switch rates were reduced 
after errors (relative to correct responses) more strongly in Experiment 1 (19.2%) than in 
Experiment 2 (-2.7%). This result suggests that the effect of previous accuracy on switch 
rates was driven by a combination of task-repetition and key-repetition biases following 
incorrect responses, which tended to cancel each other out in Experiment 2.  
General Discussion 
The conflict monitoring model predicts that a task’s representation in working 
memory is more highly activated following the experience of response conflict 
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(Botvinick, et al., 2001; Botvinick, et al., 2004; Brown, et al., 2007). In the present study, 
we used a voluntary task switching (VTS) paradigm to provide a novel test of whether 
two putative conflict-eliciting events—incongruent trials and incorrect responses—
increase the activation of a task’s representation in working memory. In the VTS 
paradigm, a bottom-up availability heuristic is thought to bias task choice toward the task 
whose representation is most highly activated in working memory (Arrington & Logan, 
2005; Lien & Ruthruff, 2008; Mayr & Bell, 2006). Thus, the conflict monitoring model 
predicts that increasing the activation of a task’s representation in an incongruent or 
incorrect trial should bias participants to repeat the same task in the next trial, leading to 
reduced switch rates. 
Effects of previous congruency confirmed the conflict monitoring model’s 
predictions. In Experiment 1, participants chose to repeat tasks more often after 
incongruent than after congruent trials. Experiment 2 revealed the same pattern even 
when the task-key mapping was reversed after each trial. Thus, effects of previous 
congruency on switch rate were likely driven by an increased bias to repeat the task 
chosen in the previous trial, rather than the key press that was made to choose that task. 
We also replicated prior findings regarding conflict adaptation. In particular, effects of 
current congruency on reaction time and accuracy were smaller after incongruent trials 
than after congruent trials. Critically, this conflict adaptation effect could not be 
accounted for by repetition priming. Thus, consistent with the conflict monitoring model, 
participants were both more likely to repeat the same task and better at performing that 
task after incongruent (versus congruent) trials. 
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In contrast, effects of previous accuracy confirmed the conflict monitoring 
model’s predictions for switch rates, but not for task performance. With regard to switch 
rates, participants switched tasks less often after incorrect (versus correct) responses in 
Experiment 1, but not in Experiment 2, wherein the task-key mapping was reversed after 
each trial. Thus, it appears that incorrect responses resulted in a task-repetition bias in 
both experiments, but that this bias was canceled out by an opposing key-repetition bias 
in Experiment 2. With regard to the performance data, neither congruency effects nor 
switch costs varied with previous-trial accuracy. Moreover, participants responded more 
slowly and less accurately after incorrect than after correct responses. This latter result 
does not fit with the conflict monitoring model’s claim that enhancing a task’s 
representation after an incorrect response involves raising the threshold for selecting a 
response in the next trial, which should result in slower, more accurate performance 
(Botvinick, et al., 2001; Yeung, et al., 2004). In sum, effects of previous accuracy 
confirmed the conflict monitoring model’s predictions for switch rates, but not for task 
performance.  
The dissociation between switch rates and task performance following incorrect 
responses is difficult to reconcile with the conflict monitoring model. Indeed, the model 
predicts that increasing the activation of a task’s representation in working memory 
should not only bias participants to repeat the same task, but also lead to better 
performance of that task in the next trial. An alternative account, however, is motivated 
by models in which a task’s representation consists of two parts: (1) a task-level 
representation and (2) a parameter-level representation (Logan & Gordon, 2001; 
Rubinstein, Meyer, & Evans, 2001). The task-level representation is similar to the goal or 
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intention of performing a task. The parameter-level representation specifies the relevant 
stimuli, responses, and rules (e.g., stimulus-response mappings) that enable task 
performance. This distinction raises the possibility that errors increased the activation of 
the task-level representation in working memory (thus biasing participants to repeat the 
same task in the next trial), but not the parameter-level representation (resulting in the 
lack of a performance enhancement). Confirmation of this account in future studies 
would indicate an important difference in the way that control processes enhance the 
activation of a task’s representation in incongruent and incorrect trials, which would need 
to be addressed by the conflict monitoring model. 
Another finding that warrants further discussion is the key-repetition bias 
following errors in Experiment 2. We speculate that this bias resulted from a temporary 
depletion of resources needed by the representativeness heuristic to generate a random 
task sequence (Baddeley, Emslie, Kolodny, & Duncan, 1998). In particular, this depletion 
enabled the bottom-up availability heuristic to exert a greater influence on task choice. 
Two sources of evidence are consistent with this possibility. First, errors impair 
subsequent resource-demanding behavior. For example, errors are followed by elevated 
RT and reduced accuracy at short response-stimulus intervals (Jentzsch & Dudschig, 
2009) and interfere with dual-task performance (Hochman & Meiran, 2005). Second, 
when participants try to generate random sequences under resource-limited conditions, 
they produce non-random sequences that are characterized by stereotyped, bottom-up 
transitions (Baddeley, et al., 1998). These findings are consistent with the view that, by 
depleting limited resources, errors could enable bottom-up processes to exert a 
heightened influence on voluntary task choice in the next trial. 
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But could bottom-up processes generate the key-repetition bias in Experiment 2?  
Recent work on event files suggests they could (Hommel, 1998, 2007). This work 
indicates that each time a stimulus is presented a temporary event file is created, which 
stores the stimulus-response association that was most recently linked to the stimulus. 
Further, the event file is automatically recalled from memory the next time the stimulus is 
presented, resulting in the activation of the previously stored stimulus-response 
association. For example, in each trial of the current study the question mark that 
prompted participants to make a random task choice was eventually linked to one of two 
possible responses (i.e., one of two key presses). This link was presumably stored in an 
event file, which was automatically recalled when the question mark appeared in the next 
trial.  
Most important, when resources needed to randomly select a task were depleted 
after an error, recalling this event file may have enabled the task choice response from the 
previous trial to exert a heightened influence on task choice via the bottom-up availability 
heuristic. The result would have been an increased key-repetition bias. However, since 
choosing to repeat a task in Experiment 2 required making a different task choice 
response than in the previous trial, a key-repetition bias would have reversed the task-
repetition bias observed in Experiment 1. Critically, we observed such a reversal at the 
short RCI. Further, this reversal was reduced at the long RCI, consistent with a temporary 
depletion of resources. We therefore conclude that bottom-up processes could have 
produced the key-repetition bias after errors in Experiment 2, in line with the claim that 
event files exert a greater influence in the voluntary task switching paradigm under 
resource-limited conditions (Demanet, et al., 2010).  
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More broadly, the present findings add to a growing literature indicating that a 
combination of top-down and bottom-up processes influences voluntary task choice. 
With regard to top-down influences, prior results indicate that the accessibility of 
resources to support top-down processes in the current trial strongly influences task 
choice. For example, switch rates are reduced in the presence (versus absence) of a 
concurrent working memory load (Demanet, et al., 2010) and in individuals with 
relatively inefficient top-down control (Arrington & Yates, 2009). Our finding that 
switch rates were reduced following incongruent (versus congruent) trials complements 
these previous results. Specifically, it indicates that the accessibility of resources to 
support top-down processes in the previous trial also influences voluntary task choice.   
With regard to bottom-up biases, our findings extend prior results indicating that 
stimulus repetition influences task choice in the VTS paradigm. For example, when task 
choices are indicated by varying the hand that is used to respond to an imperative 
stimulus, switch rates are lower when the imperative stimulus from the previous trial 
repeats than when it does not (Demanet, et al., 2010; Mayr & Bell, 2006). Such findings 
suggest that an imperative stimulus can prime a task choice in a bottom-up fashion. As 
discussed above, the present results go one step further by suggesting that a cue to 
voluntarily choose a task can also prime a task choice in a bottom-up fashion, even in the 
absence of an imperative stimulus. Thus, the present findings not only fit with the current 
literature on voluntary task switching, but also extend that literature in important ways.   
In conclusion, the present results illustrate the importance of response conflict for 
voluntary task choice, but also show that not all forms of conflict are created equal. In 
particular, they indicate a novel dissociation between previous congruency and previous 
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accuracy that is not predicted by the conflict monitoring model. Thus, our findings 
provide new constraints on the conflict monitoring model by indicating that different 
sources of response conflict have distinct effects on subsequent task performance. 
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Chapter 5   
Amplitude of the P3 component predicts voluntary task choice 
 
Abstract 
Task choice in the voluntary task switching paradigm is thought to depend on a 
combination of top-down processes which generate a random task sequence and bottom-
up processes which select the task with the strongest representation. Most tests of the 
latter process, known as the availability heuristic, have focused on whether stimulus 
aspects of the current trial bias task choice. However, task choices should also depend on 
prior task strength, independent of trial type. As the P3 event-related potential (ERP) 
component has been positively associated with the strength of a task’s representation, we 
used P3 amplitude to test whether task strength in trial n predicted task choice in trial 
n+1. To test this hypothesis, participants performed a voluntary task switching version of 
the numerical Stroop task, while EEG was recorded. In line with our predictions, a larger 
P3 on the current trial was associated with choosing to repeat tasks (versus switch tasks) 
on the following trial. This finding demonstrates that bottom-up biases, such as the 
relative strength of task representations, influences task choice in the voluntary task 
switching paradigm. Moreover, our data demonstrate the use of ERP’s to predict 
upcoming behavior.  
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Introduction 
In our daily lives we often encounter multitasking situations, where we must 
manage multiple possible tasks and often alternate between these tasks quite frequently. 
Today’s society encourages multitasking, with technology allowing us to check email 
during classes or meetings, search for the nearest gas station or restaurant from the wheel 
of a car, or follow a dizzying array of information across multiple computer monitors. 
Even when we are not actively trying to multitask, environmental information may 
distract us from the task at hand and cause us to multitask. It is no surprise, then, that 
there has been a recent surge of interest in understanding multitasking by both the public 
media (Hamilton, 2008) and the scientific community (Dux, et al., 2009; Neider, et al., 
2011; Ophir, Nass, & Wagner, 2009). 
Successfully completing one task in the face of competition from other possible 
tasks involves selecting and maintaining a task set, or the goals and rules relevant for 
performing the task (Rogers & Monsell, 1995). Doing so is thought to require cognitive 
control, a set of processes thought to maintain task goals in working memory and bias 
information processing of task-relevant stimuli (Miller & Cohen, 2001). However, such 
control must be flexible enough to quickly reconfigure the cognitive system to perform a 
new task whenever goals change, as is the case in multitasking environments (Monsell, 
2003).  
Arrington & Logan (2004) introduced the voluntary task switching paradigm in 
order to study the role of cognitive control in guiding task selection in multitasking 
environments. In each trial of a voluntary task switching study, participants are asked to 
voluntarily choose one of multiple possible tasks to perform while performing the tasks 
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equally often and in a random order. Cognitive control is thought to be necessary to 
actively select the task in each trial. Random task selection in this paradigm would result 
in an equal proportion of task repeat trials and task switch trials; however, participants 
tend to be biased towards repeating tasks (Arrington & Logan, 2004, 2005; Mayr & Bell, 
2006). This suggests that task selection in the voluntary task switching paradigm is not 
always under the guidance of cognitive control processes (Mayr & Bell, 2006).   
Arrington & Logan (2005) have proposed that task choice in the voluntary task 
switching paradigm is driven by a combination of top-down and bottom-up processes. 
First, a top-down representativeness heuristic is thought to guide task choice by 
comparing a mental history of the recent task choices to a representative random 
sequence (Arrington & Logan, 2005), or by treating each trial as a discrete event and 
performing a mental coin flip (Mayr & Bell, 2006). Second, a bottom-up availability 
heuristic is thought to guide task selection by choosing the task with the strongest 
representation in working memory (Arrington & Logan, 2005). The most recently 
performed task is still the most active in working memory (Rogers & Monsell, 1995), 
thus, when task selection is guided by an availability heuristic, a task-repetition bias 
occurs. 
Most previous studies have provided evidence for the availability heuristic by 
examining the effects of stimulus repetitions on task choice. The most prevailing finding 
is that when the task stimuli repeat from the previous trial, participants are biased to 
choose to repeat the task (Demanet, Liefooghe, Verbruggen, & Vandierendonck, 2010; 
Mayr & Bell, 2006). This finding is likely due to stimulus-response priming. When a 
stimulus is presented, it becomes associated with a response, and this association is stored 
128 
 
in what has been called an ‘event file’ (Hommel, 2004). When this stimulus repeats on 
the next trial, the event file is automatically retrieved and primes the automatic execution 
of the associated response. This response priming may simply lead to a response 
repetition which coincidentally signals a task repeat, without a task actually being chosen. 
Alternatively, stimulus repetition may prime the retrieval of a more abstract task 
representation (Arrington, Weaver, & Pauker, 2010; Demanet, et al., 2010; Waszak, 
Hommel, & Allport, 2003), which results in a given task being more available and more 
likely to be selected.  
Relative task strength may also influence subsequent task choice, independent of 
trial type. Some theorists have proposed that in order to switch tasks, the most recent task 
must be inhibited (Mayr & Keele, 2000). This process weakens the representation of the 
most recent task. Following this logic, Lien and Ruthruff  (2008) examined the effect of 
inhibition on voluntary task choice. They posited that if switching away from a task 
involved inhibiting that task, then participants would not quickly return to that task, and 
would wait until the inhibition weakened. Using three possible tasks (Task A, Task B, 
Task C), they examined the likelihood that participants would return to a task they just 
switched away from (e.g., an ABA task sequence). In line with their predictions, 
participants avoided returning to the task performed on trial n-2 in favor of performing a 
new task (e.g., an ABC task sequence). This suggests that Task A’s representation was 
less active in WM than Task C’s representation and that this difference influenced task 
choice. Thus, the likelihood of a choice to repeat tasks in the voluntary task switching 
paradigm appears to depend on the strength of a given task’s representation on trial n-1. 
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By analyzing Event-Related Potentials (ERP’s) we may be able to track task 
strength and predict subsequent task choices. ERP’s reveal the temporal dynamics of 
brain activity related to different cognitive processes. A candidate ERP component for 
examining task strength is the P3 component. The P3 has been associated with resource 
allocation, attention, and working memory updating (for recent reviews, see Kok, 2001; 
Polich, 2007). By using the P3 to measure the strength of a task’s representation on a 
given trial, we can test whether increased task strength in one trial is associated with 
choosing to repeat (versus switch) tasks on the next trial. 
The P3 has often been studied in dual-task paradigms. In these paradigms, 
participants perform two tasks concurrently, with one task having priority over the other 
task. These paradigms assume that the two tasks rely on a shared pool of cognitive 
resources (Kahneman, 1973).When the primary task increases in difficulty, more 
processing resources are dedicated to it, which in turn, decreases the availability of 
resources available to the secondary task. The amplitude of the P3 elicited by the 
secondary task stimuli is decreased as demands of the primary task are increased (Isreal, 
Chesney, Wickens, & Donchin, 1980). This suggests that P3 amplitude tracks the 
availability of resources for the secondary task. Later studies showed a reciprocal 
relationship in the amplitude of the P3s elicited by the primary and secondary task, with 
larger amplitudes elicited by the primary task resulting in smaller amplitudes elicited by 
the secondary task, and vice versa (Sirevaag, Kramer, Coles, & Donchin, 1989). Thus, 
the amplitude of the primary task P3 is proportional to the amount of resources/ attention 
dedicated to processing the primary task.  
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Along these lines, the amplitude of the P3 elicited by the target in a task switching 
paradigm may reflect the amount of resources allocated to the current task, which we 
posit reflects the strength of the task representation. Task switching studies using ERP’s 
have shown that target-locked P3 amplitude is reduced on task switch trials compared to 
on task repeat trials (Karayanidis, Coltheart, Michie, & Murphy, 2003; Kieffaber & 
Hetrick, 2005; Mueller, Swainson, & Jackson, 2007; Vandamme, Szmalec, Liefooghe, & 
Vandierendonck, 2010). However, this finding has received little notice in the literature, 
especially compared to the cue-evoked P3 (for a review, see Karayanidis, et al., 2010). 
Nevertheless, the consensus seems to be that the P3 is larger on repeat trials due to 
consolidation of stimulus-response associations, a key aspect of a task representation 
(Kok, 2001).  
Perhaps the most direct evidence that P3 amplitude may reflect the strength of a 
task’s representation in working memory comes from an ERP study with the Wisconsin 
Card Sorting Task (Barceló, Muñoz-Céspedes, Pozo, & Rubia, 2000). In the Wisconsin 
Card Sorting Task, participants must categorize the current stimulus based on its stimulus 
features (e.g., quantity, color, shape) according to the current rule. The current rule will 
occasionally change without any external signal, and the participant must determine the 
new, current rule via response accuracy feedback. These set shifts require cognitive 
control processes to reconfigure the cognitive system for the new rule. Barcelo and 
colleagues (2000) found that the amplitude of the P3 was markedly reduced on set switch 
trials compared to non-switch trials. Further, P3 amplitude showed a gradual return to 
baseline two to three trials after the shift. The authors posited that this post-shift build-up 
reflected the strengthening of the task’s representation in working memory. Thus, by 
131 
 
examining P3 amplitude, we can test the hypothesis that the strength of a task’s 
representation in one trial predicts whether participants will choose to repeat or switch on 
the next trial.  
Method 
Participants 
Fifteen healthy participants (three males) completed this study, with a mean age 
of 20.1 years. All participants were right-handed. Participants received $30 for their 
participation. Informed consent was obtained in accordance with the University of 
Michigan Institutional Review Board. 
 
Figure 5.1. Experimental Design. 
Participants performed a voluntary task switching version of the number Stroop task, which 
involved comparing two digits with respect to their numerical size or with respect to their 
physical size. Each trial began with the presentation of a question mark (?) for 200 ms. This 
indicated that participants should choose which task to perform in the current trial by pressing a 
button with the middle or index finger of their left hand. Participants were not pressured to 
choose quickly. The two digits appeared 800-1200 ms after participants chose the task. One digit 
was numerically large (e.g., 7) while the other digit was numerically small (e.g., 7). Further, one 
was presented in a large font (e.g., 3) while the other was presented in a small font (e.g., 7). In 
congruent trials, the numerically large digit was also physically large. In incongruent trials, the 
numerically large digit was physically small. Depending on the current task, participants decided 
which of the two digits (top or bottom) was numerically or physically larger. They were 
instructed to indicate their decision as quickly and as accurately as possible by pressing a button 
with their right index finger or their right middle finger. The next trial began 800-1200 ms  after 
the task response. 
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Behavioral Paradigm 
The behavioral paradigm was adapted from a previous study (Orr, Carp, & 
Weissman, 2011), with the timing adapted for use in an ERP study. Participants 
performed a VTS version of the number Stroop task (Henik & Tzelgov, 1982). In each 
trial, they were cued by a central question mark to choose whether they would compare 
two upcoming digits in terms of their numerical size or their physical size (see Figure 
5.1). The instructions emphasized that participants should choose each task an equal 
number of times and in a random order across trials (Arrington & Logan, 2004). The 
question mark remained on the screen for 200 ms, and was then replaced with a fixation 
cross. No pressure to choose quickly was indicated in the instructions. Task choices were 
indicated by using the index or middle finger of the left hand, respectively, to press the D 
or F key on a computer keyboard (task-key mappings were counterbalanced across 
participants).  
Each task choice was followed by a variable delay between 800 and 1200 ms, 
after which two digits were presented. One digit appeared 1.7° above fixation while the 
other appeared 1.7° below fixation. One of the digits was numerically large (7, 8, or 9) 
while the other was numerically small (1, 2, or 3). Moreover, one digit was physically 
large (subtending 1.1°) while the other physically small (subtending 0.6°). In congruent 
trials (50%), the numerically large digit was also physically large. In incongruent trials 
(50%), the numerically large digit was physically small. The trial sequence was 
randomized such that exact stimulus repetitions were separated by at least three trials 
(i.e., a digit appearing in trial n could not be repeated until trial n+3).  
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Participants were instructed to indicate which of the two digits (top or bottom) 
was larger as quickly and as accurately as possible. If they chose to perform the 
numerical comparison task, they indicated which of the two digits was numerically 
larger. If they chose to perform the physical comparison task, they indicated which of the 
two digits was physically larger. The digits remained on the screen for 200 ms, and were 
then replaced with a fixation cross. Responses were made by using the index or middle 
finger of the right hand, respectively, to press the J or K key on a computer keyboard 
(task-key mappings were counterbalanced across participants). The next trial was 
presented after a variable delay between 800 and 1200 ms. 
Participants viewed the stimuli on a 17” CRT monitor at a distance of 60 cm. A 
chin rest was used for head stabilization. Stimuli were generated and displayed using 
Presentation software (Neurobehavioral Systems Inc., Albany, CA).  
EEG Acquisition & Analysis 
The EEG was recorded at 512-Hz using an ActiveTwo Biosemi system 
(Amsterdam, the Netherlands) from 64 Ag/AgCl electrodes relative to a Common Mode 
Sense (CMS) active electrode and Driven Right Leg (DRL) passive electrode. The CMS-
DRL electrodes form a feedback loop, which drives the average potential close to the 
amplifier zero, as per BioSemi’s standard design 
(http://www.biosemi.com/faq/cms&drl.htm). The data were downsampled to 256 Hz with 
a low-pass filter of 52 Hz, and referenced off-line to two mastoid electrodes. 
Electrooculogram (EOG) was recorded from electrodes placed above and below the left 
eye and on the outer canthi of both eyes.  
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Data was analyzed offline using EEGLAB (Delorme & Makeig, 2004) and 
ERPLAB (http://www.erpinfo.org/erplab). Oculomotor movements were corrected with 
an automated Blind Source Separation algorithm using the Automated Artifact Removal 
toolbox for EEGLAB (Gómez-Herrero, et al.). The current analyses focused on three 
components: the CNV during the response-to-cue interval, the target stimulus-locked P3, 
and the target response locked ERN. To examine the CNV, we created epochs consisting 
of a window 500 ms before the target response to 2500 ms after the target response. 
These epochs were baseline corrected with a -50 to 50 ms response-locked interval, and 
then averaged separately as a function of the upcoming choice to repeat or switch tasks. 
To examine the P3 component, we created epochs consisting of a window 200 ms before 
stimulus target onset to 800 ms after stimulus target onset. These epochs were baseline 
corrected with a 200 ms prestimulus interval, and then averaged at each level of current 
trial and next trial task transition (repeat, switch). Epochs were excluded if they contained 
amplitudes larger than ± 500 µV or had power in the 0-2 Hz or 20-40 Hz frequency 
ranges that was larger than ± 50 dB. The remaining epochs were inspected visually for 
movement artifact, drift, or any other impurities.  
Results 
Behavioral Data 
Switch Rate Data 
As instructed, participants performed the two tasks equally often [numerical task, 
50.3%; physical task, 49.7%; t(14) = 0.57, n.s.]. As in previous studies with relatively 
long inter-trial intervals (Arrington & Logan, 2005; Orr, et al., 2011), participants did not 
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show a task repetition bias: the confidence interval for the mean switch rate (50.4%) 
contained 50% [95% CI: 43.3% - 55.9%].   
The switch rate data were submitted to a repeated measures ANOVA with two 
within-participants factors: previous trial task (numerical, physical) and previous trial 
task transition (repeat, switch). In line with our previous studies (Orr, et al., 2011; Orr & 
Weissman, 2011), participants were more likely to switch tasks following a repeat trial 
(62.5%) than following a switch trial [36.3%; F(1,14) = 29.1, p < 0.001]. No other effects 
in this analysis were significant.  
Reaction Time Data 
Reaction time data were entered in to a repeated measures ANOVA with within-
participants factors of task transition (repeat, switch) and task (numerical, physical). As 
expected reaction times were longer for switch (697 ms) compared to repeat trials [624 
ms; F(1,14) = 29.5, p < 0.001]. In line with previous studies (Henik & Tzelgov, 1982), 
reaction times were also longer in the numerical task (681 ms) compared to the physical 
task [640 ms; F(1,14) = 15.1, p= 0.001]. In addition, task interacted with task transition 
[F(1,14) = 8.1, p < 0.05]: the switch cost was larger for the physical task [88 ms; F(1,14) 
= 36.6, p < 0.001] than for the numerical task [57 ms; F(1,14) = 18.2, p < 0.001]. This is 
in line with previous studies demonstrating that it is harder to switch to the easier of two 
tasks, presumably because switching away from a hard task requires greater cognitive 
control to inhibit the harder task than does switching away from an easy task (Monsell, 
Yeung, & Azuma, 2000; Yeung, 2010). However, unlike Yeung (2010), participants did 
not paradoxically choose the harder task (numerical) more often than the easy task 
(physical), as there was no effect of task in the switch rate data presented above (see 
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Liefooghe, Demanet, & Vandierendonck, 2009 for a similar result). No other effects were 
significant. 
ERP Data 
Previous studies using both cued and voluntary task switching have observed a 
greater CNV leading up to the onset of the imperative stimulus in task switch versus 
repeat trials (Lorist, et al., 2000; Vandamme, et al., 2010). This CNV difference is 
thought to reflect the recruitment of cognitive control processes in preparation of a task 
switch. In a previous voluntary task switching study by Vandamme and colleages (2010), 
the task choice was indicated when the target stimulus was presented, meaning that the 
CNV actually predicted whether participants would choose to repeat or switch tasks. This 
is somewhat unsurprising, as the task design permitted the participants to choose the next 
task before the stimuli were presented. However, task choice and the imperative task 
response were indicated by a single button press. Thus, it is unclear whether the greater 
CNV leading up to a switch reflected processes related to preparing for an upcoming 
change in task choice or an upcoming change in task performance. In the current design, 
participants were first cued to choose the next task, and then they were presented with the 
task stimuli, so this may allow us to shed some insight on what preparatory processes the 
CNV reflects.  
In line with these previous studies, a CNV was observed during the response-to-
cue interval which was larger for upcoming task switches versus repeats. The CNV was 
maximal over right central electrode sites, maximal at channel C4. The grand-averaged 
waveform is shown in Figure 5.2. The waveforms appear to differentiate starting at 
around 400 ms. In order to determine when the CNV began to differentiate between an 
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upcoming task switch or repeat, for each participant we extracted the mean CNV 
amplitude at channel C4 between 400 and 600 ms after the response in the previous trial, 
separately for upcoming task switches and repeats. The mean amplitudes were entered 
into a paired t-test. In line with previous studies, the CNV was greater for upcoming task 
switches than for upcoming task repeats [t(14) = 3.1, p < 0.01]. This suggests that the 
CNV reflected preparatory processes for choosing a new task, and not choosing a new 
task. 
We next tested the hypothesis that P3 amplitude reflected the current strength of a 
given task representation. We first sought to replicate the previous finding of larger 
target-stimulus locked P3 amplitude on repeat compared to switch trials (Karayanidis, et 
al., 2003; Kieffaber & Hetrick, 2005; Vandamme, et al., 2010). The grand-averaged 
waveform is shown in Figure 5.3. A P3 component is apparent between 400 and 500 ms 
Figure 5.2. CNV as a function of next trial task transition. 
Grand-averaged waveforms at channel C4 showing activity during the response to cue interval as 
a function of whether the next trial was a task repeat or switch trial. Time zero represents the 
onset of the target response. The time range of the choice cue onset is denoted by the gray line. The 
waveforms were significant different 400-600 ms after the response, with a more negative 
Contingent Negative Variation (CNV) leading up to the choice to switch tasks than leading up to 
the choice to repeat tasks. The dashed rectangle marks the 400-600 ms time range on which 
analyses were performed. The waveforms were baseline corrected with respect to the period of 50 
ms pre-response to 50 ms post-response. 
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after stimulus onset. For each participant, we entered the mean amplitude between 400 
and 450 ms into a repeated measures ANOVA with two within-participants factors: 
current trial task transition (repeat, switch) and next trial task transition (repeat, switch). 
Replicating previous studies, there was a main effect of current trial task transition 
[F(1,14) = 10.2, p < 0.01]: the P3 was larger for current trial repeats than for current trial 
switches. If the P3 reflects task strength, then in line with previous work on the 
availability heuristic (Lien & Ruthruff, 2008), larger P3 amplitude on trial n should 
predict the decision to repeat tasks on trial n+1. In line with our predictions, there was 
also a main effect of next trial transition [F(1,14) = 10.0, p < 0.01], as a larger P3 on the 
current trial was associated with repeating on the next trial as opposed to switching on the 
next trial. 
 
Figure 5.3. P3 as a function of current and next trial task transition. 
Grand-averaged waveforms at channel POz showing target stimulus-locked activity as a function of 
current and next trial task transition (response, switch). There was a P3 component evident around 
400 ms post-response. P3 amplitude differed as a function of current trial and next trial task 
transition. The P3 was more positive on current trial task repeats versus current trial task switches. 
Further, the P3 was more positive when participants subsequently chose to repeat tasks than when 
they subsequently chose to switch tasks. The dashed rectangle marks the 400-450 ms time range on 
which analyses were performed. The waveforms were baseline corrected with respect to the 200 ms 
preceding the response. 
139 
 
 
Discussion 
The current findings demonstrate that the P3 can be used as a measure of task 
strength. These findings are in line with previous findings suggesting that relative task 
strength is an important influence on task choice in the voluntary task switching 
paradigm (Arrington & Logan, 2005; Lien & Ruthruff, 2008; Mayr & Bell, 2006; Orr, et 
al., 2011). Moreover, we show that relative task strength in one trial predict task choice in 
the next trial.  
We also found a larger CNV leading up to choice stimuli on task switch (versus 
repeat) trials. The one previous voluntary task switching study that examined ERPs used 
a variant of the voluntary task switching paradigm where a single response during 
stimulus presentation represented both the current task choice and the current task 
performance (Vandamme, et al., 2010). They found that a greater CNV leading up to 
stimuli presentation was associated with choosing to switch rather than repeat tasks. As 
this study did not temporally separate task choice and task performance, it is not clear 
whether their finding was associated with preparing to choose to switch or preparing to 
perform a task switch. The current study suggests that the CNV is involved in preparing 
to choose to switch. 
However, the exact function of the CNV is not very clear. Most previous ERP 
task switching studies have only discussed the CNV as reflecting preparatory processes 
(Karayanidis, et al., 2003; Karayanidis, et al., 2010; Vandamme, et al., 2010). However, 
one previous study identified a CNV-like switch negativity that they attributed to 
overcoming response inhibition (Astle, Jackson, & Swainson, 2006). Mayr and Keele 
(2000) have suggested that switching requires inhibiting the most recent task. This 
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inhibition appears to occur at the level of the response set, as switch costs are eliminated 
when switching away from a no-go task (Schuch & Koch, 2003). Thus, the CNV may 
reflect overcoming inhibition of a task’s response set.  
If the inhibition account of the CNV is correct, it suggests that when a task choice 
was made, the response set for performing the task was activated. The task performance 
response set of the previous task would need to be inhibited before the next task is 
chosen. The CNV in the current study was localized over right frontal sites. Task choice 
responses were made with the left hand, while task performance responses were made 
with the right hand. Thus, the CNV was contralateral to the task choice response, so is 
unlikely to have been related to processing task performance responses. This weakens 
support for the claim that the CNV is associated with overcoming response set inhibition. 
Furthermore, as there was only one response set active for the task choices, no inhibition 
of the choice response set would be required in order to choose to switch tasks.  
Further, we replicated previous findings that the P3 is larger on current trial 
repeats than current trial switches (Karayanidis, et al., 2003; Kieffaber & Hetrick, 2005; 
Vandamme, et al., 2010). This finding is thought to reflect greater attention to the current 
task stimulus features or a stronger configuration of the current task rules (Barceló, et al., 
2000). These aspects make the P3 an ideal measure of task set strength, which is thought 
to influence task choice in the voluntary task switching paradigm through the availability 
heuristic (Arrington & Logan, 2005).   
Perhaps the most novel finding from this study was that P3 amplitude in one trial 
predicted whether participants chose to repeat or switch in the next trial. This is in line 
with our hypothesis that the P3 represents task strength. Participants in the voluntary task 
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switching paradigm are biased to choose the task whose representation is the strongest; 
this is often the most recently performed task (Mayr & Bell, 2006). The present findings 
suggest that participants are more likely to switch away from a task (versus repeating a 
task) when it has a weaker representation, indexed by P3 amplitude.  
An alternate account of the function of the P3 has been proposed, the context 
updating theory (Donchin, 1981; Donchin & Coles, 1988; Donchin & Coles, 1998). 
According to this account, the P3 reflects cognitive control processes responsible for 
updating the contents of working memory, such as the representation of the current task. 
Accordingly, the amplitude of the P3 has been shown to be proportional to the amount of 
revision required to working memory contents. In line with this finding, the P3 should be 
larger on task switch trials, where it necessary to load a new task representation in to 
working memory, compared to task repeat trials, where the task representation merely 
needs to be maintained. Conversely, however, the P3 is typically larger on task repeat 
trials than on task switch trials (Gehring, Bryck, Jonides, Albin, & Badre, 2003; 
Karayanidis, Coltheart, Michie, & Murphy, 2003 & Murphy, 2003; Kieffaber & Hetrick, 
2005; Mueller, Swainson, & Jackson, 2007 2007; Vandamme, Szmalec, Liefooghe, & 
Vandierendonck, 2010 & Vandierendonck, 2010).  
Of the previous studies to have investigated the P3 in switching studies, only 
Gehring and colleagues (2003) discussed how this finding may relate to context updating. 
They argued that the reduction in P3 amplitude on switch trials may reflect a breakdown 
of the processes maintaining the task representation in working memory. Further, these 
authors found that the P3 on switch trials was reduced when the previous trial was a 
switch compared to a repeat. This is similar to our finding that the P3 was reduced on 
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current switch trials that preceded a task switch versus a task repeat. This further supports 
the hypothesis that the P3 reflects the strength of a task’s representation in working 
memory.  
 The present findings do not speak to the factors that determine the strength of a 
task representation, but inhibition may be one key factor. Switching to a new task 
requires inhibiting the previous task, and this inhibition weakens the representation of the 
task and decays slowly over the course of several trials (Mayr & Keele, 2000). This 
results in participants not returning to a task they recently switched away from for several 
trials (Lien & Ruthruff, 2008). One possible extension of the current study would be to 
examine how the P3 changes when there are three possible tasks, as in Lien and Ruthruff.   
Previous studies have shown that several factors influence the extent to which the 
availability heuristic guides task choice, including stimulus repetitions (Demanet, et al., 
2010; Mayr & Bell, 2006), learned associations of specific stimuli and tasks (Arrington, 
et al., 2010), and the presentation of irrelevant stimuli associated with a specific task (Orr 
& Weissman, 2011). If the finding of a larger P3 associated with choosing to repeat 
(versus switch) on the next trial is related to the availability heuristic, then the P3 may be 
useful in examining other factors thought to influence task choice through the availability 
heuristic. While stimulus repetitions do have a large influence on task choice, participants 
do not always choose to repeat tasks when the stimuli repeat. It may be possible to 
predict whether participants will follow the stimulus repetition bias from the P3 on the 
trial preceding the stimulus repeat. If fewer resources are allocated to stimulus processing 
on the initial trial, then participants may be less likely to follow the stimulus repetition 
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bias. Accordingly, smaller P3 amplitudes may be associated with choosing to switch 
(versus choosing to repeat) tasks when the stimulus repeats on the next trial. 
Arrington and Logan (2005) described the voluntary task switching paradigm as 
involving two, sometimes competing, cognitive control processes. First, cognitive control 
processes are required to choose tasks in a random order, as random sequence generation 
has been shown to rely heavily on these processes (Baddeley, 1996; Baddeley, Emslie, 
Kolodny, & Duncan, 1998). Second, task switching is thought to rely on cognitive 
control processes (Meiran, 1996; Rogers & Monsell, 1995; Rubinstein, Meyer, & Evans, 
2001). When both of these executive processes are activated there will be a high mental 
workload. This will deplete the availability of resources for cognitive control, which 
allows the availability heuristic to have a greater influence on task choice. The P3 has 
been implicated in reflecting mental workload, with reduced P3 amplitudes being 
associated with increased mental workload (Kok, 2001). However, reduced P3 
amplitudes in the current study were associated with switching tasks, which is not 
associated with the availability heuristic. 
The current study demonstrates how ERP data can used to generate predictions of 
upcoming task choices. ERP activity can used to track the engagement of mental 
processes over time, and these fluctuations may result in varying strategies. Similarly, 
previous studies have used P3 amplitude to predict upcoming instances of mind 
wandering (Smallwood, Beach, Schooler, & Handy, 2008). P3 amplitude was reduced 
prior to behavioral and subjective measures of mind wandering, reflecting reduced 
attention to the current task. In addition, EEG synchrony power may be another way to 
track the efficiency of mental processes. Increased synchrony is associated with greater 
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communication between brain regions. When synchrony decreases, this may indicated 
decreased efficiency of brain networks. Accordingly, decreased synchrony in the medial 
prefrontal cortex, which is thought to generate the ERN, has associated with upcoming 
errors (Cavanagh, Cohen, & Allen, 2009).    
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Chapter 6  
General Conclusions 
 
The studies in this dissertation explored how mechanisms of adaptive cognitive 
control influence task selection in multitasking situations. In multitasking environments, 
it is sometimes crucial to flexibly switch from one task to another, while at other times, it 
is crucial to focus on just one task. This dissertation explored the mechanisms involved in 
the latter, where the current task is enhanced in order to minimize distraction or conflict. 
My first two studies demonstrated that successfully resolving conflict during task 
selection lead to better performance in the form of reduced interference from distracters 
(Chapter 2) or reduced switch costs (Chapter 3). Chapter 4 demonstrated that resolving 
response conflict involved a task enhancement which influenced subsequent task choices. 
Chapter 5 demonstrated that the amount of attention (or resources) allocated to 
processing a task could be tracked with the P3 ERP component, and this information 
could be used to predict subsequent task choices.  
Chapter 2 dissociated between two accounts of the role of the ACC in detecting 
and resolving interference. Posner and DiGirolamo (Posner & DiGirolamo, 1998) 
suggested that the ACC is directly involved in allocating control, particularly in 
demanding, distracting situations. A group led by Jonathon Cohen proposed a model that 
shifted the locus of control from the ACC to the DLPFC. They proposed that the ACC 
monitors for conflicts in information processing, and signals the DLPFC to up-regulate 
control (Botvinick, Braver, Barch, Carter, & Cohen, 2001; Botvinick, Nystrom, Fissell, 
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Carter, & Cohen, 1999; Carter, et al., 1998; MacDonald, Cohen, Stenger, & Carter, 
2000). As loci of functional activations in the ACC had previously been shown to be 
heterogeneous (Bush, Luu, & Posner, 2000; Ridderinkhof, Ullsperger, Crone, & 
Nieuwenhuis, 2004), we proposed that different subregions within the ACC may be 
subserve attentional control (or resolving conflict) and detecting response conflict. 
The results in Chapter 2 demonstrated a double dissociation for resolving and 
detecting conflict. A dorsal subregion of the ACC responded more when resolving cue/ 
task conflict (and to a lesser extent during response conflict), and a rostral subregion of 
the ACC responded more when detecting target response conflict and did not respond 
during cue conflict resolution. Participants responded faster to targets following 
incongruent versus congruent cues, and this effect was correlated with the degree to 
which participants activated the dorsal subregion more for incongruent versus congruent 
cues. Furthermore, the pattern of activation in the dorsal subregion closely resembled that 
in the DLPFC, suggesting that these regions may both serve to up-regulate control. 
However, future studies should examine whether the dorsal subregion and the DLPFC act 
in concert, or whether there is a more unidirectional relationship between these regions.  
The dorsal subregion consisted of voxels in area 32' of the ACC as well as in the 
pre-SMA. Rushworth and colleagues (Rushworth, Walton, Kennerley, & Bannerman, 
2004) have proposed that the pre-SMA is involved in action selection, so it may be the 
case that the DLPFC is implementing a more abstract task set and it directs the pre-SMA 
(and possibly area 32') to implement or maintain a response set. While we argued against 
a similar response selection account of our findings in Chapter 3, there is a need for 
future research on this matter. 
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Chapter 3 followed up on Chapter 2, by examining the role of control in 
overriding distraction during voluntary task selection. In the real-world it is often the case 
that we encounter environmental cues that might seize our attention and bias our task 
choices. For instance, we may have the top-down goal of dieting and we encounter a cue, 
such as seeing the dessert menu at a restaurant. This cue may dominate our goals to diet, 
and we may give in and order dessert. The findings of Chapter 3 demonstrate that 
environmental information may bias even simple task choices. In addition, participants 
switched tasks more often when their task choices were biased by the distracter letters. At 
first we thought that maybe participants used the distracter letters to help them to switch 
tasks; perhaps they used the distracter letters to automatically activate the next task 
(Demanet, Liefooghe, Verbruggen, & Vandierendonck, 2010; Waszak, Hommel, & 
Allport, 2003). However, participants showed increased switch costs relative to when 
their task choice was not biased by the distracter letters. This was the case when 
comparing congruent task choices to incongruent or to neutral task choices. So it was not 
only resolving conflict on incongruent choices that was associated with better 
performance compared to congruent choices. The act of going along with the distracter 
letters reflected a reduction of top-down control, and this reduction persisted to influence 
task performance. This study suggests that exerting volitional control during task choice 
may in fact save mental effort later on during task performance.  
In Chapter 4 we presented a novel test of the conflict monitoring model 
(Botvinick, et al., 2001). Some instantiations of the conflict monitoring model simulate 
conflict-driven control with units that increase attention to task relevant stimuli (i.e., the 
flanker task simulation). However, others model such control with units that represent 
154 
 
task goals (i.e., the Stroop task simulation), and along these lines, Botvinick, Cohen, and 
Carter (2004) state more directly that conflict-driven control acts to enhance the 
representation of a task in working memory. However, studies have suggested that 
conflict is resolved by enhancing the representation of task-relevant stimuli and/or 
responses (Banich, et al., 2000; Egner, 2008; Egner & Hirsch, 2005; King, Korb, von 
Cramon, & Ullsperger, 2010; Milham, et al., 2001). Behaviorally, there is no direct 
evidence that conflict-driven control enhances a more abstract task representation as 
opposed to enhancing lower-level stimulus/ response representations. Enhancing the 
goals or rules for a task would have the same effect on RTs as enhancing stimuli or 
responses: generally faster responses with reduced congruency effects. The voluntary 
task switching paradigm introduced a new dependent measure—switch rate—that we 
could use to test whether conflict was resolved by enhancing an abstract task 
representation. People are biased to choose the task with the strongest representation; if 
conflict strengthens a given task’s representation, it followed that there would be a 
greater bias to repeat a task following trials high versus low in conflict. This is precisely 
what we found. 
While Chapter 4 confirmed a key prediction of the conflict monitoring model—
response conflict is resolved by enhancing a task’s representation—this study failed to 
support the hypothesis that errors drive similar control adjustments (Yeung, Botvinick, & 
Cohen, 2004). While we did find that errors led to a bias to repeat tasks—in fact, this was 
a much larger effect than that observed for response conflict—this bias did not seem to 
stem task enhancements. The conflict monitoring model posits that errors should trigger a 
strategic adjustment of control that results in more cautious, slower yet more accurate 
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responding. However, we found that responses following errors were no slower than 
responses following correct responses; further, responses following errors were 
significantly less accurate than responses following correct responses. The repeat bias 
following errors appears to be better explained by alternate accounts of behavioral 
adjustments following errors. Notebaert and colleagues (Notebaert, et al., 2009) have 
proposed that because errors are typically rare events, they may orient attention away 
from the current task. Jentzch and Dudschig (Dudschig & Jentzsch, 2009; Jentzsch & 
Dudschig, 2009) have suggested that error monitoring is a time-consuming process that 
interferes with subsequent processing. Thus, errors may have depleted resources available 
at the time of the task choice, so an availability heuristic may have biased task choice, 
rather than a representativeness heuristic. However, a recent study suggests that the 
presence of post-error improvements in behavior depend on the nature of the error 
(Maier, Yeung, & Steinhauser, 2011). These authors found that behavior improved when 
the errors resulted from failures of selective attention, but not when errors occurred for 
other reasons (e.g., impulsive responding). Chapter 4 was not designed to dissociate 
between errors of different types, so it is not clear whether post-error task choice was 
biased by control processes on some trials and bottom-up process on other trials.  
Chapter 5 examined whether the strength of a task’s representation (independent 
of trial type) in one trial predicted whether participants would repeat or switch on the 
next trial. The P3 ERP component has previously been associated with the amount of 
attention and/or resources allocated to a task (Kok, 2001; Polich, 2007), therefore, we 
used the P3 to track task strength. Choosing to repeat (versus switch) tasks was 
associated with a larger P3 on the prior trial. This provides novel evidence to support the 
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hypothesis that an availability heuristic sometimes guides task choice (Arrington & 
Logan, 2005).  
Matthew Botvinick and his group have recently started a line of work examining 
how the ACC may use conflict detection as an aversive learning signal. People typically 
avoid exerting mental effort, and in multitasking situations, they may use conflict to 
guide their task choices to the easier task (Botvinick, 2007; Kool, McGuire, Rosen, & 
Botvinick, 2010). Chapter 4 appears to show the contrary: participants were biased to 
repeat tasks after trials high in conflict. However, there are several differences in our 
study and the paradigms used by Botvinick. First, participants in our voluntary task 
switching paradigms are instructed to choose the tasks equally often, and in Chapters 3-5 
they successfully followed this instruction. On the contrary, there are no constraints on 
task choice in Botvinick’s studies. Second, the two tasks in our studies were always 
associated with the same amount of conflict, whereas Botvinick’s group uses tasks with 
unequal levels of conflict. Botvinick’s studies examined trends in behavior over the 
course of a series of trials, whereas our studies examined trial-to-trial adjustments in 
behavior. It would be interesting to see whether participants in Botvinick’s studies 
showed similar small-scale task choice biases, or whether such biases existed only early 
in the experiment, but disappeared once participants learned which task was associated 
with more effort.  
Chapter 3 suggests that participants may have avoided effort by choosing the task 
congruent with the distracter letters more often than they chose the alternate task. Yet, 
when participants made congruent task choices, they switched tasks more often than 
when they made incongruent or neutral task choices. Further, task switches on congruent 
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choice trials were slower than task switches on incongruent or neutral choice trials. This 
suggests that exerting less effort while choosing the task was associated with more effort 
during task performance than when more effort was made while choosing the task. One 
way to test this claim would be to use P3 amplitude to track mental effort, as was 
similarly done in Chapter 5. One possibility would be that the P3 associated with the 
target is larger following congruent versus incongruent or neutral choices.  
Future studies may examine the brain networks involved in voluntary task 
selection. There has been a recent focus on demonstrating that the frontal cortex may be 
organized in a hierarchy based on the level of abstraction (for a review, see Badre, 2008). 
More abstract processes, such as subgoaling and task switching, are carried out by rostral 
regions of frontal cortex, and more specific processes (e.g., representing stimulus-
response associations) are carried out by more caudal regions of frontal cortex. The 
paradigm used in Chapter 4 could be carried out in an fMRI scanner to see if conflict in 
one trial was associated with subsequent activation in rostral regions of the later frontal 
cortex that maintain abstract goal representations.  
Recently, it has been demonstrated that the medial frontal cortex (including the 
ACC) has a similar hierarchical organization as the lateral frontal cortex (Kim, Johnson, 
Cilles, & Gold, 2011). Thus, we might predict that resolving task conflict during 
voluntary task selection (as in Chapter 3) would be associated with activity in rostral 
regions of the medial frontal cortex, whereas resolving response conflict (as in Chapter 4) 
might be associated with activity in caudal regions of the medial frontal cortex. However, 
in Chapter 2, we found that the rostral subregion detected response conflict, whereas the 
caudal/ dorsal subregion resolved task conflict. Thus, it is unclear how different regions 
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of the medial frontal cortex might be involved differentially in processing task conflict 
and response conflict, and future research will be needed to understand how the ACC is 
involved in these processes. 
Chapter 3 suggested that task choice depends on a balance of bottom-up and top-
down processes. Future studies may examine if the trade-off between bottom-up and top-
down influences on task choice depends on the strength of task-related functional 
connectivity between frontal control regions and posterior sensory and association 
regions. Weaker functional connectivity may be associated with congruent task choices, 
and stronger functional connectivity may be associated with incongruent and neutral task 
choices. 
The studies in my dissertation suggest that resolving distraction during task 
selection in multitasking situations leads participants to focus more on the current task, 
making them more likely to continue performing a given task. This suggests that 
distraction actually makes participants less likely to multitask. But would conflict or 
distraction lead to a repeat bias in real-world multitasking environments? As suggested in 
Chapter 1, we may use conflict to detect when one task needs more of our attention than 
other possible tasks. When we are driving in a more demanding environment (e.g., a busy 
highway) we focus more on the current task. However, in a situation such as this, the task 
of driving has a clear priority over other possible tasks. In the current studies, the tasks 
were given equal priority, and there was no reward. Future studies should examine how 
manipulating relative priority or reward of tasks influences the effect of conflict on task 
choice. While participants would likely show a bias of choosing the task with the higher 
reward/ priority, it is unclear whether experiencing conflict during a low priority/ reward 
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task would lead to a repeat bias. It may be that the conflict-driven repeat bias is not strong 
enough to overcome a bias towards reward. Answering these questions would provide 
insight on how we manage task choices in the real world.   
  
160 
 
References 
Arrington, C. M., & Logan, G. D. (2005). Voluntary task switching: chasing the elusive 
homunculus. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and 
Cognition, 31(4), 683-702. doi: 10.1037/0278-7393.31.4.683 
Badre, D. (2008). Cognitive control, hierarchy, and the rostro-caudal organization of the 
frontal lobes. [doi: 10.1016/j.tics.2008.02.004]. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 
12(5), 193-200.  
Banich, M. T., Milham, M. P., Atchley, R., Cohen, N. J., Webb, A., Wszalek, T., et al. 
(2000). fMRI studies of stroop tasks reveal unique roles of anterior and posterior 
brain systems in attentional selection. Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience, 12(6), 
988-1000.  
Botvinick, M. M. (2007). Conflict monitoring and decision making: reconciling two 
perspectives on anterior cingulate function. Cognitive, Affective, & Behavioral 
Neuroscience, 7(4), 356. doi: 10.3758/CABN.7.4.356 
Botvinick, M. M., Braver, T. S., Barch, D. M., Carter, C. S., & Cohen, J. D. (2001). 
Conflict monitoring and cognitive control. Psychological Review, 108(3), 624-
652. doi: 10.1037/0033-295X.108.3.624 
Botvinick, M. M., Cohen, J. D., & Carter, C. S. (2004). Conflict monitoring and anterior 
cingulate cortex: an update. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 8(12), 539-546. doi: 
10.1016/j.tics.2004.10.003 
Botvinick, M. M., Nystrom, L. E., Fissell, K., Carter, C. S., & Cohen, J. D. (1999). 
Conflict monitoring versus selection-for-action in anterior cingulate cortex. 
Nature, 402(6758), 179-180.  
161 
 
Bush, G., Luu, P., & Posner, M. I. (2000). Cognitive and emotional influences in anterior 
cingulate cortex. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 4(6), 215-222.  
Carter, C. S., Braver, T. S., Barch, D. M., Botvinick, M. M., Noll, D., & Cohen, J. D. 
(1998). Anterior cingulate cortex, error detection, and the online monitoring of 
performance. Science, 280(5364), 747-749.  
Demanet, J., Liefooghe, B., Verbruggen, F., & Vandierendonck, A. (2010). Voluntary 
task switching under load: Contribution of top-down and bottom-up factors in 
goal-directed behavior. Psychonomic Bulletin & Review, 17(3), 387-393. doi: 
10.3758/PBR.17.3.387 
Dudschig, C., & Jentzsch, I. (2009). Speeding before and slowing after errors: Is it all just 
strategy? Brain Research, 1296, 56-62. doi: 10.1016/j.brainres.2009.08.009 
Egner, T. (2008). Multiple conflict-driven control mechanisms in the human brain. 
Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 12(10), 374-380. doi: 10.1016/j.tics.2008.07.001 
Egner, T., & Hirsch, J. (2005). Cognitive control mechanisms resolve conflict through 
cortical amplification of task-relevant information. Nat Neurosci, 8(12), 1784-
1790. doi: 10.1038/nn1594 
Jentzsch, I., & Dudschig, C. (2009). Why do we slow down after an error? Mechanisms 
underlying the effects of posterror slowing. The Quarterly Journal of 
Experimental Psychology, 62(2), 209-218. doi: 10.1080/17470210802240655 
Kim, C., Johnson, N. F., Cilles, S. E., & Gold, B. T. (2011). Common and Distinct 
Mechanisms of Cognitive Flexibility in Prefrontal Cortex. The Journal of 
neuroscience, 31(13), 4771-4779. doi: 10.1523/jneurosci.5923-10.2011 
162 
 
King, J. A., Korb, F. M., von Cramon, D. Y., & Ullsperger, M. (2010). Post-Error 
Behavioral Adjustments Are Facilitated by Activation and Suppression of Task-
Relevant and Task-Irrelevant Information Processing. Journal of Neuroscience, 
30(38), 12759-12769. doi: 10.1523/jneurosci.3274-10.2010 
Kok, A. (2001). On the utility of P3 amplitude as a measure of processing capacity. 
Psychophysiology, 38(3), 557-577.  
Kool, W., McGuire, J. T., Rosen, Z. B., & Botvinick, M. M. (2010). Decision making and 
the avoidance of cognitive demand. Journal of Experimental Psychology: 
General, 139(4), 665-682. doi: 10.1037/a0020198 
MacDonald, A. W., Cohen, J. D., Stenger, V. A., & Carter, C. S. (2000). Dissociating the 
role of the dorsolateral prefrontal and anterior cingulate cortex in cognitive 
control. Science, 288, 1835-1838.  
Maier, M. E., Yeung, N., & Steinhauser, M. (2011). Error-related brain activity and 
adjustments of selective attention following errors. NeuroImage, 56(4), 2339-
2347. Doi: 10.1016/j.neuroimage.2011.03.083 
Milham, M. P., Banich, M. T., Webb, A., Barad, V., Cohen, N. J., Wszalek, T., et al. 
(2001). The relative involvement of anterior cingulate and prefrontal cortex in 
attentional control depends on nature of conflict. Brain Research: Cognitive Brain 
Research, 12, 467-473.  
Notebaert, W., Houtman, F., Opstal, F. V., Gevers, W., Fias, W., & Verguts, T. (2009). 
Post-error slowing: An orienting account. Cognition, 111(2), 275-279.  
Polich, J. (2007). Updating P300: An integrative theory of P3a and P3b. Clinical 
Neurophysiology, 118(10), 2128-2148. doi: 10.1016/j.clinph.2007.04.019 
163 
 
Posner, M. I., & DiGirolamo, G. J. (1998). Executive attention: Conflict, target detection, 
and cognitive control. In R. Parasuraman (Ed.), The attentive brain. (pp. 401-
423). Cambridge, MA, US: The MIT Press. 
Ridderinkhof, K. R., Ullsperger, M., Crone, E. A., & Nieuwenhuis, S. (2004). The role of 
the medial frontal cortex in cognitive control. Science, 306(5695), 443-447. doi: 
10.1126/science.1100301 
Rushworth, M. F. S., Walton, M. E., Kennerley, S. W., & Bannerman, D. M. (2004). 
Action sets and decisions in the medial frontal cortex. Trends in Cognitive 
Sciences, 8(9), 410-417. doi: 10.1016/j.tics.2004.07.009 
Waszak, F., Hommel, B., & Allport, A. (2003). Task-switching and long-term priming: 
Role of episodic stimulus-task bindings in task-shift costs. Cognitive Psychology, 
46(4), 361-413.  
Yeung, N., Botvinick, M. M., & Cohen, J. D. (2004). The neural basis of error detection: 
Conflict monitoring and the error-related negativity. Psychological Review, 
111(4), 931-959. doi: 10.1037/0033-295X.111.4.931 
 
 
 
 
